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Foreword 
1.  In a  few  months  from  now,  the  euro- will  be  a  reality.  By  creating  the  single 
currency,  Europe will  be  offering its  citizens,  its  children and its  partners  in the 
wider world a more concrete symbol of the common destiny it has freely chosen: 
that of  building a community based on peace and prosperity. 
2.  On  1 January 1999  Member States  will  for  the  first  time  be  embracing  a  single 
currency, at the end of  a long process involving sovereign political decisions on the 
part of the  Heads  of State  or  Government and  culminating  in fulfilment  of the 
economic conditions necessary for its success. 
3.  The introduction of  the euro confirms the advent of  a genuine culture of stability in 
Europe  that  is  essential  to  the  establishment  of a  stable,  sound  and  efficiently 
managed economic framework.  It is  also a response to  globalisation and current 
developments in the world economy.  While the euro will not, on its own, enable the 
scourge of unemployment to be swept away, without the euro the prioritY assigned 
to the jobs struggle would be deprived of  a key instrument. Economic and monetary 
union (EMU) will revitalise the European economy and the single market,  foster 
investment,  boost  business  competitiveness,  benefit  consumers  and  savers,  and 
make life easier for citizens where both work and travel are concerned. 
4.  The  repercussions  of this major event will  be felt  beyond the  boundaries of the 
Union:  use  of the  euro  will  spread  on the  international  scene.  The  euro  will 
gradually come to be one of  the world's leading transaction, investment and reserve 
currencies.  It will demonstrate the existence and the unity of Europe to its partners 
and will help to make the international monetary system more stable. 
5.  On  the  eve  of the  arrival  of the  euro,  an  economic  recovery  conducive  to 
employment is under way,  now that inflation has  been brought under control and 
public fmances are being placed on a sounder footing in Europe.  Progress towards 
economic  and  monetary  union  is  beginning  to  yield  tangible  results.  The 
Commission's convergence report bears witness to this: in the space of  a few years, 
the  Member States  have  made  great  strides  in  bringing  their  economies  closer 
together and improving their economic performances.  The Commission therefore 
recommends  to  the  Council  that  eleven  Member States  adopt  the  euro  on 
1 January 1999: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. 6.  The decisions taken by the governments and the instruments laid dpwn in the Treaty 
require  the  Member States  to  press  ahead:  only  the  achievement  of budgetary 
balance in the medium term will restore some room for manoeuvre in steering their 
economic policies.  Budget consolidation and a balanced policy mix will facilitate 
the smooth management of economic and  monetary union.  The maintenance of 
price stability, thanks to an independent European Central Bank and to the closer 
coordination at Community level of national economic policies, will ensure that it 
functions harmoniously and effectively. 
7.  Europe will,  however,  reap  full  benefit from  economic and  monetary union if it 
proves capable at the same time of making significant progress in other areas of 
policy, be it employment or taxation. 
8.  Concern for  the well-being of future  generations  should prompt us  to  make  the 
necessary efforts.  And the need to adapt Europe's economic and social structures,· 
on the threshold of the 21st century,  leaves us  no alternative.  On this condition 
alone will the cyclical upturn discernible today and the impetus given by the creation 
of  the euro usher in an era of  lasting progress and sustainable growth in Europe. 
THE EURO, A CURRENCY WITH LASTING STABILITY 
9.  By  ratifying  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the  Member States  opted  for  stability  after 
leaniing from experience that high levels of inflation, the accumulation of public 
deficits and high long-term interest rates distort business decisions and expectations, 
shift  the  burden  of a  short-lived  recovery  onto  future  generations  and  deter 
investment, slow down growth and hold back job creation. 
10.  The  achievement  of a  high  degree  of convergence  between  Member States' 
economies  lays  the  foundations  for  a  stable  economic  framework  in  the 
European Union.  This  framework  now  has  to  be  safeguarded  and  solidly 
underpinned. 
Convergence is now an established fact in Europe 
11.  Creation of the single  currency  satisfies  the  need  for  stability  on which  growth 
depends: the collapse of the international monetary system in 1971  and the lack of 
tools for economic and monetary cooperation between the Member States caused 
inflation to soar out of  control, growth to fall sharply and unemployment to surge in 
Europe. 
12.  Europe  responded  to  this  challenge  by  putting  in  place  machinery  for  ensuring 
economic and financial  solidarity.  From  1979 onwards, the establishment of the 
European Monetary System and the creation of  the ecu thus gave birth to an area of 
stability which helped to curb inflation and to stabilise exchange rates between most 
of  the Member States. 13.  But the globalisation of the economy and the turbulent international environment 
called for a response commensurate with what is at stake in European integration: it 
had become essential, in order to secure a deeper single market, to shelter it from 
erratic  exchange-rate  fluctuations.  By  signing the Treaty  on European Union in 
1992,  the  Member States  confirmed  their  determination  to  ensure  that  goods, 
services, people and capital can move freely,  to facilitate genuine convergence of 
economic  policies  and  to  provide  Europe  with  a  single  currency  before  the 
year 2000. 
14.  Often put to the  test in recent years, that political resolve has  never faltered.  Its 
credibility  is  founded  on a  deep-seated  and  oft-repeated  conviction that,  in  the 
interests  of Europe  and  of its  Member States,  the  objectives,  conditions  and 
timetable  for  achieving  economic  and  monetary  union  as  laid  down  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty must be scrupulously adhered to.  The record of  the last few years 
is impressive: 
•  the  outstanding  progress  made  by  Member States  demonstrates  the  extent  to 
which their economies have  converged.  The  average  rate of inflation in the 
Community has fallen substantially and is now under the 2% mark in nearly all 
Member States.  The average general government deficit in the Community fell 
from 6.1% of GDP in 1993 to 2.4% in 1997, allowing a structural reduction in 
the government debt ratio.  These achievements have enabled long-term interest 
rates  to  fall  sharply,  thereby  benefiting  investment  and  growth,  and  have 
strengthened exchange-rate stability within the EMS.  On the basis of  the analysis 
set out in this report, the Commission therefore recommends to the Council that 
eleven Member States  adopt the  euro  on _1  January 1999  since  they fulfil  the 
necessary conditions; 
•  the institutional stages of  the process have been in line with the provisions of  the 
Treaty  as  spelled  out  in  the  reference  scenario  adopted  by  the  Madrid 
European Council  in  December 1995:  the  legal  and  technical  framework 
(stability  and  growth  pact,  legal  status of the  euro,  new  European  monetary 
system, etc.) crucial to the smooth operation of  EMU is now in place; 
•  since publication of the Commission's Green Paper in May 1995, the necessary 
preparations for introducing the euro on 1 January 1999 have been carried out 
with determination,  precision and  vigour  by  the  Community  institutions,  the 
Member States and economic agents, who are awaiting the decision of  the Heads 
of  State or Government to launch EMU in order to reap the fruit of  their labours. 
The Commission recommendation provides the legal basis for that decision to be 
taken at the European Council on 2 May. 
3 15.  Even  before  the  single  currency  is  introduced,  confidence  is  being  restored  in 
Europe.  The fact that inflation has been brought under control, that public finances 
have been placed on a. sounder footing and that interest rates have fallen to all-time 
lows are the reasons behind the present economic recovery, which is creating jobs, 
and the stable monetary conditions in Europe despite the Asian crisis.  Growth is 
back: it has risen from 1.8% ofGDP in 1996 to 2.7% in 1997.  And the forecasts are 
fot:  2.8% in 1998 and 3.0% in 1999.  Europe is expected to create 3.4 million jobs 
over the three years between 1997 and 1999. 
16.  These encouraging economic ac.hievements augur well for the success of the euro. 
The  large  number of Member States  which  fulfil  from  the  outset the  necessary 
conditions  for  the  changeover  to  the  single  currency  demonstrates  that  the 
European Union  has  satisfactorily  prepared  the  ground  for  this  new  phase  of 
European integration.  It has found the way back to  stability, the lasting nature of 
which  should  enable  it  to  reap  the  substantial  benefits  that  will  flow  from  the . 
credibility of  the euro. 
The Union has started out on the road to lasting stability 
17.  For this purpose, the Treaty offers a number of  essential guarantees: 
•  the independence of  the European Central Bank (ECB), the main objective being 
to maintain price stability.  Without prejudice to this objective, the ECB will lend 
its support to general policies within the Community with a view to contributing 
to lasting growth, a high degree of  convergence and a high level of  employment; 
•  the maintenance of  sound public finances: the pooling of  the currency imposes an 
obligation on everyone to observe strict economic and budgetary discipline.  The 
Commission intends to play its full  part and in particular to ensure compliance 
with the provisions of  the stability and growth pact; 
•  the instruments  necessary  for  strengthening  surveillance  and  coordinating  the 
economic policies of the Member States in the euro area:  the Commission will 
assume  all  its  responsibilities  with regard  to  the  permanent  operation  of the 
relevant procedures. 
18.  The  political  resolve  of governments  is  essential  for  the  success  of EMU. 
Reasonable and responsible  behaviour on the part of the national  authorities and 
economic agents  is  even more important than mere compliance with the rules of 
procedure.  It determines the future of  the European economies.  The determination 
of governments  has  enabled  all. the  Member States  to  reduce  their  government 
deficits and to reap the initial positive results.  The same attitude should commit 
them, in the medium term, to pursue the objective of a budget which is  close to 
balance or in surplus.  This commitment forms part of  the stability and growth pact. 
4 . 19.  The Member States, having learnt from past experience ~d  errors, must seize the 
opportunity  that  the  euro  now  offers  to  exploit  their  improved  economic 
environment in order to  further  consolidate public finances  and to conduct their 
budgetary policies in such a way as to restore the room for manoeuvre which they 
still lack.  Expenditure must, sooner or later, be p~d  for: the objective of  a balanced 
budget in the medium term must be attained, if  only to enable Europe to prepare for 
the consequences of the inevitable ageing of its population as the next millennium 
dawns.  To act otherwise would mean bequeathing to future generations the burden 
of  deficits accumulated by their parents. 
20.  All the Member States are  concerned,  whether or not they take part in EMU on 
1 January 1999, since they are all potential members.  Progress towards convergence 
will be facilitated by the consultations on economic, budgetary and financial matters 
provided/for in the Treaty, by the provisions of the stability and growth pact that 
apply to the non-euro countries and by the option they have of joining the new 
exchange-rate mechanism. 
21.  The political resolve_ofthose in power, the progress made towards convergence, the 
guarantees offered by the Treaty and the coordination and surveillance mechanisms 
established by the conclusions and resolutions of  the Amsterdam European Council 
will all confer on the euro a measure of  credibility equal to that enjoyed today by the 
currencies  of  the  best-performing  Member States.  The  euro  represents  an 
opportunity for the future of  Europe; it is up to Europe to seize it. 
THE EURO, A FRESH IMPETUS FOR EUROPE 
22.  Since  the  Communities  were  established,  economic  cooperation  and  monetary 
cooperation  have  taken  it  in  turns  to  strengthen  European  integration:  the 
determination  to  complete  the  customs  union  and  the  dismantling  of barriers 
between the Member States set the scene for the EMS.  This permitted and then 
spurred on completion of  the single market, which will be consolidated by the euro. 
EMU will impart fresh impetus to the construction of  Europe.  But, for this, its full 
potential must be exploited. 
EMU: an opportunity for employment-friendly policies 
23.  The foundations of an employment-friendly economic policy are a balanced policy 
mix,  sustained  convergence  and  monetary  stability.  EMU  will  lay  these 
foundations.  But their full impact on employment will not be felt unless they are 
accompanied by significant progress in the area of  structural adjustment. 
5 24.  The room for manoeuvre within the budget must be devoted to  reducing  social 
security contributions on wages, and especially low wages.  If the cost of labour is 
reduced, firms will be encouraged to take on more workers. Job creation will be 
fostered by more flexible goods, services and labour markets and by a reorganisation 
of  work within industries and firms as part of  negotiations between management and 
unions.  Lastly, the near-disappearance of inflation means that a closer link can be 
established between pay levels and worker productivity which will make it easier for 
management  and  unions  to  conduct  a  responsible  wage  policy  conducive  to 
employment. 
25.  The  European Union must from now on obey the  imperatives of (i) encouraging 
entrepreneurship, in particular in small and medium-sized businesses, by reducing 
.  red tape and providing easier access to capital markets, (ii) according research the 
priority it should enjoy under any.future-oriented policy, and (iii) undertaking the 
efforts needed to educate and train individuals. 
26.  The  early  implementation  of the  new  title  on  employment  in  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam was reflected in the conclusions of  the Extraordinary European Council 
meeting held in J.,uxembourg in November 1997, which opens up new prospects in 
the struggle for jobs.  Objectives were jointly agreed, a working method was devised 
and multilateral surveillance of  results was introduced.  Once EMU is launched, the 
Member States  will  have  available  more  effective  instruments  to  promote 
employment policies and structural reforms at national level.  In this respect, the 
euro  presents  an outstanding  opportunity to  sever the  link  between  deficit  and 
unemployment and to trigger the dynamics of  stability and employment. 
EMU: a deepening of  the single market 
27.  The euro is an essential complement of  the single market. It will bring to an end the 
exchange-rate fluctuations between the participating Member States, which, in the 
past, have managed in one fell swoop to wipe out the productivity gains achieved by 
businesses and their workers with considerable effort.  Low inflation. and interest 
rates  and  more  predictable  growth  will  reduce  the  uncertainties  that  impede 
· investment decisions.  Lastly, by eliminating the exchange risk, the euro will make 
firms more competitive and will-if  they put preparations  swiftly in hand- give 
them the springboard from which to withstand competition in the global economy. 
At  Community  level,  the  remaining  barriers  to  trade  must  be  dismantled  and 
progress made towards tax harmonisation so that the benefits. are maximised. 
6 28.  For consumers, as well as  for the enterprises which buy,  sell, work or invest in 
another Member State, the euro will improve the transparency of  trade, will sharpen 
competition and will enable consumers to purchase goods at better piices and firms 
to become more competitive.  Combined with the freedom of movement provided 
for in the Treaty, the single currency will thus promote unification of  the goods and 
services  markets,  improvements  in investment quality and integration within the 
single market.  The euro will lastly herald the birth of the "European consumer", 
whose purchasing power will be guaranteed by the stability of the single currency. 
But in order to benefit from keener competition, which will now be felt even in the 
most outlying areas of the Union, the arrangements for providing consumers with 
better information will have to be strengthened. 
29.  The creation of a  large euro capital market in  1999 will radically alter financial 
markets for the benefit of firms and households through increased competition and 
an improvement in the quality of  service.  This development is already discernible as 
financial  institutions  prepare  for  the  euro.  All  economic  agents  will  ultimately 
benefit from the availability of  loans or borrowings in one and the same currency on 
a larger and more liquid market and under conditions of transparency, equality of 
access and cost that are similar to those prevailing for the dollar.  This will lead to 
permanently low interest rates that will benefit households and firms.  Under these 
conditions, the introduction of  the euro must be accompanied by an acceleration in 
the reforms needed to improve the effic~ency of  financial markets. 
30.  Finally, the introduction of euro notes and coins on 1 January 2002 will constitute 
the final  stage of EMU.  Thanks to the complete elimination offoreign-exchange 
transaction costs, it will lead to savings and simplifications in the lives of  European 
citizens.  The general public must be prepared now for this change so as to pre-empt 
any fears  it might arouse.  In addition to its economic and monetary aspects, the 
introduction  of euro  notes  and  coins  should  provide  hundreds  of millions  of 
Europeans with a material and concrete symbol of  their common identity. 
EMU: a European presence on the international seene 
31.  In adopting the euro, the peoples of Europe have decided to occupy a place on the 
international scene that is commensurate with their history and their economic and 
commercial strength.  In so doing, they are demonstrating their unity to the rest of 
the world and are asserting their presence in the monetary sphere. 
32.  At the  heart of an integrated  international  economic  system  in which trade  and 
financial flows are becoming increasingly mobile, they are establishing a wide area 
of  stability and prosperity which will minimise uncertainty for economic agents. 
7 33.  At the same time, with better use of  the complementarities between Member States' 
economies, the single currency will enable Europe to become more outward-looking 
by reinforcing its global position and role.  The euro is suited to taking on the mantle 
of one of the  leading  international  currencies.  Firstly,  it will  rapidly  become  a 
currency in which world trade is conducted and invoiced, reflecting Europe's huge 
importance in this sphere.  Secondly, the euro's credibility, allied to a large and very 
liquid  financial  market,  will  attract  foreign  investment.  Lastly,  the  euro's 
development will  increasingly  confer  on  it the  status  of an  international  reserve 
currency. 
34.  More fundamentally, the euro, through its recognised stability and widespread use, 
will  help  establish  a  better  balance  in  international  monetary  relations,  offering 
Europe the opportunity, together with its principal partners, to find ways of making 
the international monetary system more stable.  But, in order for Europe to derive all 
the external benefits it is entitled to expect from the creation of  the euro and in order 
for it to play its rightful role on the international scene, it must be able to speak with 
one voice.  This is essential if  it is to defend its interests as effectively as possible. 
35.  Lastly,  the  single  currency  will  consolidate  the  achievements  of  more  than 
forty years of cooperation at a time when Europe is embarking on a new era in its 
history, namely enlargement to include the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
Cyprus and the  Baltic countries.  The prosperity brought about by the economic 
integration of  the present Member States and the attraction of  the euro will give the 
prospective member countries the  incentive to  take the  rapid  steps  necessary for 
them to become full members of the European Union.  The extension of European 
integration throughout the continent will guarantee stability and peace in the future. 
-oOo-
36.  The  attached  report  takes  stock  of the  progress  made  by  the  Member States  in 
fulfilling  their obligations  regarding  the  achievement of economic  and  monetary 
union.  In accordance with the  Treaty,  this assessment examines whether a high 
degree  of sustainable  convergence  has been achieved  by  analysing  the  extent to 
which  each  Member State  has  satisfied  the  convergence  criteria  laid  down  in 
Article 109j  of the Treaty.  The  other conditions and factors  provided for  in that 
Article are also examined.  On the basis of its assessment· and of the report by the 
European Monetary Institute, the Commission recommends to the Council that the 
following  Member States  adopt  the  euro  on  1 January 1999:  Belgium,  Germany, 
Spain, France, Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal and 
Finland. 
8 3  7.  Greece and Sweden have also made progress towards convergence. They are urged 
to continue their efforts so as to enable them to join the first group of  participants in 
the euro following a further review of  progress in two years' time, or sooner if  one 
of  them so requests.  · 
38.  The United Kingdom and Denmark will be assessed when they notify the Council of 
their intention to participate in the third stage,  in accordance with the  protocols 
annexed to the Treaty. 
-oOo-
39.  The picture painted  in this  report  is  one of collective  success:  drawing on past 
experience and availing themselves of  the instruments put in place by the Treaty on 
European Union, all the Member States have for several years now been engaged in 
efforts to promote convergence that are now beginning to bear fruit in the form of  a 
resumption of  growth.  Adoption of  the euro Will crown those ~ndeavours by giving 
Europeans  an  instrument  which  will  consolidate  the  stability of their  economic 
framework, foster trade within the single market, strengthen their competitiveness 
and bolster their position on the international scene. 
40.  This is also the picture of an economy which has reached maturity.  The European 
Central Bank will be responsible for safeguarding price stability.  The Commission 
and  the  Council  will  make  determined  efforts  to  improve  economic-policy 
coordination.  The Member States, for their part, will have to press ahead with their 
convergence efforts, strengthen the responsibility of all economic actors and carry 
out structural reforms in order to restore healthy and sustainable growth to Europe. 
It  is only through the exercise of this collective responsibility that the euro,  the 
common property of  all citizens of  the Union, will guarantee prosperity and promote 
employment. 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation in accordance with article 109j(2) 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
Article 1  09j of  the Treaty lays down the procedure and timetable for taking decisions on 
the passage to the third stage of  EMU. The Council, meeting in  Dublin on 13 December 
1996 in the composition of Heads of State or Government decided that there· was not a 
majority of  Member States fulfilling the necessary conditions for the adoption of  a single 
currency, that the Community would not enter the third stage of EMU in 1997 and that 
the procedure laid down in Article 109j(4) of the Treaty should be applied as early as 
possible in. 1998. According to paragraph 4 of  Article 1  09j the procedure provided for in 
paragraphs  1 and 2  of that same  article,  with the  exception of the second indent of 
paragraph 2, have to be repeated. The Commission and the EMI must therefore present to 
the Council a report on the progress made in the fulfilment by the Member States of  their 
obligations regarding the achievement of  economic and monetary union;  subsequently 
and based on these reports the Commission submits to the Council a recommendation on 
which Member States fulfil the necessary conditions to adopt the single currency. 
The Commission convergence report has been adop~  by the college on 25 March 1998. 
The  EMI  has  adopted its report on 24 March.  The Commission and the EMI  reports  . 
include  an  examination  of the  compatibility  between  each  Member  State's  national 
legislation, including the statutes of  its national central bank, and Articles 107 and 108 of 
the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The reports also examine the achievement of a 
high degree of sustainable Convergence by reference to the fulfilment by each Member 
State of the convergence criteria.  The  reports  of the Commission and EMI also take 
account of the development of the ECU, the results of the integration of markets, the 
situation  and  development  of the  balance  of payments  on  current  account  and  an 
examination of  the development of  unit labour costs and other price indices. 
In its report the Commission presents its arguments showing that Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have corrected 
their excessive deficit situation. Consequently, the Commission is adopting and sending 
to the Council on 25 March 1998, for each of these Member States, a recommendation 
for the Council to abrogate, in accordance with Article 104c(12), its previous decisions 
on the.existence-of an excessive deficit in those Member States. If  the Council acts upon 
the  Commission recommendations  than  the  said Member States,  in the  terms  of the 
Treaty,  are  considered  to have  fulfilled  the  convergence  criterion  on the  budgetary 
position. 
P-ae1 of2 The  Commission,  after  examining,  in  its  convergence  report,  the  fulfilment  by  each 
Member State of the convergence criteria,  considers  that a high degree of sustainable 
convergence  has  been  achieved  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland; because they are exercising 
their opt-outs, it is not necessary to  assess whether Denmark and the United Kingdom 
fulfil the other necessary conditions for the adoption of  a single currency. 
On the  basis of its  report  and  that of EMI  the  Commission  is  recommending  to  the 
Council  that  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal and  Finland  fulfil  the  conditions  for  adopting  a  single 
currency. 
Page 2 of2 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR A 
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION . 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 109J (2) OF THE TREATY 
The Council of  the European Union, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  esta~lishing the  European  Community,  and  in  particular  Article  109j, 
paragraph 2 thereof, 
.  Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission, 
Having regard to the report from the Commission  1, 
Having regard to the report from the European Monetary Institute2, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament, 
1.  Whereas  the  procedure  and  timetable  for  taking  decisions  on the  passage  to  the  third  stage  of 
economic and monetary union (EMU) are laid down in Article 109j; whereas the Council, meeting in 
Dublin on 13 December 1996 in the composition of  Heads of  State or Government decided that there 
was not a majority of Member States fulfilling the· necessary conditions for the adoption of a single 
currency, that the Community would not enter the third stage of  EMU in 1997 and that the procedure 
laid down in Article 109j(4) of  the Treaty should be applied as early as possible in 1998; 
2.  Whereas in accordance with paragraph 4 of  Article 109j the procedure provided for in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of that same  article,  with the  exception of the  second  indent of paragraph 2,  have  to  be 
repeated; 
3.  Whereas Article  I 09j( 1) lays down that the reports prepared by the Commission and the European 
Monetary Institute shall include an examination of the compatibility between each Member State's 
national legislation, including the statutes of  its national central bank, and Articles 1  07 and 1  08 of  the 
Treaty  and  the  Statute  of the  European  System  of Central  Banks  and  shall  also  examine  the 
achievement of a  high  degree of sustainable  convergence  by  reference to the  fulfilment  by each 
Member State of  the following criteria: 
- the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate of inflation 
which is  close to that of,  at most,  the three best performing Member States in terms of price 
stability; 
- the sustainability of  the government financial position; this will be apparent from having achieved 
a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as  determined in accordance 
with Article 104c(6); 
1 COM(  ....  ) 
2 Reference 
Page1 of9 - the observance of  the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of 
the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the currency of 
any other Member State; 
- the  durability  of convergence  achieved  by *  Member  State  and  of its  participation  in  the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the  European Monetary  System  being reflected  in  the  long-term 
interest-rate levels;  -
Whereas  these  four  criteria  and  the  relevant  periods  over  which  they  are  to  be  respected  are 
developed further in Protocol No 6; whereas the reports of the Commission and the EMI shall also 
take account of the development of the ecu, the results of the integration of markets, the situation 
and  development  of the  balances  of payments  on  current  account  and  an  examination  of the 
development of  unit labour costs and other price indices; 
4.  Whereas according to the fll'St  indent of Article 1  09j(2), on the basis of these reports, the Council 
shall assess, for each Member State, whether it fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of a 
single currency and shall recommend its findings to the Council meeting in the composition of  the . 
Heads of  State or  Government which, after having consul~d  the European Parliament, in accordance 
with Article  109j(4),  shall  confirm  which Member States fulfil  the necessary  conditions  for  the 
adoption of a single currency; whereas for  Denmark and the United Kingdom one such necessary 
condition is the notification to the Council in accordance with Protocols No 12 and 11  respectively, 
that their country intends to participate in the third stage of  EMU; 
5.  Whereas Member States' national legislation including the statutes of national central banks shall as 
nec~ssary be adapted with a view to ensuring compatibility with Articles 107 and 1  08 of  the Treaty 
and the Statute of  the ESCB; whereas such adaptations need to ensure compatibility with the Treaty at 
the latest at the date of  the establishment of  the ESCB; whereas the reports of  the Commission and the 
EMI provide a detailed assessment of  the compatibility of  the legislation of  each Member State with 
Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the statute of  the ESCB; 
6.  Whereas according to Article 1 of  Protocol No 6 the criterion on price stability referred to in the first 
indent of  Article 109j(l) shall mean that a Member State has a price performance that is sustainable 
and an average rate of  inflation, observed over a period of  one year before the examination, that does 
not exceed by more than  1% percentage points that of,  at most, the three best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability; whereas for the purpose of the criterion on price stability inflation 
will be measured by harmonised indices of consumer price (HICPs) defined in Council Regulation 
(EC) n° 2494/95; whereas in order to assess the price stability criterion a Member State's inflation has 
been measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of  twelve monthly indices relative 
to the arithmetic average of twelve monthly indices of the previo~ period; whereas in the one year 
period ending in January 1998 the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability 
were France, Ireland and Austria, with inflation rates of, respectively 1.2%, 1.2% and 1.1 %; whereas 
a reference value calculated as the simple arithmetic average of  the inflation rates of the three best 
performing Member States in terms of  price stability plus 1.5 percentage points was considered in the 
reports of  the Commission and the EMI; whereas the reference value in the one year period ending in 
January 1998 was2.7%; 
7.  Whereas according to Article 2 of  Protocol No 6 the criterion on the government budgetary position 
referred to in the second indent of  Article 109j(l) shall mean that at the time of  the examination the 
Member State is not the subject of a Council decision under Article  104c(6) of this Treaty that an 
excessive deficit exists; 
8.  Whereas according to Article 3 of Protocol No 6 the criterion on participation in the exchange-rate . 
mechanism of  the European Monetary System referred to in the third indent of  Article 109j(l) shall 
mean  that  a  Member  State  has  respected  the  nonnal  fluctuation  margins  provided  for  by the 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at 
least  the  last two  years  before  the  examination.  In  particular,  the  Member  State  shall  not  have 
devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency on its  own 
initiative for the same period. Whereas in assessing the fulfilment of  this criterion in their reports, the 
Commission and the  EMI have examined the two year period ending in February 1998 and have 
takeri into account the fact that the decision taken in August 1993 by the ministers and central bank 
governors  of the  Member States  to  widen  temporarily the  fluctuation  margins of the  ERM  from 
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exchange rate stability of  Member State currencies; 
9.  Whereas according to .Article 4 of Protocol No 6 tile criterion on the convergence of interest rates 
referred in the fourth  indent of Article  109j(l) sball mean that, observed over a period of one year 
before the examination, a Member State bas had au average nominal long-term interest rate that does 
not exceed by more than two percentage points that o( at most, the three best performing Member 
States in terms of  price stability; whereas for the purpose ofthe criteria on the convergence of  interest 
rates comparable interest rates on I 0-year benchmark govemment bonds were used; whereas in order 
to  assess  the  fultilment  of the  interest  rate  criterion  a reference  value  calculated  as  the  simple 
arithmetic average of  the nominal long-term interest rates of  the three best performing Member States 
in terms of  price stability plus two percentage points was considered in the reports of  the Commission 
and the EMI; whereas the reference value in the one year period ending in January 1998 was 7  .S0.4; 
10.  Whereas, in accordance with ArticleS of  Protocol No 6 the data used in tht current assessment of  the 
fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  will  be  provi~ by  the  Commission;  whereas  for  the 
preparation of this  recommendation the  Commission provided data; whereas  budgetary data were 
provided by the Commission after reporting by the Member States by  I  March  1998 in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) n° 3605/93; 
11.  Whereas  during the  second stage  of EMU  no  Council  Decision on the  existence of an  excessive 
deficit existed for Ireland and Luxembourg; whereas according to its Decision of  27 June 1996 under 
Article 104c(l2) the Council abrogated its previous Decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit 
in Denmark; whereas according to its Decision of 30 June 1997 under Atticle 104c(l2) the Council 
abrogated  its  previous  Decisions  on  the existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  the Netherllnds  and 
Finland;  whereas  according to its  Decisions  of I  May  1998  under  Article  104c(l2) the  Council 
abrogated its previous Decisions on the existence of  an excessive deficit in Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom; 
12.  Whereas, on the basis of the present recommendations, the Council meeting in the composition of 
Heads of  State or Government shall confirm Which Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for 
the adoption of  a single currency; 
HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Article 1 
Assessment 
1.  In  Belgium  national  legislation,  including  the statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Arti~les 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in Belgium in the year ending in January 1998 stood at 1.4% 
which is below the reference value; 
Belgium  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Belgium has  been a member of the  ERM during the  last two years;  in that period the 
Belgian  franc  (BEF)  bas  not  been  subject  to severe  tensions  and  Belgium  has  not 
devalued, on its own initiative, the BEF bilateral central rate against any other Member 
State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in Belgium was, on average, 
S. 1% which is below the reference value. 
Belgium has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations regarding the  achievement of ewnomic and 
monetary union. Belgium fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents 
of Article 109j(l) and bas therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. 
Consequently,  Belgium  fulfils  the · necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single 
currency. 2.  Denmark, in accordance with paragraph I of Protocol No 12  and the Decision.taken by 
the Heads of State or Government in  Edinburgh in December 19923,  has notified the 
Council that it will not participate in the third stage of  economic and monetary union; the 
assessment  of the  fulfilment  by  Denmark  of the  other  necessary  conditions  for  the 
adoption of a single currency is therefore not necessary; in accordance with paragraph 2 
of  Protocol No 12, Denmark will have an exemption once the third stage has started; 
3.  In Germany national  legislation,  including the  statute of the· national  central bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in Germany in the year ending in January 1998 stood at 1.4% 
which ·is below the reference value; 
Germany  is  not  the  subject of a  Council  Decision  on the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Germany has been a member of the ERM during the last two years;  in that period the 
German  mark (DEM)  has  not been subject to severe tensions  and  Germany  has  not 
devalued, on its own initiative, the DEM bilateral central rate. against any other Member 
State's currency 
in  the  year ending  in  January  1998  the  long-term  interest  rate  in  Germany  was,  on 
average, 5.~%  which is below the reference value. 
Germany has fulfilled  its  legal obligations regarding the achievement of economic and 
monetary  union.  Germany  fulfils  all  the  convergence  criteria  mentioned  in  the  four 
indents  of Article  109j(1)  and  has  therefore  achieved  a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergence. Consequently, Germany fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of 
a singl~ currency. 
4.  In  Greece  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in Greece in the year ending in  January  1998 stood at 5.2% 
which is above the reference value; 
the  Council  has  decided  on  26 September 1994  that  an  excessive  government  deficit 
exists in Greece and this Decision has not been abrogated; 
the currency of  Greece did not participate in the ERMin the two years ending in February 
1998; during this period the Greek drachma (GRD) has been relatively stable against the 
ERM currencies but it has experienced, at times, tensions whlch have been counteracted 
by temporary increases in domestic interest rates aod by foreign exchange intervention. 
The GRD joined the ERM in March 1998. 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in Greece was, on average, 
9.8% which is above the reference value. 
Greece has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. Greece does not fulfil any of  the convergence criteria mentioned in the 
four  indents  of Article  109j(l).  Consequently,  Greece  does  not  fulfil  the  necessary 
conditions for the adoption of  a single currency. 
3 OJ C 348 of31.12.92, p.  1. 
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5.  In  Spain  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB 4; 
the average inflation rate in Spain in the year ending in January 1998 stood at 1.8% which 
is below the reference value; 
Spain  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Spain has been a member of  the ERM during the last two years; in that period the Spanish 
peseta (ESP) has not been subject to severe tensions and Spain has not devalued, on its 
own initiative, the ESP bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in  Spain was, on average, 
6.3% which is below the reference value. 
Spain  has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding  the  achievement  of economic  and 
m~netary  union. Spain fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents of 
Article  109j(l) and has therefore  achieved a  high  degree of sustainable  convergence. 
Consequently, Spain fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of  a single currency. 
6.  In France  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  natio"al  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB5; 
the average  inflation rate  in  France in  the year ending in  January 1998  stood at  1.2% 
which is below the reference value; 
France  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
France has been a member of  the ERM during the last two years; in that period the French 
franc (FRF) has not been subject to severe tensions France has not devalued, on its own 
initiative, the FRF bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in France was, on average, 
5.5% which is below the reference value. 
France  has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding  the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. France fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents 
of Article 1  09j(l) and has therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. 
Consequently,  France  fulfils  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single 
currency. 
7.  In Ireland  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in  Ireland in the year ending in January  1998  stood at  1.2% 
which is below the reference value; 
during the second stage of  EMU Ireland was not the subject of  a Council Decision on the 
existence of  an excessive government deficit; 
Provided that the current government proposals have been enacted at the date of the establishment of 
the ECB. 
Provided  that the current government proposals have been enacted at the date of  the establishment of 
the ECB. 
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Ireland has been a member of  the ERM during the last two years; in that period the Irish 
pound (IEP) has not been subject to severe tensions and the IEP bilateral central rate has 
not been devalued against any other Member State's currency; on 16  March  1998 at a 
request of  the Irish authorities the bilateral central rates of  the IEP against all other ERM 
currencies were revalued by 3%. 
in the year ending in January 1998- the long-term interest rate in Ireland was, on average, 
6.2% which is below the reference value. 
Ireland has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding  the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. Ireland fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents 
of Article  I 09j( 1) and has therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. 
Consequently,  Ireland  fulfils  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single 
currency. 
8.  In  Italy  national  legislation,  including  the  statute .  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 ofthe Treaty and the Statute ofthe ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in Italy in the year ending in January 1998 stood ~t 1.8% which 
is below the reference value; 
Italy is not the subject of  a Council Decision on the existence of  an excessive government 
deficit; 
Italy rejoined the ERM in November 1996; in the period from March 1996 to November 
1996 the Italian lira (ITL) appreciated vis-a-vis the ERM currencies; since it re-entered 
the ERM the ITL has not been subject to severe tensions and Italy has not devalued, on its 
own initiative, the ITL bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the  long-term interest rate in Italy was, on average, 
6. 7% which is below the reference value. 
Italy  has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding  the  achievement  of economic  and 
monetary union. Italy fulfils the convergence criteria mentioned in the first, second and 
fourth indents of  Article 109j(l); as regards the criterion mentioned in the third indent of 
Article  109j(l),  the  currency  of Italy,  although  having  rejoined  the  ERM  only  in 
November 1996, has displayed sufficient stability in the last two years. For these reasons 
Italy has achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. Consequently, Italy fulfils 
the necessary conditions for the adoption of  a single currency. 
9.  In Luxembourg national legislation, including the statute of  the national central bank, is 
compatible with Articles 107 and I 08 of  the Treaty and the statute of  the ESCB6; 
the  average inflation rate  in Luxembourg in the year ending in January  1998  stood at 
1.4% which is below the reference value; 
during the second stage of EMU Luxembourg was not the subject of a Co.uncil Decision 
on the existence of  an excessive government deficit; 
Luxembourg has been a member of  the ERM during the last two years; in that period the 
Luxembourg franc (LUF) has not been subject to severe tensions and Luxembourg has not 
devalued, on its own initiative, the LUF bilateral central rate against any other Member 
State's currency; 
in the year ending in January  1998  the long-term interest rate in Luxembourg was,  on 
average, 5.6% which is below the reference value. 
Provided that the current government proposals have been enacted at the date of the establishment of 
theECB. 
Page 6 of9 7 
Luxembourg has fulfilled its legal obligations regarding the achievement of  economic and 
monetary union.  Luxembourg fulfils  all the  convergence criteria mentioned  in  the  four 
indents  of Article  1  09j(I)  and  has  therefore  achieved  a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergence. Consequently, Luxembourg fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption 
ofa single currency. 
10  In the Netherlands national legislation, including the statute of  the national central bank, 
is compatible With Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute ofthe ESCB; 
the average inflation rate in the Netherlands in the year ending in-January 1998 stood at 
1.8% which is below the reference value; 
The Netherlands is not the subject of a Council Decision on the existence of  an excessive 
government deficit; 
the Netherlands has been a member of the ERM during the last two years; in that period 
the  Netherlands  Guilder  (NLG)  has  not  been  subject  to  severe  tensions  and  the 
Netherlands has not devalued, on its own  initiative, the NLG bilateral central rate against 
any other Member State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in the Netherlands was, on 
average, 5.5% which is below the reference value. 
The Netherlands has fulfilled its legal obligations regarding the achievement of  economic 
and monetary union. The Netherlands fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the 
four indents of Article  1  09j( 1) and has therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable 
convergence.  Consequently,  the  Netherlands  fulfils  the  necessary  conditions  for  the 
adoption of  a single currency. 
11.  In  Austria  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB7; 
the  average inflation rate  in  Austria in  the year ending in  January 1998  stood at  1.1% 
which is below the reference value; 
Austria  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Austria has  been  a member of the  ERM  during the  last two  years;  in  that period the 
Austrian  schilling (A TS)  has  not  been subject  to severe tensions  and Austria  has  not 
devalued, on its own  initiative, the ATS ·bilateral central rate against any other Member 
State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in Austria was, on average, 
5.6% which is below the reference value; 
Austria has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. Austria fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents 
of Article  109j(l) and has therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. 
Consequently,  Austria  fulfils  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single 
currency. 
Provided that the current government proposals have been enacted at the date  of  the establishment of 
theECB. 
Page 7 of9 12.  In  Portugal  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average inflation rate  in  Portugal in the year ending in  January 1998 stood at 1.8% 
which is below the reference value; 
Portugal  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Portugal has  been a member of the  ERM  during the  last two  years;  in  that period the 
Portuguese escudo (PTE) has not been subject to severe tensions and Portugal has not 
devalued, on its own  initiative, the PTE bilateral central rate against any other Member 
State's currency;  · 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in Portugal was, on average, 
6.2% which is below the reference value. 
Portugal has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations regarding the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. Portugal fulfils all the convergence criteria mentioned in the four indents 
of Article  I 09j(l) and has therefore achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence. 
Consequently,  Portugal  fulfils  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single 
currency. 
13.  In  Finland  national  legislation,  including  the  statute  of the  national  central  bank,  is 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the  average  inflation rate  in  Finland in the year ending in  January 1998 stood at  1.3% 
which is below the reference value; 
Finland  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
Finland has been a member of the ERM since October 1996;  in the period from March 
1996  to  October~ 1996  the  Finnish  markka  (FIM)  appreciated  vis-a-vis  the  ERM 
currencies; since it entered the ERM the FIM has not been subject to severe tensions and 
Finland has not devalued, on its own  initiative, the FIM bilateral central rate against any 
other Member State's currency; 
in the year ending in January 1998 the long-term interest rate in Finland was, on average, 
5.9% which is below the reference value. 
Finland  has  fulfilled  its  legal  obligations  regarding  the  achievement of economic  and 
monetary union. Finland fulfils the convergence criteria mentioned in the first, second and 
fourth indents of Article  109j(l); as regards the convergence criterion mentioned in the 
third indent of  Article 109j(I), the currency of  Finland, although having entered the ERM 
only in  October 1996, has displayed sufficient stability in  the last two years.  For these 
reasons  Finland has achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence.  Consequently, 
Finland fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of  a single cwrency. 
14.  In  Sweden national legislation, including the statute of the national central bank, is  not 
compatible with Articles 107 and 108 ofthe Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB; 
the average  inflation rate  in  Sweden in the year ending in  January 1998 stood at  1.9% 
which is below the reference value; 
Sweden  is  not  the  subject  of a  Council  Decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive 
government deficit; 
the currency of Sweden has never participated in the ERM; in the two years under review 
the Swedish krona (SEK) fluctuated against the  ERM currencies reflecting among others 
the absence of  an exchange rate target;  · 
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6.5% which is below the reference value. 
Sweden has made insufficient progress in the fulfilment of its legal obligations regarding 
the  achievement  of economic  and  monetary  union.  Sweden  fulfils  the  convergence 
criteria mentioned in the first, second and fourth indents of Article  l09j(l) but does not 
fulfil  the  convergence  criterion  mentioned  in  the  third  indent  of Article  l09j (1). 
Consequently,  Sweden  does  not  fulfil  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a 
single currency. 
15.  The United Kingdom, in accordance with paragraph 1 of  Protocol Noll, has notified the 
Council that it does not intend to move to the third stage of  economic and monetary union 
on l January 1999; the assessment of  the fulfilment by the United Kingdom of the other 
necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency is therefore not necessary; by 
virtue of  the notification made by the United Kingdom articles 4 to 9 of Protocol No I I 
lay down the rules applicable to the United Kingdom during the third stage; 
Article 2 
Findings 
In the light of the above, the fmdings of the Council are that Belgium, Gennany, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland fulfil  the necessary conditions for the 
adoption of a single currency.  The Council recommends to the Council, meeting in  the  composition of 
Heads of State or Government, to confinn that the said Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for 
the adoption of  a single currency on I January 1999. 
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8 1.  INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.1.  Role of  the report 
This report has  been prepared in accordance  with Article  1  09j(l) of the  Treaty which 
requires the Commission to report to the Council on the progress made in the fulfilment 
by the  Member States of their obligations regarding the achievement of economic and 
monetary union (EMU). The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is similarly required to 
report to the Council. 
These reports are the first steps of  the procedure set out in Article 1  09j which will lead to 
the decision by the Council, meeting (on 2 May 1998) in the composition ofthe.Heads of 
State  or  Government,  on  which  Member  States fulfil the  necessary conditions for  the 
adoption of  a single currency. 
In  November  1996  the  Commission  already  presented  a  report1  in accordance  with 
Article 109j(1)  .. This examination of  the progress towards convergence by Member States 
was followed by the formal decision2 in accordance with Article 109j(3) by the Council, 
meeting  in  the  composition  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  in  Dublin  in 
December 1996, that,  at that time,  a majority of the  Member  States did  not  fulfil  the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency. As a consequence the starting 
date for the third stage of EMU was set for 1 January 1999, as determined by the Treaty 
and confirmed on several occasions by the European Council. 
As  recorded  in the  Edinburgh agreement of 1992, Denmark has  given .notification,  in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Protocol No 12 of the Treaty, that it will not participate 
in the third stage of EMU.  Similarly, the United Kingdom has notified the Council, in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Protocol No 11  of the Treaty, that it does not intend to 
move to the third stage in  1999.  Although Denmark and the United Kingdom will not 
participate  in the  single  currency  in  1999,  the  convergence  performance of these  two 
countries is examined in this report along with the other Member States. 
1 
2 
COM(96)560, "Report on Convergence in the European Union in 1996". 
Council Decision of  13 December 1996 (96n361EC), OJ L 33S, 24.12.1996, p. 48. 
9 On the basis of this report and that of the EMI, the Commission is separately submitting 
to  the  Council  a  recommendation  for  the  assessment  to  be  made  by  the  Council  in 
accordance with Article 109j(2); the Council (of Ecofin ministers) will assess for  each 
Member State  whether it  fulfils  the  necessary conditions  for  the  adoption of a  single 
currency and will recommend its findings to the Council, meeting in the composition of 
Heads of  State or Government. 
In the following sections of this opening chapter the key results and conclusions of the 
report are summarised, first by subject in the order dealt with in the main body of the 
report and then for each Member State. The structure of  the rest of  the report follows that 
established  by  Article 109j(1).  Chapter 2  examines  the  compatibility  between  each 
Member State's national legislation (including the  statutes of its national central bank) 
and Articles 107 and 108 of  the Treaty and the Statute of  the European System of Central 
Banks  (ESCB).  The  following  four  chapters  (Chapters 3-6)  examine  in  turn  the 
performance of the Member States in relation to each of the four convergence criteria, 
concerning  price  stability,  the  government  budgetary  position,  exchange  rates  and 
long-term interest rates. Chapter 7 looks at several other areas that are to· be taken account 
of in  the  Commission and  EMI  reports:  development of the  ECU,  the  results  of the 
integration of  markets, the balances of  payments on current account, and unit labour costs 
and other price indices. 
The report makes use of economic data and information available up to  16 March 1998 
and takes account of developments concerning relevant national legislation up to the date 
of  adoption of  the report. 
1.2.  Compatibility of legislation and convergence 
Remarkable  progress  towards  the  achievement  of  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence has been made in all Member States since the beginning of  the second stage 
of EMU.  This progress gathered greater momentum during  1996  and  1997  and in the 
early part of 1998, when efforts to achieve convergence (especially in the budgetary field) 
were intensified in many Member States. Other necessary preparations for the third stage 
have also advanced at both national and Community levels. 
10 Compatibility  between  national  legislation,  including  the  statutes  of national  central 
banks, and'  Articles 107 and 108 ofthe Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB is examined in 
Chapter 2 of this report.  Compatibility has  to be ensured, in particular, concerning the 
objectives of national central banks and .their independence and in respect of provisions 
affecting the. integration of the national central banks in the ESCB and other monetary 
matters. Member States are required to ensure the compatibility of  their legislation at the 
latest  at  the  date  of the  establishment of the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  Most 
Member  States  have  already  enacted  necessary  changes  in  legislation,  or are  in the 
proce·ss  of legislating  on  government  proposals  for  changes.  The  situation  in  eight 
Member States (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugaland 
Finland) can be considered as  compatible with Treaty requirements, while in. a further 
four Member States compatibility will be ensured provided that the existing government 
proposals  are  enacted  (in  Spain,  Luxembourg  and  Austria)  or  the  present  draft 
government proposal is submitted to and adopted by Parliament (in France). In the case 
of  Sweden,  the  requirements  of  the  constitution  will  prevent  adoption  of  the 
government's proposals before  late  in  1998,  and there  remain some  incompatibilities 
between the present draft laws and the Treaty.  By virtue of their opt-outs, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom are under no obligation to make their legislation compatible, except 
for  central  bank  independence  in  the  case of Denmark,  for  which this  legislation  is 
compatible. 
The report examines the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence by 
reviewing in detail (in Chapters 3-6) the progress made by Member States in fulfilling 
each of  the four convergence criteria of  Article 109j(l).  · 
11 The steady progress made in the Community as a whole and by individual Member States 
in moving towards or maintaining a high degree of  price stability continued in 1997 and 
into  1998. The assessment of price stability and inflation convergence in the Member 
States (described in Chapter 3)  has  been made using the recently available hannonised 
indices of consumer prices (IDCPs), which provide a better and more comparable basis 
for the assessment than national consumer price indices. The average rate of  inflation for 
each Member State has been calculated as the percentage change in the average HICP in 
the  latest  12 months  relative  to  the  average  index  in the  preceding  12 months.  The 
reference value has been calculated for the purpose of  this report as the simple arithmetic 
average  of the  average  inflation  rates  in the  three  best  performing  Member  States 
plus 1.5 percentage points. Calculated in this way and according to the latest available 
information (JanuarY 1998), the three best inflation performers were France, Ireland and 
Austria,  and  the  reference  value  was  2.7%  (see  Table 1.1  and  Graph 1.1).  Fourteen 
Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the  United Kingdom)  had 
average inflation rates below this reference value. In view of  the structural changes (both 
institutional and behavioural) which have played an important role  in achieving price 
stability and given the developments in unit labour costs and other price indices, there are 
strong reasons for believing that the current inflation performance in all these 14 Member 
States is sustainable. Greece has also had success in bringing the inflation rate down but 
it still remains much higher than the reference value. 
12 The assessment of  the convergence criterion on the government budgetary position (see 
Chapter 4) is linked to decisions made in accordance with the excessive deficit procedure 
in  Article 1  04c  of ·the  Treaty.  At  present  five  Member  States  (Denmark,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland) are  not the subject of a  Council  decision 
under Article 1  04c(  6) on the existence of  an excessive government deficit and so already 
fulfil  the  criterion.  The  Commission  is  initiating  the .. 1998  implementation  of the 
excessive  deficit  procedure  in  parallel  with  this  report.  Government  deficits  have 
generally been brought down significantly during the  second stage of  EMU  from  the 
levels reached in 1993, when they were swollen by the effects of recession. Substantial 
further progress was made by Member States in 1997. The deficits in 14 Member States 
in 1997 were either below or equal to the 3% of  gross domestic product (GDP) reference 
value, and further declines in deficits are expected in 1998. While the government debt 
ratio was below the 60% of GDP reference value in 1997 in only four Member States 
(France, Luxembourg, Finland and the United Kingdom), almost all the other Member 
States with higher debt ratios have succeeded in reversing the earlier upward trend. Only 
in Germany, where the debt ratio is just above 60% of  GDP and the exceptional costs of 
unification continue to bear heavily, was there a further small rise in the debt ratio in 
1997. In the current year,  1998, falls  in the debt ratio are expected in all the Member 
States where the ratio is above the reference value. Conditions are in place for a sustained 
decline in debt ratios in future years. The Commission is recommending to the Council 
the abrogation of the excessive deficit decisions for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy,  Austria,  Portugal,  Sweden  and  the  United Kingdom.  While  Greece  has  made 
substantial progress in reducing public finance imbalances in recent years, its deficit in 
1997 was still well above the reference value but is expected to be below it in 1998. 
13 The  Treaty  refers  to  the  exchange  rate  criterion  as  the  observance  of the  normal 
fluctuation margins of the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System  (EMS)  for  at  least two  years  without  severe  tensions  and  without  devaluing 
against  the  currency of any  other Member  State.  The  operational  framework  used  in 
Chapter 5 to interpret the criterion verifies participation in the ERM for at least two years 
and assesses exchange rate behaviour with respect to a ±2.25% fluctuation range around 
each currency's central rate against the median currency in the ERM grid. The two-year 
period under review is from March 1996 to February 1998. Ten currencies - the Belgian 
franc, the Danish krone, the German mark, the Spanish peseta, the French franc, the Irish 
punt, the Luxembourg franc, the Dutch guilder, the Austrian schilling and the Portuguese 
escudo - have been in the ERM for more than two years at the time of this examination. 
The Finnish markka entered the ERM in October 1996, while the Italian lira re-entered 
the  mechanism  in November 1996,  i.e.  less  than  two  years  ago.  The  ERM  has  been 
generally  stable  and the .vast  majority of participating currencies  have  been clustered 
close to their ERM central rates in the period under review. Among these currencies, only 
the  Irish  punt  has  deviated  from  its  central  rate  against  the  median  currency  for  an 
extended period of time; however, the deviation of the punt ·has  been mostly above its 
central  rate.  The  Irish punt was  revalued  by  3% against the  other ERM currencies  in 
March 1998 after the close of the review period.  All  in all,  these  12 currencies can be 
considered not to have experienced severe tensions in the two years under review.  The 
Greek drachma, the Swedish krona and the pound sterling did not participate in the ERM 
during the review period. However, the Greek drachma entered the ERM in March 1998, 
after the close of  the review period. 
The fourth criterion, on the durability of convergence as reflected in long-term interest 
rates, is examined in Chapter 6.  Long-term interest rates are forward-looking indicators 
which  reflect  the  financial  markets'  assessment  of underlying  economic  conditions, 
including  the  sustainability  of  inflation  performance  and  budgetary  positions. 
Developments  in  bond  markets  during  the  last  two  years  as  the  third  stage  of EMU 
approaches  have  resulted  in  a  significant  narrowing  in  interest  rate  differentials, 
especially for the previously higher-yielding countries. The assessment of the criterion is 
based  on  the  interest  rates  on  comparable  1  0-year  benchmark  bonds  (not  fully 
comparable for Greece), using an average·rate over the latest  12 months. The reference 
value has been calculated as the simple arithmetic average of  the long-term interest rates 
of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability plus 2 percentage 
points. In January 1998 the reference value was 7.8%. Fourteen Member States (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) had average long-term interest rates 
below  th_e  reference  value.  Greece  has  also  experienced  declining  interest  rates  over 
recent years,  but  the  level  of the  long-term  interest  rate  still  remains  higher than the 
reference value. 
14 The Treaty also requires that this report should examine developments in several other 
areas  relevant  to  economic  integration  and  convergence.  These  are  dealt  with  in 
Chapter 7. The scale of  and activity in financial markets in ECU have tended to decline in 
importance during the second stage. The spread between the private and public ECU has 
become very narrow as the certainty of the one-to-one convertibility between the ECU 
and the euro has been incorporated by the markets. The Single Market programme has 
been having a significant impact on economic integration, particularly on the structure of 
trade  between  Member  States,  on  foreign  direct  investment  flows,  on  competition 
conditions and on price convergence for  certain categories of goods and services.  The 
current account of the balance of payments reflects the national saving and investment 
balance in each Member State; the Community as  a whole and  10 Member States are 
estimated to have been in surplus in 1997.  Additional indicators for unit labour costs, 
import prices and other prices confmn the picture of a· satisfactory and soundly based 
price performance in most Member States. 
15 Table 1.1 
Current performance of the Member States in relation to convergence 
Inflation  Government budgetary position  Exchange  Long-term 
rates  interest rates 
Existence  Deficit 
HICP  of  (%of  Debt  ERM 
(a}  an excessive  GDP}  (%ofGDP)  participation  (d) 
deficit  (b)  (c) 
January  Change from  March  January 
1998  1997  1997  previous year  1998  1998 
1997  1996  199S 
Reference 
2.7  (e)  3  60  7.8 (f)  value 
B  1.4  yes  (g)  2.1  122.2  -4.7  -4.3  -2.2  yes  S.1 
DK  1.9  no  -0.7  6S.1  -S.S  -2.7  -4.9  yes  6.2 
D  1.4  yes  (g)  2.7  61.3  0.8  2.4  7.8  yes  S.6 
EL  S.2  yes  4.0  108.7  -2.9  l.S  0.7  yes  (h)  9.8 (i) 
E  1.8  yes  (g)  2.6  68.8  -1.3  4.6  2.9  yes  6.3 
F  1.2  yes  (g)  3.0  S8.0  2.4  2.9  4.2  yes  S.5 
IRL  1.2  no  -0.9  66.3  -6.4  -9.6  ~6.8  yes  6.2 
I  1.8  yes  (g)  2.7  121.6  -2.4  -0.2  -0.7  yes  (j)  6.7 
L  1.4  no  -1.7  6.7  0.1  0.7  0.2  yes  S.6 
NL  1.8  no  1.4  72.1  -5.0  -1.9  1.2  yes  S.5 
A  1.1  yes  (g)  2.S  66.1  -3.4  0.3  3.8  yes  5.6 
p  1.8  yes  (g)  2.S  62.0  -3.0  -0.9  2.1  yes  6.2 
FIN  1.3  no  0.9  SS.8  -1.8  -0.4  -1.5  yes  (k)  .  5.9 
s  1.9  yes  (g)  0.8  76.6  -0.1  -0.9  -1.4  no  6.5 
UK  1.8  yes  (g)  1.9  S3.4  -1.3  0.8  3.5  no  7.0 
EUR  1.6  2.4  72.1  -0.9  2.0  3.0  6.1 
(a)  Percentage change in arithmetic average ofthe latest 12 monthly harmonized indices of  consumer prices 
(HICP)  relative to the arithmetic  average of  the 12  HICP of  the previous period. 
(b)  Council decisions of26.09.94, 10.07.95, 27.06.96 and 30.06.97 
(c)  A negative sign for the government deficit indicates a surplus. 
(d)  Average maturity 10 years; average of  the last 12 months. 
(e)  Definition adopted in this report: simple  arithmetic average of  the inflation rates of  the three best performing 
Member  States in terms of  price stability plus l.S perccritage points. 
(f)  Definition adopted in this report:  simple arithmetic average of  the 12-month average of  interest rates of  the 
three  best performing Member  States in terms of  price stability plus 2 percentage points. 
(g)  Commission is recommending abrogation. 
(h)  Since March 1998. 
(i)  Average of  available data during the past 12 months. 
(j)  Since November 1996. 
(k)  Since October 1996. 
SOUI'Ce: Commission services. 
16 Graph 1.1  Key convergence indicators 
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17 1.3.  Assessment for each Member State 
1.3.1. Belgium 
The Belgian government proposed substantial amendments to central bank legislation in 
1996  which  were  adopted  by  Parliament  in  February 1998.  Amendments  related  to 
independence enter into force on the day of  the establishment of the ECB; provisions on 
the integration of the central bank in the ESCB  will become applicable when Belgium 
adopts the euro.  Legislation in Belgium is  compatible with the  Treaty and the  ESCB 
Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Belgium during the 12 months to January 1998 was  1.4%, 
below  the  reference  value  of 2.7%.  The  Belgian  inflation  rate  has  been  below  the 
reference value throughout the period from December 19963. Belgium fulfils the criterion 
on price stability. 
Belgium is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council  Decision of 26 September 1994).  However,  the  government  deficit  has  been 
reduced substantially and continuously during the  second stage from  7.1% of GDP  in 
1993  to 2.1%  in  1997,  below the  reference  value.  A further  decline  in  the  deficit  is  · 
expected in 1998. The government debt ratio peaked in 1993 at 135.2% ofGDP and has 
since declined every year to  reach  122.2%  in  1997;  the  level  reached  by  the  primary 
surplus, amounting to more than 5% of GDP since 1994, contributed to put the debt ratio 
on a sustainable downward path. The debt ratio is expected to continue to decline in 1998 
and in future years; the Belgian government has recently confirmed its commitment to 
maintain the primary surplus at a high level over the medium term. The Commission is 
recommending  to  the  Council  the  abrogation  of the  excessive  deficit  decision  for 
Belgium; if  the Council acts on this recommendation then Belgium will be considered as 
fulfilling the criterion on the government budgetary position. 
The Belgian franc has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of 
this  examination and  has  not experienced  severe  tensions  during  the  two-year period 
under review. The Belgium franc has always traded well within the ±2.25% band around 
the central rate against the median currency in the ERM.  Belgium fulfils  the exchange 
rate criterion. 
3  The average rate of  inflation using the HICP is only available from December 1996. 
18 The average long-term interest rate  in Belgium in the year to  January 1998 was  5.7%, 
below the reference value of 7.8%. The reference value has been respected by Belgium 
throughout the period since December 19964• The differential of the Belgian long-term 
interest rate from those of the Member States with the lowest interest rates has narrowed 
further. Belgium fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Belgium  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
1.3.2.  Germany 
The Bundesbank Act of 1957 ensured a comparatively high level of independence for the 
central bank already at the start of Stage Two of EMU. In view of Stage Three of EMU, 
the  German government put forward a proposal amending the  Bundesbank Act which 
was adopted by Parliament in December 1997. The Act amending the Bundesbank Act of 
1957 will come into force on the date Germany adopts the single currency. However, the 
provisions  relating  to  the  independence  of the  Bank  became  effective  on  the  day 
following  its  promulgation,  i.e.  on  30 December 1997.  Legislation  in  Germany  is 
compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Germany during the  12 months to January 1998 was  1.4%, 
below  the  reference  value  of 2. 7%.  The  German  inflation  rate  has  been  below  the 
reference value throughout the period from December 1996. Germany fulfils the criterion 
on price stability. 
The 1994 decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit in Germany (Council Decision 
of 26 September 1994) was abrogated in  1995  (Council Decision of 10 July 1995).  An 
unexpected deterioration in the  public  finances  in  1995  led to  the  adoption of a new 
decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  Germany  (Council  Decision  of 
27 June 1996)  which  has  not  yet  been  abrogated.  The  government  deficit  has  been 
. reduced from 3.4% ofGDP in 1996 to 2.7% in 1997, below the reference value. A further 
decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio has been rising; it 
climbed just above the reference value of 60% of GDP  in 1996 and increased again in 
1997 to  61.3%.  However, the debt ratio  is  expected to  start declining in  1998  and it 
remains close to the 60% of GDP  reference value.  Moreover, the exceptional costs of 
German  unification  continue  to  place  a  heavy  burden  on  the  public  finances.  The 
Commission  is  recommending  to  the  Council  the  abrogation of the  excessive  deficit 
decision for Germany; if  the Council acts on this recommendation then Germany will be 
considered as fulfilling the criterion on the government budgetary position. 
4  The reference value based on the interest rates of the three best performers in terms of price stability 
selected using the HICP is only available from December 1996 
19 The German mark has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of 
this  examination and  has not experienced  severe tensions  during  the  two-year period 
under review. The German mark has always traded well within the ±2.25% band around 
the central rate against the median currency in the ERM. Germany fulfils the exchange 
rate criterion. 
The average long-term interest rate in Germany in the year to January 1998 was 5.6%, 
below the reference value of 7.8%. The reference value has been respected by Germany 
throughout  the  period  since  December 1996;  indeed,  Germany  has  been  one  of the 
MelJlber States with the lowest long-term interest rates.  Germany fulfils the criterion on 
the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Germany  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
1.3.3.  Greece 
The Greek government introduced a draft law in order to comply with the Treaty and 
Statute  requirements  in  Summer 1997.  This  law  was  adopted  by  Parliament  in 
November 1997  . and  became  effective  in  December 1997.  The  provisions  on 
independence entered into force in December 1997. The timing of the Bank's integration 
in the  ESCB is  not fully  satisfactory.  Notwithstanding this imperfection,  legislation in 
Greece is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Greece during the  12 months to January 1998  was 5.2%, 
well  above  the  reference  value  of 2. 7%.  The  Greek  inflation  rate  has  exceeded  the 
reference· value throughout the period from  December 1996,  but there  has  been some 
narrowing of  the differential. Greece does not fulfil the criterion on price stability. 
Greece is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council Decision of 26 September 1994). There has been a very large reduction in the 
government deficit from 13.8% of GDP in 1993 to 4.0% in 1997, but the deficit is still 
well above the reference  value.  The government debt ratio is  high;  while it has  been 
relatively stable during the· second stage, it reached a peak of 111.6% of GDP in 1996 
before  declining  to  108.7%  in  1997.  Greece  does  not  fulfil  the  criterion  on  the 
government budgetary position. 
The  Greek  drachma entered  the  ERM  in  March 1998  but  did  not  participate  in  the 
mechanism during the two years under review; the drachma was relatively stable against 
the ERM currencies in the review period but at times experienced tensions which were 
counteracted by increases in domestic interest rates and by foreign exchange intervention. 
Greece does not fulfil the exchange rate criterion. 
20 The average long-tenn interest rate in Greece in the year to  January 1998  was  9.8%, 
above the reference value of 7.8%. The interest rate data for Greece, which related until 
May 1997  to  bonds  with  original  maturity  of less  than  10 years,  are  not  strictly 
comparable with those for other Member States. The differential between interest rates in 
Greece and those in the Member States where interest rates are lowest has been declining 
but still remains large. Greece does not fulfil the criterion on the convergence of interest 
rates. 
1.3.4. Spain 
Spain refonned its central bank legislation already in  1994.  Law 13/1994 granted the 
central  bank autonomy from  the  administration and established price  stability  as the 
primary objective of  monetary policy. This Law was amended by two consecutive acts in 
recent months. A law amending the Law of  1994 with regard to certain aspects relating to 
independence was adopted on 31 December 1997. With a view to the Bank's objectives, 
its integration in the ESCB and other legislation the government submitted another draft 
law amending Law 13/1994 in February 1998. Provided that the draft law is adopted by 
Parliament in its present form, legislation in Spain is compatible with the Treaty and the 
ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Spain during the 12 month to January 1998 was 1.8%, below 
the reference value of2.7%. The reduction in inflation in Spain in 1996 and 1997 brought 
the average inflation rate down to and then below the reference value from July 1997 
onwards. Spain fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
Spain is at present the subject of a  decision on the  existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council Decision of 26 September 1994).  However,  the  government deficit has been 
reduced substantially from 7.3% ofGDP in  1995 to 2.6% in 1997, below the reference 
value. A further decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government.debt ratio rose 
from 60.0% of GDP in 1993 to 70.1% in 1996 and then declined to 68.8% in 1997; the 
debt ratio is expected to decline again in 1998 and in future years. The Commission is 
recommending to the Council the abrogation of  the excessive deficit decision on Spain; if 
the Council acts on this recommendation then Spain will be considered as fulfilling the 
criterion on the government budgetary position. 
The Spanish peseta has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of 
this examination and has not experienced severe tensions  during the two-year period 
under review.  The  Spanish peseta has  almost always traded within the ±2:25% band 
around  the  central  rate  against  the  median  currency  in  the  ERM.  Spain  fulfils  the 
exchange rate criterion. 
21 The average long-term interest rate in Spain in the year to January 1998 was 6.3%, below 
the reference value of 7.8%. The narrowing of interest rate differentials in 1996 brought 
the average rate in Spain down such that it has been below the reference value throughout 
the period from December 1996. The differential of the long-term interest rate in Spain 
from those in the Member States where interest rates are lowest has continued to narrow. 
Spain fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission considers that Spain has achieved a high degree of  sustainable convergence. 
1.3.5.  France 
France  revised  its  central  bank  statute  with  a  view  to  EMU  already  in  1993.  The 
government intends to submit to Parliament a draft law amending the Law of 1993 in the 
last week of March 1998.  The amendment related to  independence is  planned to  enter 
· into  force  on  the  date  of establishment  of the  ECB,  the  other  amendments  on 
1 January 1999. Provided that the draft government proposal is submitted to and adopted 
by Parliament in its present form, legislation in France is compatible with the Treaty and 
the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate  in France during the  12 months  to  January 1998  was  1.2%, 
below the reference value of 2. 7%; indeed, France was one of the three best performing 
Member States used for the calculation of this reference value. The French inflation rate 
has been below the reference value throughout the period from December 1996. France 
fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
France is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an  excessive deficit 
(Council  Decision of 26 September 1994).  However,  the  government deficit has  been 
reduced substantially from 5.8% ofGDP in 1994 to 3.0% in 1997, equal to the reference 
value. A further decline in the deficit is expected in  1998.  The government debt ratio, 
although it has been rising during the second stage and reached 58.0% of GOP in 1997, 
remains below the reference value. The Commission is recommending to the Council the 
abrogation  of the  excessive  deficit  decision  for  France;  if the  Council  acts  on  this 
recommendation  then  France  will  be  considered  as  fulfilling  the  criterion  on  the 
government budgetary position. 
The French franc has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of  this 
examination and has not experienced severe tensions during the two-year period under 
review. The French franc has almost always traded within the ±2.25% band around the 
central rate against the  median currency in the ERM.  France fulfils  the exchange rate 
criterion. 
22 The  average  long-term  interest rate  in  France  in the  year to  January 1998  was  5.5%, 
below the reference value of 7.8%.  The reference value has  been respected by  France 
throughout the period since December 1996; indeed, France has been one of  the Member 
States  with  the  lowest  long-term  interest  rates.  France  fulfils  the  criterion  on  the 
convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  France  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
1.3.6. Ireland 
The Central Bank Act 1998 which was adopted by Parliament in March 1998 amends the 
earlier Central Bank Acts 1942-1997 by various provisions related to EMU. This Act will 
come  into  operation on such day  or days  as  the  minister may  appoint.  Legislation in 
Ireland is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average  inflation rate in Ireland during the  12 months to  January 1998  was  1.2%, 
below the reference value of 2. 7%; indeed, Ireland was one of the three best performing 
Member States used for the calculation of  this reference value. The Irish inflation rate has 
been  below the  reference  value  throughout  the  period  from  December 1996.  Ireland 
fulfils the criterion on price stability.  ' 
Ireland  has  never  been  the  subject  of an  excessive  deficit  decision.  Throughout  the 
second  stage  the  government  deficit  has  been well  below  the  reference  value  and  a 
surplus  of 0.9%  of GDP  was  achieved  in  1997.  An improvement  in  the  surplus  is 
expected  in  1998.  The  government  debt  ratio  has  been  declining  very  rapidly,  from 
96.3% of  GDP in 1993 to 66.3% in 1997; it is expected to fall below the reference value 
in 1998. Ireland fulfils the criterion on the government budgetary position. 
The Irish punt has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of this 
examination and has not experienced severe tensions during the  two-year period under 
review.  The Irish punt was revalued against the other ERM currencies in March 1998, 
after the close of the review period. During the review period, the Irish punt exhibited a 
higher variability than other ERM currencies, and traded beyond a ±2.25% fluctuation 
range around its central rate against the median currency for an extended period of  time. 
However, the deviation of the Irish punt was mostly above its central rate and reflected 
the favourable conditions in the Irish economy.  Therefore, the higher variability is  not 
indicative of severe tensions in the examination period. Ireland fulfils the exchange rate 
criterion. 
23 The  average  long-term interest rate  in Ireland in the year to January 1998  was  6.2%, 
below the reference value of 7.8%.  The  reference value has been respected by Ireland 
throughout  the  period  since  December 1996.  The  differential  of the  Irish  long-term 
interest rate from those of  the Member States with the lowest interest rates has narrowed 
further. Ireland fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Ireland  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
1.3. 7.  Italy 
In October 1997 the Parliament mandated the Italian government to adopt legislation by 
legislative  decree  in  relation  to  EMU.  The  Italian  government  introduced  a  draft 
legislative decree  in December 1997 with a view to  adapting  Italian legislation to  the 
requirements  of the  Treaty  and  the  Statute.  This  legislative  decree  was  adopted  by 
government  in March 1998.  The  provisions  concerning  independence  enter  into  force 
upon  publication  of the  legislative  decree,  provisions  on  integration  on  the  date 
established by the minister or on the date when Italy adopts the euro. Legislation in Italy 
is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Italy during the 12 months to January 1998 was ·1.8%, below 
the reference value of  2. 7%. The reduction in inflation in Italy in 1996 and 1997 brought 
the average inflation rate down to and then below the reference value from  June 1997 
onwards. Italy fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
Italy  is  at  present the  subject of a  decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit 
(Council  Decision of 26 September 1994).  However,  there  has  been a very  large  and 
continuous reduction in the government deficit during the  second stage  from  9.5% of 
GDP in 1993 to 2.7% in 1997, below the reference value. A further decline in the deficit 
is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio peaked in  1994 at 124.9% of GDP and 
has  since declined every year to  reach  121.6% in  1997; the steady rise in the primary 
surplus, which reached over 6% of GDP in 1997, contributed to put the debt ratio on a 
sustainable downward path. The debt ratio is expected to decline at a faster pace in 1998 
and in future years; the Italian government recently renewed its commitment to maintain 
the  primary  surplus· at  an  appropriately  high  level  over  the  medium  term.  The 
Commission is  recommending  to  the  Council  the  abrogation  of the  excessive  deficit 
decision  for  Italy;  if the  Council  acts  on  this  recommendation  then  Italy  will  be 
considered as fulfilling the criterion on the government budgetary position. 
The Italian lira has participated in the ERM since November 1996. For the preceding part 
of  the period under review, the lira appreciated trend vis-a-vis the ERM currencies. Since 
it re-entered the  ERM,  the  lira has  always traded within the ±2.25% band around the 
central rate against the median currency in the ERM. Although the lira has part~cipated in 
the ERM only since November 1996, it has not experienced severe tensions during the 
review period and has thus, in the view of  the Commission, displayed sufficient stability 
in the last two years. 
24 The average long-term interest rate in Italy in the year to January 1998 was 6. 7%, below 
the reference value of7.8%. The narrowing of  interest rate differentials in 1996 and 1997 
brought the average rate in Italy down below the reference value from  February 1997 
onwards. The differential of  the long-term interest rate ·in Italy from those in the Member 
States where interest rates are lowest has continued to narrow. Italy fulfils the criterion on 
the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission considers that Italy has achieved a high degree of  sustainable convergence. 
1.3.8. Luxembourg 
Based on an earlier proposal, the government subMitted to Parliament a revised draft law 
on the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois in December 1997. The draft is intended to be 
adopted by Parliament in April and to enter into force on 1 May 1998. Several provisions 
in  this  draft  law linked  to  independence  and  integration  in  the  ESCB  are  not  fully 
satisfactory. Provided that the draft law is adopted by Parliament in its present form and 
notwithstanding these imperfections, legislation in Luxembourg is compatible with the 
Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Luxembourg during the  12 months to January 1998  was 
1.4%, below the reference value of 2.7%.  The inflation rate in Luxembourg has  been 
below the  reference  value  throughout  the  period  from  December 1996.  Luxembourg 
fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
Luxembourg has never been the subject of an excessive deficit decision. Throughout the 
second stage the government accounts have been in surplus; the surplus was  1. 7% of 
GDP in 1997. The government debt ratio is very low and far below the reference value; 
in 1997 it was only 6.7% of GDP. Luxembourg fulfils the criterion on the government 
budgetary position. 
The Luxembourg franc has participated in the ERM for longer than .two years at the time 
of this  examination and has not experienced severe tensions during two-years period 
under review. The Luxembourg franc has always traded well within the ±2.25% band 
around the central rate against the median currency in the ERM. Luxembourg fulfils the 
exchange rate criterion.  · 
The average long-term interest rate in Luxembourg in the year to January f998 was 5.6%, 
below  the  reference  value  of 7.8%.  The  reference  value  has  been  respected  by 
Luxembourg throughout the period since December 1996; indeed, Luxembourg has been 
one of  the Member States with the lowest long-term interest rates. Luxembourg fulfils the 
criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Luxembourg  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergence. 1.3.9. Netherlands 
In September 1997 the Dutch government submitted to Parliament a proposal for a new 
Act  amending  the  Bank  Act 1948  governing  the  central  bank  of the  Netherlands. 
Parliament adopted this  Act on  24 March 1998.  The  provisions  relating to  the  central 
bank's independence will enter into force on the date of  establishment ofihe ECB, those 
relating  to  the  bank's integration  in  the  ESCB  at  the  beginning  of Stage Three.  One 
provision related to  the  integration of the Bank in the  ESGB  is  not fully  satisfactory. 
Notwithstanding this imperfection, legislation in the Netherlands is compatible with the 
Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in the Netherlands during the  12 months to January 1998. was 
1.8%, below the reference value of 2. 7%.  The Dutch inflation rate has  been below the 
reference value throughout the period from December 1996. The Netherlands fulfils the 
criterion on price stability. 
The  decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  the  Netherlands  (Council 
Decision  of  26 September 1994)  was  abrogated  in  1997  (Council  Decision  of 
30 June 1997). The government deficit was brought down from 4.0% of GDP in 1995 to 
1.4% in 1997, below the reference value.  The government debt ratio reached its highest 
level in 1993 at 81.2% of GDP and has since declined to 72.1% in 1997; the debt ratio is 
expected  to  continue  declining  in  1998  and  future  years.  The Netherlands  fulfils  the 
criterion on the government budgetary position. 
/ 
The Dutch guilder has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time of 
this  examination and has  not experienced  severe  tensions  during  the  two-year period 
under review. The Dutch guilder has always traded well within the ±2.25% band around 
the  central rate  against the  median currency in  the  ERM.  The  Netherlands  fulfils  the 
exchange rate criterion. 
The average long-term interest rate in the  Netherlands in the year to  January 1998  was 
5.5%,  below  the  reference  value  of 7.8%.  The  reference  value  ha.S  been  respected 
throughout the period since December 1996; indeed, the Netherlands has been one of the 
Member  States  with  the  lowest  long-t~rm interest  rates.  The  Netherlands  fulfils  the 
criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  _of  its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission considers that the Netherlands has  achieved a high degree  of sustainable 
convergence. 
26 1.3.10. Austria 
In view of  the requirements of  the Treaty, the Austrian government submitted draft laws 
to  Parliament  in Autumn 1997  and  in March 1998.  According  to  the  proposals,  the 
provisions ensuring the independence of  the central bank will enter into force at the date 
of establishment of the  ESCB;  the  remaining  provisions  will  enter  into  force  when 
Austria adopts the single currency. Provided that the draft law is adopted in its present 
fonn,  legislation in Austria is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Austria during the 12 months to January 1998 was 1.1%, 
below the reference value of  2. 7%; indeed, Austria was one of the three best performing 
Member States used for the calculation of  this reference value. The Austrian inflation rate 
has been below the reference value throughout the period from December 1996. Austria 
fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
Austria is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council Decision of 10 July 1995). However, the government deficit has been reduced 
from 5.2% ofGDP in 1995 to 2.5% in 1997, below the reference value. A further decline 
in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio rose from 62.7% of  GDP in 
1993 to 69.5% in 1996 and then declined to 66.1% in 1997; the debt ratio is expected to 
decline again in  1998  and in future  years.  The Commission is  recommending to  the 
Council the abrogation of  the excessive deficit decision for Austria; if  the Council acts on 
this recommendation then Austria will be considered as fulfilling the criterion on the 
government budgetary position. 
The Austrian schilling has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time 
of this examination and has not experienced severe tensions during the two-year period 
under review.  The Austrian schilling has always traded well within the ±2.25% band 
around  the  central  rate against the median currency ,in  the  E~.  Austria fulfils  the 
exchange rate criterion. 
The average long-tenn interest rate  in Austria in the year to  January 1998  was 5.6%, 
below the reference value of  7 .8%. The reference value has been respected throughout the 
period since December 1996; indeed, Austria has been one of  the Member States with the 
lo~  long-tenn interest rates. Austria fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest 
rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Austria  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
27 1.3.11. Portugal 
In January 1998 a Law was adopted amending the Organic Law of the central bank of 
Portugal  with  a  view to  the  requirements  of the  Treat}'.  Provisions  in the  new law 
regarding independence have already entered into force, while the other provisions will 
come into force  when Portugal adopts the euro.  Legislation in Portugal is compatible 
with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Portugal during the 12 months to January 1998 was 1.8%, 
below the reference value of 2. 7%.  The reduction in inflation in Portugal in 1996 and 
1997 brought the average inflation rate down to and then below the reference value from 
June 1997 onwards. Portugal fulfils the criterion on price stability. 
Portugal is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council Decision of 26 September 1994).  However,  the government deficit has  been 
reduced substantially and continuously during the second stage from  6.1% of GDP in 
1993  to  2.5% in  1997,  below the reference value.  A  further  decline  in the  deficit is 
expected in 1998. The government debt ratio reached a peak of 65.9% of GDP in 1995 
and  has  since  declined to  62.0%  in  1997;  a  further  decline  in the  debt ratio  to the 
reference value is expected in 1998. The Commission is recommending to the Council 
the abrogation of the excessive deficit decision for Portugal; if the Council acts on this 
recommendation  then  Portugal  will  be  considered  as  fulfilling  the  criterion  on the 
government budgetary position. 
The Portuguese escudo has participated in the ERM for longer than two years at the time 
of this examination and has not experienced severe tensions during the two-year period 
under review. The Portuguese escudo has almost iuways traded within a ±2.25% band 
around the central rate  against the  median currency in the  ERM.  Portugal  fulfils  the 
exchange rate criterion. 
The average long-term interest rate in Portugal in the year to January 1998 was 6.2%, 
below the reference value of 7.8%. The narrowing of interest rate differentials in 1996 
brought the average rate in Portugal down such that it has been below the reference value 
throughout the period from December 1996. The differential of  the long-term interest rate 
in Portugal from those in the Member States with the lowest interest rates has conaued 
to narrow. Portugal fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Portugal  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
28 1.3.12. Finland 
The review of  Finnish central bank legislation started in 1993, leading up to the adoption 
of an amended Central Bank Act by Parliament in June 1997. This Act, which entered 
into force on 1 January 1998, established the independence of  the Bank but did not clarify 
its integration in the ESCB. The government put forward  in February 1998 a new bill 
comprising amendments of  the Bank of  Finland Act,  the Currency Act and the Coin Act; 
this bill was adopted by Parliament on 20 March 1998. The provisions on independence 
will enter into force  shortly, the other provisions of the Bank of Finland Act will enter 
into force when Finland adopts the single currency. Legislation in Finland is compatible 
with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The. average inflation rate in Finland during the  12 months to January 1998 was 1.3%, 
below the reference value of  2. 7%. The. Finnish rate has been below the reference value 
throughout  the  period  from  December 1996.  Finland  fulfils  the  criterion  on  price 
stability. 
The decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Finland (Council Decision of 
10 July 1995)  was  abrogated  in  1997  (Council  Decision  of  30 June 1997).  The 
government deficit was  reduced  significantly from  8.00/o  of GDP  in  1993  to  0.9% in 
1997, below the reference value.  A surplus is expected in  1998.  The government debt 
ratio peaked in 1994 at 59.6% ofGDP, below the reference value, and has since declined 
to  reach  55.8%  in  1997.  Finland  fulfils  the  criterion  on  the  government  budgetary 
position. 
The Finnish markka has participated in the ERM since October 1996. For the preceding 
part of the period under review, the markka appreciated vis-a-vis the ERM currencies. 
Since it entere~ the ERM, the markka has for most of  the time traded within the ±2.25% 
band around  the  central  rate  against the  median  currency  in  the  ERM.  Although the 
markka has  partiCipated  in the  ERM only  since October 1996,  it has not experienced 
-severe tensions during the review period and has thus, in the view of the Commission, 
displayed sufficient stability in the last two years. 
The average long-term interest rate  in Finland in the year to  January 1998  was  5.9%, 
below the reference value of 7  .8%.  The reference value has been respected by· Finland 
throughout the  period since December 1996.  The  differential of the Finnish long-term 
interest rate from those of  the Member States with the lowest interest rates has narrowed 
further. Finland fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
In  the  light  of its  assessment  on  the  fulfilment  of the  convergence  criteria  the 
Commission  considers  that  Finland  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence. 
29 1.3.13. Sweden 
The  government put forward  to  Parliament a proposal to  amend the Constitution,  the 
Riksdag  Act  and  the  Riksbank  Act  in  November 1997.  Parliament  adopted  the 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  in  March 1998  in  a  first  vote.  The  second  vote 
confirming the amendments to the Constitution can only be taken by the next Parliament 
after the general elections scheduled for September 1998. The amendments to the other 
two Acts are planned to be adopted by Parliament together with the second vote on the 
Constitution in October 1998. All amendments would enter into force on 1 January 1999. 
The present drafts incTude  some incompatibilities with respect to the integration of the 
central bank in the ESCB .. Also, the foreseen date of adoption of the proposals is not in 
accordance  with  the  timetable  specified  in  the  Treaty.  Legislation  in  Sweden  is  not 
compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
The average inflation rate in Sweden during the  12 months to January 1998 was  1.9%, 
below  the  reference  value  of 2. 7%.  The  Swedish  inflation  rate  has  been below  the 
reference value throughout the period from December 1996. Sweden fulflls the criterion 
on price stability. 
Sweden is at present the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
(Council Decision of 10 July 1995). However, there has been a very large and continuous 
reduction in the government deficit from 12.2% ofGDP in 1993 to 0.8% in 1997, below 
the reference value. A surplus is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio peaked in 
1994 at 79.0% of GDP and has since declined every year to reach 76.6% in 1997; the 
. debt ratio is expected to continue to decline in 1998 and in future years. The Commission 
is  recommending  to  the  Council  the  abrogation of the  excessive  deficit  decision  for 
Sweden; if the Council acts on this recommendation then Sweden will be considered as 
fulfilling the criterion on the government budgetary position. 
The Swedish krona has never participated in the ERM; in the two years under review the 
krona has fluctuated against the ERM currencies, reflecting among others the absence of 
an exchange rate target. Sweden does not fulfll the exchange rate criterion. 
30 The average long-term interest rate in Sweden in the year to  January 1998  was  6.5%, 
below the reference value of 7  .8%.  The narrowing of interest rate differentials in 1996 
brought the average rate in Sweden down such that it has been below the reference value 
throughout the period since December 1996.  The differential of the  long-term  interest 
rate  in  Sweden  from  those  in  the  Member  States  with  the  lowest  interest  rates  has 
continued to narrow. Sweden fulfils the criterion on the convergence of  interest rates. 
• • • 
Because they are exercising their opt-outs, 'Denmark and the United Kingdom will not be 
included in the first group of Member States participating in the single currency. It will, 
therefore,  not  be  necessary  for  the  Council  to  assess  whether  Denmark  and  the 
United Kingdom  fulfil  the  other  conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single  currency. 
Nevertheless,  these two  countries  are  closely involved  in the  deepening  of economic 
integration and the enhancement of  economic policy cooperation in the successive stages 
of  EMU. Just as for the other Member States, this report gives information on the state of 
central  bank  legislation  in  Denmark  and  the  United Kingdom  and  examines  the 
convergence performance of  these two countries. 
31 2.  COMPATmiLITY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION WITH THE TREATY 
AND  THE  STATUTE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  SYSTEM  OF  CENTRAL 
BANKS 
2.1.  Introduction 
According to the second sentence of Article 109j(l) of the Treaty, the report drawn up 
under  this ·article  "shall  include  an  examination  of the  compatibility  between  each 
Member State 's national legislation,  including the statutes of  its national central bank, 
and Articles 107 and 108 of  this Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB (European System of 
Central Banks)".  · 
The present chapter is devoted to this examination. The first section describes the scope 
of  the adaptations that are necessary to bring national legislation in line with the Treaty 
and the Statute.  The  second section is on timing.  The third  section is  a  country-by-
country assessment of the compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty and the 
Statute, with a particular foqus on national legislation regarding the central bank. 
2.2.  Scope of necessary adaptation of national legislation 
2.2.1.  General 
As from 1 January 1999, the competence for monetary policy, exchange rate policy and 
monetary law is transferred from participating Member States to the Community level. 
Naturally,  provisions referring  to  national  competence  in these  fields  and  setting  up 
national rules are numerous in any jurisdiction. Article 108 reads: 
"Each  Member State shall ensure,  at the  latest at the  date of  the  establishment of  the 
ESCB,  that its national legislation including the statutes of  its national central bank is 
compatible with this Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB. " 
The method by which compatibility is  to  be achieved  is  not specified in the  Treaty. 
Possible methods are deletion of national provisions, incorporation in national law of 
language reflecting Treaty or ESCB Statute provisions, reference to such provisions, or a 
mixture thereof. 
32 The examination can be divided into three areas: 
- objectives of  national central banks (NCBs) 
- independence 
- integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
2.2.2. Objectives 
The  objectives  of a  NCB  must be  compatible  with the  objectives  of the  ESCB  as 
formulated in Article 105(1) of  the Treaty (and Article 2 of  the Statute of  the ESCB): 
"The  primary  objective  of the  ESCB  shall  be  to  maintain  price  stability.  Without 
prejudice to the objective of  price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic 
policies  in  the  Community  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  the  achievement of the 
objectives of  the Community as laid down in Article 2." 
· References in national law to the policy of  the government or to specific macroeconomic 
objectives  are  not  incompatible  provided  that  tlie  primacy  of the  first  and  second 
objectives of  Article 105 of  the Treaty is respected. 
2.2.3. Independence 
Article 1  07 of  the Treaty ensures that the ESCB will operate free from instructions from 
third parties. It reads as follows:  · 
"When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties confe"ed upon them 
by this Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB,  neither the ECB nor a national central bank, 
nor any memb.er of  their decision-making bodies shall seek or take  instructions from 
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of  a Member State or from any 
other body.  The  Community institutions and bodies and the governments of  the Member 
States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of  the 
decision-making bodies of  the ECB or of  the national central banks in the performance of 
their tasks. " 
The features which make up independence may be grouped as foJJows: 
•  Institutional 
This group includes for instance the absence of any right of a body external to the 
NCB, as far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned, 
- to give instructions to a NCB; 
- to approve, suspend, annul or defer a decision of  a NCB; 
- to censor decisions of  a NCB on legal grounds; 
- to participate in decision-making bodies of  a NCB with a right to vote; 
- to be consulted before a NCB takes a decision. 
33 •  Personal 
- certain rules are imposed on national legislation by virtue of Article 14.2 of the 
Statute of  the ESCB: 
+  the term of  office for the Governor must be at least five years; 
+  a  Governor may be  relieved  from  office  only if he  no  longer fulfils  the 
conditions required for the performance of  his duties or if  he has been guilty 
of  serious misconduct. 
With  a  view  to  Article 107,  which  covers  all  members  of decis~on-making 
bodies, it is desirable that these rules not only apply the Governor, but also to the 
other members  who  are  involved  in the  performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
However,  it may be justified under certain conditions to  appoint members of 
decision-making bodies for a period of less than five  years.  Two cases are at 
stake:  appointment  of new  members  for  the  remainder  of the  term  of the 
predecessor in case of a vacancy; and staggered initial appointment, where one 
or several members are appointed for less than five years. In the first case, the 
shorter term of office may be warranted by the perspective that the respect of a 
pre-determined rhythm of repjacements strengiliens collective independence. In 
the second case, which is a once-for-all deviation from the minimum term, the 
benefit may be seen in enhanced continuity in the management of the central 
bank; 
- where a member of a decision-making body with ESCB-related tasks exercises 
functions  outside this  body,  his  or her independence  may,  depending  on the 
nature of such functions, be jeopardised. 
•  Financial 
A NCB must, of course, be financially accountable.  However, a right to control ex 
ante the budget may, depending on the context, create a situation where a NCB is 
unable to fulfil its ESCB-related tasks independently. 
2.2.4.  Integration of  NCBs in the ESCB and other legislation 
According to Article 9.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB shall ensure that the tasks 
conferred upon the ESCB are implemented either by its  own activities or through the 
NCBs. Furthermore, according to Article 14.3, the NCBs are an integral part of  the ESCB 
and shall act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. Therefore, 
provisions in. the statuteS\Of N CBs which stand in the way of the N CBs assuming their 
role need to be adapted under Article 108. 
The following is a list of  examples of  incompatibilities: 
- a provision which assigns to the NCB the competence. to set interest rates for credit 
operations or to impose minimum reserves; 
- rules which constrain the Governor in his voting behaviour in the ECB'  s Governing 
Council; 
provisions which prevent the decision-making body of a NCB from complying with 
the ECB's guidelines or instructions; 
rules which do not respect the financial provisions of  the Statute of  the ESCB; 
rules which prevent a NCB from holding and managing the official foreign reserves. 
34 Certain other provisions should be brought into line with the provisions of  the Treaty as 
well.  Examples are  any  provisions which attribute the competence  for  exchange rate 
policy  to,  the  government  or  which  assign  competence  to  national  authorities  for 
determining the volume of coins to be  issued without referring to the  ECB'  s right of 
approval. 
2.2.5. Legislation outside the scope of  Article 108 
The elements of  national legislation which are addressed above can be compared directly 
with provisions of  the Treaty and the ESCB statute.  Any necessary adjustments in these 
areas are to be made by virtue of  Article 108. 
A country adopting the single currency will have to make further adjustments which can 
only be specified when the  ECB  has  laid down detailed  rules,  or because  secondary 
legislation is  still to be adopted by the Council.  Points at issue are the details of the 
confidentiality  regime  of national  central  banks,  the  competence  of NCBs  to  make 
regulations for clearing and payment systems, or the definition of  the national currency as 
the lawful currency of a Member State. These adaptations, which are not the subject of 
the examination under Article 109j, fall under the general obligation of  Member States to 
remove  incompatibilities with EC  law from  their national  legislation.  This legislation 
should be brought into line at the date specified in secondary legislation or when the ECB 
specifies the respective rules. 
Nor does this report examine whether national legislation complies with the Treaty in 
general,  i.e.  with  any  obligation  of Member  States  to  adapt  their  legislation  to 
Community  law  other  than  those  obligations  which  follow  from  the  transfer  of 
competences in the context of  EMU. 
2.3.  Timing of adaptation 
Article 108 requires Member States to "ensure" that their legislation is compatible with 
EC law at the date of  the establishment of the ESCB at the latest. Compatibility is only 
ensured when the legislative process is completed. This conclusion applies to all three 
areas identified above,  i.e.  legislation related to the definition of a NCB's objectives, 
independence as well as integration into the ESCB and other legislation. However, the 
distinction between the three areas is important when it comes to  determining the date 
from which legislation must be applicable. 
35 Many decisions which the ECB will take between its establishment and the end of 1998 
will  pre-determine the  monetary  policy of the  euro  area.  Therefore,  incompatibilities 
which belong to the independence of  a NCB need to be effectively .removed at the date of 
establishment of the  ECB,  i.e.  the  relevant changes  in legislation  must  not  only  be 
adopted, but must be in force at this date. 
Other areas of legislation, in particular those which belong to the integration of a NCB 
into the ESCB, need to become effective at the latest when a country adopts the single 
currency and the responsibility of  its central bank for monetary policy is transferred to the 
ECB. 
A  point of particular  importance  is  the  definition  of the  objectives  of a  NCB.  This 
definition belongs to the integration of a NCB into the ESCB, with the consequence that 
amendments of the  objectives need not become effective before a  country adopts  the 
single currency.  · 
The examination of legislation in this report is based on the situation on 24  March 1998. 
In a few  Member States,  legislation is  being adapted but has  at present not yet been 
formally  adopted  by  Parliament.  In  these  cases,  the  assessment  is  based  on  the 
assumption that the draft proposals will be adopted in their present form. 
2.4.  Situation in the Member States 
The  following  country-by-country  examination  starts  with  a  summary  of legislative 
action taken since the beginning of the second stage of EMU (January 1994) or shortly 
before.  I  This is followed by an assessment of compatibility which starts with a general 
statement and goes on, where appropriate, by enumerating specific outstanding points. 
The general statement concludes that a country's legislation either is or is not compatible 
with  the  Treaty  and  the  ESCB  Statute.  Legislation  is  not  compatible  where 
incompatibilities exist which infringe upon principles of  the Treaty. In a number of  cases, 
imperfections have been identified which are either of a technical nature, or concern the 
transitional period up to the end of 1998  only,  or are ambiguities rather than  obvious 
inconsistencies.  Where  outstanding points  enumerated after  the  general  statement  are 
limited to such imperfections, the country's legislation is judged to be compatible with 
the Treaty and the ESCB .Statute. 
According to Article 109e(5) of tht:  Treaty, Member States were invited, as appropriate, to start the 
process leading to the independence of  their central bank during the second stage, in accordance with 
Article 108. 
36 2.4.1.  Belgium 
2. 4.1.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
Until recently, the legal provisions governing the central bank of  Belgium were laid down 
in the Organic Law of 1939 and the Statutes of  1939 - both as amended. The government 
proposed  amendments  to  the  Organic  Law  already  in  1996,  which  were  ultimately 
adopted by Parliament in February 1998. · 
The Banis: is a limited liability company; the Belgian State owns a controlling stake with 
50% of  the shares. Company law only supplements the Law and the Statute. The Bank is 
managed by the Governor and the Board of  Directors which comprises the Governor and 
five  to  seven  Directors.  The  Bank's structure  also  includes  the  Council  of Regency 
(which consists of the  members of the  Board and ten· non-executive members) and a 
Government  Commissioner.  Under  the  previous  legislation,  the  Council  of Regency 
supervised the Board. and had the power to fix certain key rates and terms of operation; 
no explicit provision on the Bank's objective existed; the Commissioner was entitled to 
oppose the Bank's decision on ESCB-related matters on grounds of  legality. 
Under the new Organic Law the following changes were introduced which are relevant 
with a view to Article 108 of  the Treaty: 
- Objectives 
The.  Bank's objectives  are  derived  from  a  general  reference  in Article 2  of the  Law 
pursuant to which the Bank shall form an integral part of  the ESCB. 
- Independence 
The · powers of the  Council of Regency  in  ESCB-related  matters  were  shifted to  the 
Board;  the  Council  of Regency  has  only  advisory  functions;  it  does  not have  to  be 
consulted ex ante on decisions to be taken. 
The Government Commissioner's power to review the legality of  the Bank's activities in 
the field of  ESCB-related tasks has been abolished. 
Grounds for dismissal of  the members of  the Board have been adjusted to Article 14.2of 
the ESCB Statute. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
Articl~ 2 of  the new Organic Law stipulates that "the Bank shall be an integral part of  the 
ESCB the Statutes of  which have been fzxed in  the respective Protocol annexed to  the 
Treaty establishing the European Community". All provisions which had given the Bank 
the power to define monetary policy, i.e. to fix interest rates or to impose the maintenance 
of  minimum reserves, and to issue banknotes were deleted. 
37 - Timing 
The  provisions of the Organic Law will be  put into  force  by decision of the  King  at 
different dates. Amendments related to independence enter into force at the date of the 
establishment of the ECB. Provisions on integration become effective at the latest when 
Belgium adopts the euro with the exception of  the provision relating to banknotes which 
will come into force when banknotes denominated in euro are introduced. 
2. 4.1. 2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Belgium is compatible with the requirements of  the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. 
It is expected that the provisions on the transfers of  powers in ESCB-related matters from 
the Council of  Regency to the Board will be put into force at the date of  the establishment 
ofthe ESCB. 
2.4.2. Denmark 
The legal provisions governing the central bank of Denmark are set out in the National 
Bank of  Denmark Act of 1936 (Act No 116). The Bank is a self-governing institution. 
The governing bodies of  the Bank are the Board of  Governors, the Board of  Directors and 
the  Committee  of Directors.  Authority  for  monetary  policy  rests  with  the  Board  of 
Governors, consisting of  three members with the Chairman appointed by the Crown. The 
core provisions of  the Act of 1936 are: the primary objective of  the Bank is to maintain a 
safe  and  secure currency system and to  facilitate  and regulate payment flows  and the 
extension  of credit;  the  Board  of Governors  has  full  freedom  in  formulating  and 
implementing  monetary  policy,  including  setting  interest  rates  and  deciding  on other 
monetary policy instruments. 
The members of the Board of Governors are  appointed for an indefinite term of offtce 
with  a  retirement  age  of seventy.  They  may,  according  to  the  Bank's  bye-laws,  be 
dismissed by the Crown (for the Chairman) or by two-thirds majority of the members of 
the  Board of Directors (for the  other members)  with no  grounds  for  dismissal  being 
specified. 
The  Minister of Economic  Affairs  supervises  the  Bank's fulfilment  of its obligations 
under the National Bank of  Denmark Act. 
38 Protocol No 12  of the Treaty on certain provisions relating to  Denmark states that the 
Danish government shall notify the Council of its position concerning participation in the 
· third stage before the Council makes its assessment under Article 109j(2) of the Treaty. 
Denmark has given its notification that it will not participate in Stage  Three ·and,  in 
accordance with Article 2 of the Protocol, Denmark will be treated as a country with a 
derogation.  Implications thereof were elaborated in a Decision taken at the Edinburgh 
Summit in December 1992.  This Decision states that Denmark will retain its existing 
powers in the field of monetary policy according to its national  laws and regulations, 
including powers of  the national bank of  Denmark in the field of  monetary policy. 
In the light of  t~e situation described above, the assessment of compatibility of Danish 
legislation with the requirement of the  Treaty and the ESCB  Statute is limited to the 
independence  of the  central  bank2.  This  assessment  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
legislation in Denmark is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB StatUte. 
2.4.3.  Germany 
2. 4. 3.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
The  legal  provisions  governing  the  central  bank  of Germany  are  set  out  in  the 
Bundesbank Act of 1957  and its  Statute of 1958  as  amended.  The  Bundesbank Act 
ensured a comparatively high level of  independence for the German central bank already 
at the start of  Stage Two of  EMU. 
The core provisions of the  Act of 1957  are:  the primary objective of the Bank is to 
safeguard the currency; the Bank is independent from instructions of the government in 
carrying out its tasks. Decisions on monetary policy have up to now been taken by the 
Central Bank Council which consists of the President and the Deputy President of the 
Bank, up to six other members of  the Directorate and the Presidents of  the Land Central 
Banks:  · 
In  view  of EMU,  the  Bundesbank  Act  was  amended  by  the  6th  Act  amending  the 
Bundesbank Act in December 1997. This Act covers the following areas: 
- Objectives 
The tasks and objectives of  the Bank were adapted by a revision of  Section 3 to state that 
"The Deutsche Bundesbank  ...  shall participate in the fulfilment of  its (the ESCB's) tasks 
with the primary objective of  maintaining  price stability ...  ". 
Section 12  providing for the support of the Bank to the general economic policy of the 
government was amended to take account of  the fact that such support can only be given 
as far as this is compatible with the Bank's tasks as an integral part of  the ESCB. 
2  Member States wjth a derogation are obliged to make their central bank independent at the date of  the 
establishment of  the ECB at the latest. 
39 - Independence 
The minimum tenn of office for the President and other members of the Central Bank 
Council has been extended to five yearsJ. The possibility for the government to defer the 
decisions by the Central Bank Council for two weeks has been repealed. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
Section 6 was amended to state that the Central Bank Council shall act in accordance 
with guidelines and instructions of  the ECB when assuming ESCB-related tasks. 
The provisions on the Bank's power to fix interest rates in monetary policy OP.eration and 
to impose minimum reserves were repealed. The provisions on banknote issuance and on 
participatjon in international institutions were  amended in order to  reflect the  ECB'  s 
prerogatives in these areas. 
- Timing 
The 6th Act amending the Bundesbank Act will come into force on the date from which 
Gennany participates in Stage Three of EMU  pursuant to  Article 109j  of the  Treaty. 
However, the provisions relating to the independence of the Bank became effective on 
the day following its promulgation, i.e. on 30 December 1997. 
2.4.3.2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Gennany is compatible with the requirements ofthe Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. 
3  Already  under  the  previous  Act,  the  President  and  the  Deputy  President  of the  Bank,  the  other 
members of  the Directorate and the Presidents of the Land Central Banks had to be appointed for eight 
years; in exceptional cases, however, appointments were possible for a shorter period but not for less 
than two years. The minililum period in exceptional cases will now be raised to five years. 
40 2.4.4.  Greece 
2.4.4.1. Overview and legislative action ta/cen since 1994 
Until recently the legal provisions governing the central bank of Greece were laid down 
in the  Statute  of the  Bank of Greece  of 1928  as  amended.  The  Bank's legal  fonn, 
unaltered by recent legislation, is a corporation; the holding of  the Greek State is limited 
to no more than 10 per cent of the share capital of  the Bank. The principal organs of  the 
Bank are the General Council and the Monetary Policy Council.  The Monetary Policy 
Council consists of the Governor, two Deputy Governors and three other members. The 
tenns of  office of  the members of  the Monetary Policy Council are six years. 
Legislation in order to comply with the Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three 
was adopted by Parliament in November 1997 and became effective in December 1997. 
The new law introduced the following major amendments: 
- Objectives 
The primary objective of the Bank is to ensure price stability. Without prejudice to this 
objective,  the Bank shall support the  general economic policy of the government.  As 
from  when  Greece  adopts  the  single  cUITency,  the  Bank  shall  pursue  the  primary 
objective  of maintaining  price  stability  in  accordance  with  the  terms  set  out  in 
Article 105(1) of  the Treaty. 
- Independence 
The Monetary Policy Council will "define and implement monetary policy and decide on 
matters pertaining to  the ·conduct of  exchange  rate policy,  the  operation of  payment 
systems  and  the  issue  of banknotes ".  The  General  Cotincil  retains  the  other  tasks 
conferred upon it by the Statute of  the Bank, except for matters falling within the duties 
of  the ESCB for which the Governor is responsible. 
The g!ounds for dismissal of  the Governor and the Deputy Governors have been adjusted 
to  Article 14.2  of the  ESCB  Statute.  When  the  first  Monetary  Policy  Council  is 
established, exceptionally, the tenn of office of the other three members will be four, 
three,  and  two  years  respectively.  A  person who  is  replacing  one of the  other three 
members of  the Monetary Policy Council prior to the expiry of  their tenn of  office will be 
appointed for the remainder of  the tenn of  office if  this is more than two years. 
Article 3 stipulates that " .. neither the Bank of  Greece nor any member of  its decision-
making bodies shall seek or ta/ce instructions from the government or any organisation. 
Neither  the  government  nor  any  other political authority  shall seek to  influence  the 
decision-making organs of  the Bank ... " - Integration in the ESCB 
As from when Greece adopts the single curre11.cy, the Bank shall act in accordance with 
the guidelines and instructions of the ECB as stipulated in Article 105(2) and (3) of the 
Treaty and Articles 3 and 14.3 of  the ESCB Statute. 
Article 12.17 of  the new law states that " As from the date of  adoption of  the euro as the 
national currency,  every legal provision which contravenes primary or secondary EU 
legislation on the operation ofthe ESCB and/or of  the ECB shall cease to be valid" 
Company law will only apply to the Bank to the extent that this is compatible with the 
specific provisions of  law applying to the Bank. 
- Timing 
The provisions on independence entered into force in December 1997. 
2. 4. 4:2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Greece is compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. 
However, an imperfection to be noted is that the new law includes some powers of the 
Bank of Greece which the Bank will only have as long as Greece has not adopted the 
euro and the Bank is not an integral part of  the ESCB. This concerns the power to impose 
minimum  reserves  and  the  participation  of the  Bank  in  international  monetary  and 
economic organisations_ without the ECB' s right of  approval. 
42 2.4.5. Spain 
2.4.5.1. Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
Spain substantially reformed its central bank legislation already in 1994 with a view to 
EMU. Law 13/1994 of June 1994 granted the central bank of Spain autonomy from the 
administration and established price stability as the primary objective of  monetary policy. 
The  Bank's governing  bodies  comprise  the  Governor  and  the  Deputy  Governor,  the 
Governing Council and the Executive Commission. 
The Governing Council is made up of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, six elected 
members and two ex officio members  (the  Director General  of the  Treasury and the 
Deputy Chairman of the Stock Exchange Commission). It lays down general guidelines 
for  the Bank's activities and supervises the  implementation of monetary policy to  be 
carried out by the Executive Commission. 
The  Executive  Commission comprises  the  Governor,  the  Deputy  Governor  and  two 
elected members. Its main task is the implementation of monetary policy, subject to the 
Governing Council's guidelines. 
The Bank's objectives reads as follows:  "The Bank shall define and implement monetary 
policy with the primary objective of  achieving price stability.  Without prejudice to this 
objective, monetary policy shall support the general economic policy ofthe Government" 
(cf. Article/.2 ofthe Law 13/1994). 
Spain undertook to amend the Law of 1994 by two consecutive acts in recent months. A 
law amending the Law of 1994 with regard to .  certain aspects relating to independence 
was adopted and published on 3l·December 1997. With a view to the Bank's objectives, 
its integration in the ESCB and other legislation the government submitted another draft 
law amending Law 13/1994 in Febiuary 1998. 
Objectives 
Concerning the Bank's objectives, the draft law provides that without prejudice to the 
primary objective of maintaining price  stability and to  the  functions  which the  Bank 
exercises as a member of the ESCB pursuant to Article 105(1) of the Treaty, the Bank 
shall support the general economic policy of  the government. 
Independence 
The  law  of 31 December 1997  stipulates  that  the  two  ex  officio  members  of the 
Governing Council are barred from voting on all ESCB-related matters. Furthermore, the 
terms of office of the elected members of the Governing Council are extended to  six 
years; this also applies to members substituting for elected members who have left office 
before the expiry of  their six years' term. 
43 Integration and other legislation 
The draft law includes provisions stating that the Bank will form part of the ESCB and 
will be subject to the ECB' s guidelines and instructions in the exercise of ESCB-related 
functions. Provisions vesting power in the Bank and its decision-making bodies  to define 
and implement monetary policy or to impose the maintenance of minimum reserves will 
be  repealed  or  amended  to  reflect  the  ECB's  competence  in  this  area.  Similarly, 
provisions establishing competence of  the government in the area of  excluylge rate policy 
will  be  abrogated.  Rules  on  banknotes  will  be  restricted  to  peseta-denominated 
banknotes, and the Bank's monopoly of  issuance will be repealed. The Bank's obligation 
to pay to the government interim instalments on the annual profit will also be abolished. 
Timing 
The Law of 1997 enters into force on the date of  establishment of  the ECB. The draft law 
of  February 1998 is intended to enter into force when Spain adopts the single currency. 
2. 4. 5. 2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Spain is  compatible with the requirements of the  Treaty and the  ESCB 
Statute. This assessment is based on the assumption that the draft law of  February 1998 is 
adopted in its present form. 
2.4.6. France 
2. 4. 6.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
The legal provisions governing the central bank of  France are enshrined in Law 93-980 of 
1993 as amended. Under that Law the Bank's objectives, structure and relationship with 
government were substantially revised with a view to the requirements of  the Treaty. The 
Bank's capital  is  held  by  the  State.  Its  decision-making  bodies  are  the  Governor,  the 
Monetary Policy Council and the General Council. 
The Governor, assisted by two Deputy Governors, is responsible for the management of 
the Bank. 
The Monetary Policy Council consists of the Governor, the two Deputy Governors and 
six other members. It is responsible for monetary policy decisions. 
The General Council consists of the members of the Monetary Policy Council plus one 
staff representative. Within the present legal framework, the General Council administers 
the  Bank  and  takes  decisions  in  all  other  areas  outside  monetary  policy.  A  censor 
appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance attends the meetings of the 
General Council and may oppose any of  its decisions. 
44 The government intends to submit to Parliament a draft law amending the Law of 1993 in 
the last week of  March. With respect to this draft, the following points are relevant in the 
context of  Article 108 of  the Treaty: 
- Objectives 
The Bank's objectives will be redefined as follows:  it shall  " ...  participate in carrying 
out the tasks and complying with the objectives conferred upon the ESCB by the Treaty. 
Within this framework,  and without prejudice to the primary objective of  price stability, 
the Banque de France shall support the general economic policy of  the government". 
-Independence 
Competence for ESCB-related matters will.be shifted from the General Council to the 
· Monetary  Policy  Council.  The  Governor's  right  and  obligation  to  appear  before 
parliamentary committees will be placed under the reserve of  Article 1  07 of  the Treaty. 
-Integration into the ESCB and other legislation 
The new law will state that the Bank forms an integral part of the ESCB. Similarly, the 
provision on the competence of  Monetary Policy Council will be amended to reflect that 
the Bank will be subject to the instructions and ~delines  of  the ECB. 
Provisions giving the Bank and its  Monetary Policy Council power to  formulate  and 
implement  monetary  policy  will  be  deleted.  Provisions  on ' banknote  issuance,. 
participation in international agreements and the government's power to determine the 
exchange rate policy will be amended. 
-Timing 
The new law is planned to enter into force on 1 January 1999 or at another date when 
France adopts the euro.  However, the provision according which the members of the 
Monetary Policy Council shall not seek or accept instructions from  the government or 
any other person is planned to enter into force at the date of  establishment of  the ECB. 
45 2. 4. 6. 2.  Assessment of  compatibility: 
Legislation in France is compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute.  This  assessment  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  draft  government 
proposal  for  the  amendment of the  Law 93-980  is  adopted by the  government and 
subsequently by Parliament in its present form.  It is to be understood that the General 
Council will have no  competence to  decide on issues related to  the conduct of the 
Bank's activities which derive from the tasks of  the ESCB. 
46 2.4. 7.  Ireland 
2. 4. 7.1.  Overview and legislative action talcen since 1994 
The Central Bank Act 1998, which was adopted by Parliament in March 1998, amends 
the earlier Central Bank Acts 1942-1997 by various provisions related to EMU. 
The central bank of  Ireland is governed by a Board of  Directors made up of  the Governor 
and up to nine non-executive Directors. Two Directors (the "Service Directors") can at 
the same time be officials of  the Ministry of  Finance. Prior to the Act of 1998, the Board 
was responsible for  monetary policy although the daily exercise of such powers had 
largely been delegated to the Governor; the Minister of  Finance was entitled to oblige the 
Governor or the Board to consult or advise him on matters which fall within the Bank's 
competence although in practice such a right had never been used. 
The  main  amendments  introduced  by  the  Central  Bank  Act 1998  with  a  view  to 
Article 108 of  the Treaty are the following: 
- Objectives  " 
The Bank's objectives have been redefined by stating that in discharging its functions as 
part of  the ESCB, "the primary objective of  the Bank shall be to maintain price stability" 
and, without prejudice to this objective,  "the Bank shall support the general economic 
policies  in  the  Community  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  the  achievement  of the 
objectives of  the  Community as laid down  in Article 2 of  the  Treaty";  the Bank shall 
'  - . -
assume other functions under the Treaty, Statute and national law without prejudice to 
the objective of  price stability. 
- Independence 
The performance of all  ESCB-relat~ tasks  has  been shifted  from  the  Board  to  the 
Governor; the Governor must inform the Board and may discuss the performance of  such 
tasks with it, subject to Treaty and ESCB Statute requirements. 
The Governor's obligation to consult the Minister of Finance was abolished as far  as 
ESCB-related matters are concerned; the Governor informs the Minister upon request, 
subject to Treaty and ESCB Statute requirements; 
The grounds for dismissal of  the Governor and his right of  appeal were amended. 
47 •  Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
A  general  provision  was  inserted  making  it  clear that  the  Bank "shall perform  any 
function or duty or exercise any power required by or under the provisions of  the Treaty 
or the ESCB Statute";  ·  · 
A further provision was introduced allowing a flow of  information between the Bank and 
the EMIIECB; the provisions on banknote issuance were amended to reflect Article 1  05a 
of  the Treaty; provisions ,giving the Minister power in the area of  foreign exchange policy 
have  been  deleted;  the  provision  authorising  the  Minister  to  suspend  private 
undertakings'  activities on macroeconomic  grounds  has  been reworded to reflect that 
concerns about the value of  the currency may no longer motivate such measure. 
- Timing 
The Central Bank Act 1998 shall come into operation on such day or days as the Minister 
may appoint. 
2. 4. 7. 2. Assessment of  compatibility · 
Legislation in Ireland is compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. 
It  is  expected that the  Minister will  exercise  the  power to  put the  Act into  force  in 
accordance with the timetable envisaged by Article 108 of  the Treaty. 
2.4.8. Italy 
2. 4. 8.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
The statute of  the central bank of  Italy is contained in Royal Decree No 1067 of 1936 as 
amended. The Bank's structure reflects its original status as a joint stock company. 
The Bank is directed by the Governor, assisted by the General Manager.  The Bank is 
administered by the Board of  Directors, composed of  the Governor and 13 non-executive 
members, i.e. members who hold positions outside the Bank. The Board has some limited 
competence in certain ESCB-related matters other than monetary policy. 
In October 1997 the Parliament granted the government the power to adopt legislation by 
legislative decree in relation to the introduction of  the euro and Article 108 of  the Treaty. 
Making use of  this power, the Italian government introduced a draft legislative decree in 
December 1997 with a view to  adapting  Italian legislation to  the requirements of the 
Treaty  and  the  Statute.  The  legislative  decree  was  adopted  by  government  on 
4 March 1998.  Necessary  amendments of the  "statuto  della Banca d'Italia"  following 
from  this legislative decree were adopted by the  General Meeting of Shareholders on 
19 March 1998; approval of this decision by Presidential Decree is expected to be given 
in the first half of  April. 
48 - Objectives  . 
The new legislative decree states in Article 2 that the Bank shall  ''pursue the objectives 
assigned to the ESCB in conformity with Article 105(1) of  the Treaty." 
- Independence 
The term of  office of members of the Board other than the Governor is extended to five 
years. As before the introduction of  the new law, the term of  office of  the Governor is not 
specified. Persons holding positions outside the Bank with potentially conflicting interest 
can no longer be appointed as members of  the Board. 
The power of the Ministry of the Treasury to  fix  certain deposit interest rates  and to 
suspend and annul decisions of  the Board in ESCB-related matters is abolished. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
Provisions  regarding  the  definition  of monetary  policy,  the  management  of official 
foreign reserves, bank.note issuance and the distribution of  monetary income are amended 
to respect the prerogatives of the ESCB in these fields. In particular, decision-making or 
supervisory powers of  the Ministry of  the Treasury and other authorities in these areas are 
repealed. 
- Timing 
The  provisions  concerning  independence  entered  into  force  upon  publication  of  .  the 
legislative decree on 14 March 1998, provisions on integration will enter into force on the 
date established by the minister or on the date when Italy adopts the euro. 
2. 4. 8. 2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Italy is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
It is expected that the minister will put into force at the date of the establishment of the 
ESCB the provisions which transfer the management of foreign reserves to the central 
bank. 
Given that the Governor can only be dismissed on the grounds specified in Article 14.2 
of the  ESCB  Statute,  the  absence  of a  fixed  term  of office  can  be  considered  as 
compatible. 
49 2.4.9.  Luxembourg 
2.4.9.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
Based oil an earlier proposal, the government submitted a revised draft law to Parliament 
in December 1997 amending the Statute of the monetary institute of Luxembourg (the 
"Institute") which is at present laid down in the Law of 1983. 
The Institute is an entity under public law whose capital is held by the Grand Duchy. Its 
decision-making bodies are the Management and the Council. The Management, which is 
in charge of the fulfilment of the Institute's tasks, consists of the Director General and 
two Directors who are appointed for a term of  office of six years. The Council consists of 
six non-executive members, i.e. members who hold positions outside the Institute; they 
are appointed for a period of office of four years. In the draft law it is envisaged to alter 
the  Council's  composition.  Once  the  law  is  in  force,  the  Council  will  comprise  the 
members of  the management plus six non-executive members. 
Up  to  the  present,  the  Institute  has  never  fully  exercised  monetary  tasks  due  to  the 
Monetary  Union  with  Belgium  existing  since  1922.  The  National  Bank  of Belgium 
assumes a number of  central bank functions for Luxembourg. 
The draft law includes the following main elements: 
- Objectives 
The Institute's principal objective will be to maintain price stability, Without prejudice to 
this objective, it will support the general economic policy. 
- Independence 
Institutional  independence  in  ESCB-related  matters  will  be  explicitly  provided  for; 
grounds  for  dismissal  ,of  members  of  the  Management  will  be  amended;  the 
government's right to dismiss the Management in its entirety on grounds of fundamental 
disagreement will be repealed; it will be clarified that the government's decision on the 
annual  discharge has  to  be  taken  without prejudice to  the  Institute's independence in 
ESCB-related tasks. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
A general provision will be inserted saying that the Institute "shall be the central bank of 
Luxembourg in  the framework of  the  ESCB ".  Its  name  will  be  changed to  "Banque 
Centrale  du  Luxembourg".  The  provisions  on monetary  income  will  be  amended  to 
reflect the ESCB Statute. 
- Timing 
Entry into force will be on the first day of  the month following the date of  publication. 
50  . 2. 4. 9. 2. Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Luxembourg is  compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the 
ESCB  Statute.  This  assessment  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  proposed  law 
amending the law of 1983 will be adopted by Parliament in its present form.  However, 
the following imperfections are to be noted: 
- the draft law fails to ensure that no conflicts of interest arise for the six non-executive 
members of the Board in the performance of their functions  inside and outside the 
Bank; 
- the Institute's secondary objective of supporting the general economic policy fails to 
reflect  unambiguously  the  secondary  objective  of the  ESCB  as  formulated  in 
Article 1  05 of  the Treaty; 
- the  provisions  vesting  in  the  Institute  and  its  Council  the  power  to  "define  and 
implement  monetary  policy  at  the  national  level"  do  not  reflect  the  ECB'  s 
competences; 
- the same remark applies to the provision according to which the Institute may provide 
credit facilities to ensure the efficiency and stability of  payment systems. 
2.4.1 0. Netherlands 
2. 4.1 0.1. Overview and  legislative action taken since 1994 
In September 1997 the government submitted to  Parliament a proposal for a new Act 
replacing the Bank Act 1948 governing the central bank of  the Netherlands. This Act was 
finally adopted by Parliament on 24 March 1998. 
The Bank is a limited company subject to company law and specific public law rules. All 
shares are held by the State. The Bank's internal structure (Governing and Supervisory 
Board) reflects this legal form. The Governing Board consists of the Governor and three 
to  five  Executive  Directors.  It  is  competent  for  all  policy  decisions  and  for  the 
management of the  Bank.  The  Supervisory Board consists of nine  to  12 members.  It 
supervises the Bank's management. One of  its members is the Royal Commissioner. 
Under the Bank Act 1948 the Ministry of Finance was empowered to issue directions to 
the Governing Board4;  the Royal  Commissioner supervised the  Bank on behalf of the 
government; the Bank's objective was defined as to regUlate the value of the currency in 
a way "most conducive to the nation's prosperity and wealth". 
4  In the case of  objections presented by the Bank, the Bank is only obliged to comply if  the government 
has confirmed the directions and after the different positions have been published. In  practice these 
rights have never been used. 
51 The new Act introduces the following changes with a view to Article 108 of  the Treaty: 
- Objectives 
The former definition of  the Bank's objectives has been replaced by a language identical 
to Article 1  05(1 ). 
- Independence 
The Royal Commissioner's supervisory powers will be abolished. 
The grounds for dismissal of a member of the Governing Board have been brought into 
line with the grounds mentioned in Article 14.2 of  the ESCB Statute. 
- Integration in the ESCB 
Section 1 expressly states that the Bank will constitute an integral part of  the ESCB as far 
as  ESCB-related  tasks  are  concerned.  Section 3  provides  that  " in  carrying  out  the 
(ESCB) tasks and duties .... the Bank shall seek and take instructions exclusively from the 
ECB". 
The ESCB-related tasks of the Bank have been defined in accordance with Article 3 of 
the ESCB Statute; similarly; the provisions on operations and banknote issuance have 
been adjusted to acknowledge the articles of  the Statute; they are placed under the general 
reserve of"due observation ofthe provisions of  the Treaty". 
- Timing 
The provisions relating to independence will come into force at the date of establishment 
of  the ECB, those relating to integration at the beginning of Stage Three. 
2. 4.1 0. 2.  Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in the Netherlands is compatible with the requirements of  the Treaty and the 
ECB Statute. 
One imperfection to be noted is the provision in the Act according to which the Bank has 
the task to "co-define" monetary policy; this should be read as referring to the governor's 
role as member of  the Governing Council of  the ECB. 
52 2.4.11. Austria 
2.4.11.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
In view of  Article 108 of  the Treaty, the government transmitted a draft law to Parliament 
on 10 March 1998. At present, the legal provisions governing the Central Bank of  Austria 
are set out in the Central Bank Act of 1984 as amended. 
The Bank is a joint stock company; half of its capital is subscribed by the Republic. The 
Bank's  structure  (General  Meeting  of shareholders,  General  Council  and  Board  of 
Executive  Directors)  reflects  this  legal  form.  The  General  Council  consists  of its 
chairman  (the  "President"),  two  Vice-Presidents  and  11  non-executive  members.  It 
directs  the  Bank  and  takes  all  basic  decisions  on  monetary  policy.  The  Board  of 
Executive Directors which comprises the Governor as its chairman, the Vice-Governor 
and two to four other members, is in charge ofthe,management of  the Bank; it reports to 
the General Council and acts in accordance with the latter's guidance. 
A state commi.ssioner exercises control over the Bank's activities to ensure compliance 
with the Central Bank Act. 
The draft Law includes the following main elements: 
- Objectives 
Section  4 of  the Central Bank Act of 1984 stipulating ~at  the Bank shall pay due regard 
to the economic policy of the government when determining monetary and credit policy 
will be replaced by a provision stating that  "Within the framework of  Community law, 
notably Articles 2 and 105 of  the Treaty,  the Bank will be obliged to pursue the objective 
of  price stability with all the means which are at its disposal.  Without prejudice to the 
aim of  price stability,  the  general macroeconomic requirements concerning economic 
growth and the development of  employment shall be taken account of  and the general 
economic policies in the Community shall be supported". 
- Independence 
When assuming ESCB-related tasks the Bank and the members of its decision-making 
bodies  will  be  explicitly  prohibited  from  seeking  or  taking  instructions  from  any 
Community or national institution or body or from any other body. 
Decision-making power in all ESCB-related matters will be transferred from the General 
Council to the Board of Executive Directors, thus solving the problem of the General 
Council  members  acting  only  on  an  honorary  basis.  There  will  be  only  one 
Vice-President in the General Council, while the number ofmell).bers will not change. 
The minimum term of office of the  Governor,  the Vice-Governor and the other two 
members of  the Board of  Executive Directors will be extended to five  year~; the grounds 
for their dismissal will be adjusted to conform with Article 14.2 of  the ESCB Statute; any 
activity raising doubts as to their personal independence will be prohibited. 
I 
A provision will be introduced stating that the Governor and Vice-Governor when acting 
as members of  the ECB Governing and General Councils are not bound by any decisions 
of  the Bank's General Council or Board of  Executive Directors. 
53 The  state commissioner's powers will be reduced;  the only remaining right will  be  to 
attend  the  shareholders'  General  Meeting  and  the  General  Council  meetings  in  an 
advisory capacity. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
Provisions will be introduced stipulating that the Bank is  "an integral part of  the ESCB " 
and that, when fulfilling ESCB-related tasks,  "it shall act in accordance with guidelines 
and instructions of  the ECB ". 
Furthermore,  provisions  on  participation  m  international  monetary  institutions  and 
banknote issuance will be amended. 
- Timing 
The provisions of the  Act ensuring the  personal  independence of the  members of the 
Board of Executive Directors will  enter into  force  at the date  of establishment of the 
ECB. A transitional rule will be introduced for the remainder of  Stage Two protecting the 
Board against interference from  the General  Council in matters relating to the Bank's 
preparation for Stage Three. 
The remaining provisions will enter into force when Austria adopts the single currency. 
2. 4.11. 2.  Assessment of  compatibility 
··Legislation in Austria is compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. This assessment is based on the assumptiQn that the proposed Act amending the 
Central Bank Act of 1984 is adopted by Parliament in its present form. 
54 2.4.12. Portugal 
2. 4.12.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
In January 1998 a Law was adopted amending the Organic Law of the central bank of 
Portugal with a view to Article 108 of  the Treaty. 
The Bank is managed by the Governor and the Board of  Directors. Supervisory functions 
are  exercised  by  the  Board  of Auditors,  advice  can  be  requested  from  the  Advisory 
Board. The Board of Directors is made up of the Governor, one or two Vice-Governors 
and three to five Directors. 
The new Law includes the following amendments: 
- Objectives 
The  old  Article 3  pursuant  to  which  the  Bank  had  to  take  into  account  the  overall 
economic policy of the government when pursuing the  goal of price stability has been 
replaced by a provision saying that the Bank "shall pursue the objectives of  and take part 
in the performance of  the tasks entrusted to the ESCB". 
- Independence 
The Governor's obligation to submit to the government any vetoes on decisions of the 
Board has been suppressed; a provision has been inserted according to which decisions of 
the Board on ESCB-related matters require the consent of the Governor; the provision 
giving the Minister influence on monetary policy and other ESCB-related tasks has been 
deleted; likewise, the Minister's signature of  notices of  the Bank has been abolished. 
Grounds for dismissal of  the members of the Board have been adapted to Article 14.2 of 
the ESCB Statute. The members of  the Board are not allowed to assume any remunerated 
activity outside the Bank (except lecturing at universities). 
- Integration in the ESCB  . 
A new Article 3 has been introduced stipulating that the Bank "shall be an integral part 
of  the ESCB" and shall act  "in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of  the 
ECB". 
In order to  respect  the  ECB 's prerogatives,  amendments  have  been  made  regarding 
.  banknote issuance, monetary policy operations, minimum reserves and participation in 
international monetary institutions. 
- Timing 
All provisions regarding independence have entered into force already;while the other 
provisions will come into force when Portugat adopts the euro. 
55 2. 4.12. 2.  Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Portugal is compatible with the requirements of  the Treaty and the ESCB 
Statute. 
2.4.13. Finland 
2. 4.13.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
The  legal  provisions  governing  the  Central  Bank  of Finland  are  set  out  in  the 
Constitution, the Parliament Act and the Central Bank Act. 
The  governing bodies  are  the  Board and the  Parliamentary Supervisory Council.  The 
Board comprises the Governor, who is the chainnan, and up to five members, appointed 
by the President of  the Republic on a proposal by the Parliamentary Supervisory Council. 
The Governor is appointed for seven years and the other members of the Board for five 
years. The Parliamentary Supervisory Council consists of nine members of Parliament 
appointed for the parliamentary term. 
The process of  reviewing central bank legislation started already in 1993 and an amended · 
Central  Bank Act was  adopted by Parliament in June 1997  and entered into force  on 
1 January 1998.  The  new  Act  established the  independence  of the  Bank  but did  not 
address  the  issue  of integration  in  the  ESCB.  In order  to . comply  fully  with  the 
requirements  of the  Treaty  and  the  ESCB  Statute,  the  government  put  forward  in 
February 1998 a new draft bill on the Bank of Finland Act which is intended to replace 
the recent Central Bank Act. The bill also contains changes to the Currency Act and the 
Coin Act. The bill was adopted by Parliament on 20 March 1998. The main provisions of 
the new legislation are: 
- Objectives 
As  stated in Article 2 of the draft law,  "the primary objective of  the  Bank of  Finland 
shall be  to  maintain price .stability.  Without prejudice  to  the  objective  laid down  in 
paragraph 1,  the  Bank of  Finland shall also  support the  achievement of other policy 
objectives in accordance with the Treaty". 
- Independence 
The Parliamentary Supervisory Council, which previously had extensive competences, is 
transformed into a mainly supervisory authority with restricted powers in respect of the 
Bank's administration. The grounds for dismissal of  members of  the Board have been be 
brought in line with Article 14.2 of  the ESCB Statute. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
The main task of the Bank will be to contribute to the execution of monetary policy as 
defmed by the Governing Council of the  ECB.  The Bank shall also  contribute to the 
issuance  of banknotes,  contribute  to  the  management  of foreign  exchange  reserves, 
participate  in  maintaining  the  reliability  and  efficiency  of the  payment  system  and 
provide for the publication of  statistics. 
56 The provision of  the Currency Act on decision-making concerning the /external value of 
the Finnish markka will be repealed. 
- Timing 
The provision of  the Bank of Finland Act ensuring independence of  the Bank will enter 
into  force  soon after  ratification  by the  President on 27 March 1998.  The  remaining 
provisions of  the Bank of  Finland Act, the Currency Act and the Coin Act will enter into 
force when Finland joins Stage Three of  EMU. 
2. 4.13. 2.  Assessment of  compatibility 
Legislation in Finland is compatible with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
2.4.14. Sweden 
2. 4.14.1.  Overview and legislative action taken since 1994 
The  legal  provisions  governing  the  Central  Bank  of Sweden  are  contained  in  the 
Constitution, the Riksdag Act and the Riksbank Act of 1988 as amended. 
In the  perspective of economic  and  monetary  union,  the  government .  put forward  to 
Parliament a proposal to amend the Constitution, the Riksdag Act and the Riksbank Act 
in  November 1997.  Parliament  adopted  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  in 
March 1998 in a first vote. 
According  to  the  Riksbank  Act,  the  Bank  is  administered  by  the  Governing  Board 
consisting of  eight members. Seven of  the members are elected directly by Parliament for 
four years normally.  The Governor is elected for a  five-year term by the other seven 
members. The Governor may be dismissed by the other members of  the Governing Board 
and they in tum may be dismissed by Parliament, with no  grounds being stated.  The 
Governing Board is responsible for all important decisions but the Governor is the only 
member taking part in the day-to-day management of  the Bank. 
The Bank is responsible for all matters of  exchange rate and monetary policy. There is no 
statutory objective for monetary policy. Prior to taking decisions of  importance regarding 
monetary and exchange rate policy, the Bank must consult the Minister of Finance. The 
Bank  is  formally  responsible  to  Parliament.  This  means  that  Parliament  annually 
determines  whether  to  discharge  the  Governing  Board  from  responsibility  for  its 
administration during the preceding year. 
57 The government proposal includes the following changes: 
- Objectives 
The implicit objectives for the Bank to maintain price stability will be laid down by law 
in the Riksbank Act. 
- Independence 
Public  authorities  will  be  prohibited from  giving  the  Bank  instructions  on  monetary 
policy through a provision in the Constitution. The Bank will no longer have to consult 
with the  Minister of Finance prior to  taking policy decisions.  The  Riksbank Act will 
prohibit higher officials of  the Bank from seeking or taking instructions. 
An Executive Board will be established with the task of defining monetary policy. The 
Governing Board will appoint all members of the Executive Board for six-year periods 
with  the  Governor  of the  Bank  being  one  of its  members.  An  amendment  to  the 
Constitution will secure the tenure of the members of the  Executive Board by stating 
grounds for  dismissal conforming to  Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute. The Governing 
Board will be given a supervisory function with no monetary policy competence. 
- Integration in the ESCB and other legislation 
The  responsibility  for  exchange  rate  policy  will  be  transferred from  the  Bank to  the 
'government. 
The government proposal does not address issues related to the integration of  the Bank in 
the ESCB. 
Current  rules  regarding  confidentiality  establish  the  principle  that  all  documents  are 
public unless they are  made  secret Qy  law.  Chapter 3,  Article 1 of the  Secrecy Act of 
1980 · provides  for  the  possibility  of applying  secrecy  on  a  case-by-case  basis  to 
information concerning Sweden's  "central finance policy,  monetary policy, or currency 
policy,  if  it can be  assumed that the  aim of  decided or anticipated actions would be 
counteracted should the information be disclosed " 
-Timing 
The second vote confirming the amendments to the constitution can only be taken by the 
next Parliament after the general elections in September 1998. The amendments to the 
Riksdag Act and the Riksbank Act are planned to be adopted by Parliament together with 
the second vote on the Constitution in October 1998. All amendments would enter into 
force on 1 January 1999. 
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Legislation in Sweden is  not compatible with the requirements of the  Treaty and  the 
ESCB Statute. The following incompatibilities are to be noted: 
- the  time  constraints  for  the  adoption  of present  draft legislation do  not permit to 
assume that legislation will be adapted in time. As a consequence, the Bank will not 
be independent at the date of  establishment of  the ECB; . 
- the present draft legislation does not ensure full integration of  the Bank in the ESCB; 
in particular, the provisions regarding the Bank's powers in the monetary· policy area 
do not recognise the ESCB's powers in this field.-
Furthermore, the present draft legislation includes some imperfections: 
Chapter 9, Article 13, of  the Constitution giving the Bank the exclusive right to issue 
banknotes does not recognise the ESCB'  s competence in this field.  T~e adaptation of 
this article requires the endorsement of  two consecutive Parliaments; 
- the prohibition to  seek or ui.ke  instructions only covers monetary policy issues  and 
does not extend to all ESCB-related tasks. 
2.4.15. United Kingdom 
In May 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced reforms concerning the Bank 
of England.  These  reforms  were  transformed  into  a  Bill  introduced  to  Parliament  in 
October 1997, which is expected to come into law in the first half of 1998. 
According to the Bill, the Court of  Directors, responsible for managing the Bank's affairs 
(other than the formulation of  monetary policy), will consist of  the Governor, two Deputy 
Governors and 16 Directors. The Governor and the two Deputy Governors are required to 
work exclusively for the Bank. The Governor and the Deputy Governors are appointed 
for renewable five-year terms and Directors for renewable three-year terms. A Governor, 
Deputy  Governor  or Director  may  be  dismissed  from  office  under  certain  specified 
conditions. 
59 Other features of  the Bill include the following: 
- the Bank .has a specific monetary policy objective of maintaining price stability and, 
subject to that, supporting the government's economic policy, including its objectives 
for growth and employment;. 
- the Treasury may specify annually what price stability is to be taken to consist of and 
what the government's economic policies are to be taken to be for these purposes; 
- the establishment of a Monetary Policy Committee, consisting of the Governor, two 
Deputy  Governors,  two  additional  senior  Bank  officials  and  four  other  expert 
members from outside the Bank is responsible for formulating monetary policy;  -
- the government retains the right to give the Bank directions with respect, to monetary 
policy in extreme economic circumstances, for a limited period, subject to ratification 
by Parliament. 
By virtue of Paragraph 5 of Protocol No 11  annexed to  the Treaty,  Article 108  of the 
Treaty does not apply to the United Kingdom as long as it does not wish to participate in 
Stage Three  of EMU.  The  United Kingdom  has  notified the  Council· that  it  does  not 
intend to move to the third stage of EMU on 1 January 1999. As a consequence, as long 
as the United Kingdom does not change its position, it is under no obligation to adapt its 
legislation with a view to Stage Three of  EMU. 
In light of  the situation described above, no assessment of  compatibility is undertaken for 
the  United Kingdom.  An  assessment  will  have  to  be  made  if  and  when  the 
United Kingdom decides to participate in Stage Three of  EMU. 
60 3.  - PRICE STABILITY 
3.1.  Treaty provisions 
The price stability criterion is defined in the first indent of Article 1  09j(1) of the Treaty: 
"the achievement of  a high degree of  price stability {. .. ]  will be apparent from a rate of 
inflation which is close to that of, at most,  the three best performing Members States in 
terms of  price stability. II 
Protocol No 6 on the  convergence  criteria  develops  Article 109j(l),  by  stipulating  in 
Article 1 that  a  Member  State  is  convergent  in  terms  of inflation  if it "has a price 
performance that is sustainable and an average rate of  inflation, observed over a period 
of  one year before the examination,  that does not exceed by more than 1  ~  percentage 
points  that of,  at most,  the  three  best performing Member  States  in  terms of  price 
stability.  Inflation  shall  be  measured by means of the  consumer price.  index  on a 
comparable basis, taking into account difforences in national definitions. II 
Since national consumer price indices (CPis) diverge substantially in terms of  ~oncepts, 
methods and practices, they do not constitute the appropriate means to meet the Treaty 
requirement that inflation must be  measured on a comparable basis.  To  this end, the 
Council adopted on 23 October 1995  a framework Regulation (No 2494/95) setting the 
legal basis for the establishment of a hannonised methodology for compiling consumer 
price indices in the Member States. This regulation laid down a graduated approach to 
harmonisation comprised of  two steps. 
The first step of  the harmonisation process consisted in the production by March 1996 of 
a set of "interim indices of consumer prices" (llCPs). These mterim indices were based 
entirely on existing national CPis, adjusted solely so as to make the coverage of goods 
and services as similar as possible. The IICPs were used in the 1996 convergence reports 
presented by the Commission and the EMI. 
The second step of  the harmonisation process resulted in the construction of  "harmonised 
indices  of consumer prices"  (HICPs).  They  are  compiled  by  the  Member  States  and 
harmonised in several ·methodological areas as well as with regard to coverage (for more 
details  see  the  annex  to  this  chapter).  The  first  set  of HICPs  was  published  in 
March 1997,  with historical  series  dating  back to  January 1995.  Even  though  certain 
elements in their construction remain to be fully harmonised, the HICPs in their current 
shape represent a very substantial advance and clearly constitute much more comparable 
and reliable data for the assessment of price stability and inflation convergence in the 
Member States than the national CPis. 
61 3.2.  Price stability as assessed by the HICPs 
3.2.1. Recent trends 
The time series for  the  HICPs  are  available only from  January 1995.  As  a result,  the 
analysis  of recent  inflation trends  based  on these  indices  cannot  start before  January 
1996.  Over  the  last  two  years,  further  headway  towards  price  stability  and  inflation 
convergence has been made throughout the Community.  Inflation in the Community as a 
whole as measured by the HICP (percentage change on a year earlier) declined steadily 
from 2.7% in January 1996 to  1.5%  in  April1997. It  edged up  marginally during the 
summer of 1997 due to temporary factors  such as  a pick-up in import prices resulting 
from the effective depreciation of Community currencies as well as increases in indirect 
taxation and/or administered prices in some countries. Since October 1997, inflation has 
resumed its downward trend, reaching a low of 1.3% in January 1998. 
In the  1  0 Member States where the annual inflation rate was  close to  or below 2% in 
January 1996  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  France,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Austria,  Finland and  Sweden)  inflation remained generally subdued until 
January 1998 (see Graph 3.1). However, during the period under review, in some of  these 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Austria)  inflation temporarily exceeded 2% 
but fell back significantly thereafter. Only in the Netherlands and Sweden has there been 
a more pronounced and sustained rise in inflationary pressure, during the second half of 
1997. In the former country, this acceleration basically reflected the combined impact of 
the continued strong pace of output growth, leading to a closing of the output gap and a 
gradual  tightening of labour market conditions, and the  depreciation of the  guilder in 
effective terms.  However,  under the  impact of a marked  slowdown  in  import  prices, 
reflecting both the fading impact of  the depreciation of the guilder in effective terms and 
a fall  in the international prices of raw materials,  inflation fell  sharply during the last 
couple of months, reaching 1.6% in January 1998.  In Sweden, several factors are behind 
the marked pick-up in price increases over the last 12 months, including: the unwinding 
of some special factors which sent inflation down to a very low level in 1996 (such as a 
reduction in VAT on food  and  a strong appreciation of the  krona),  increased indirect 
taxes,  higher  administered  prices  and  an  acceleration  in  wage  increases.  However, 
following the temporary rises due to these specific factors, and under the influence of a 
tightening of both monetary and  budgetary policies,  inflation stopped increasing  from 
September 1997 onwards, and even slowed down to just above 2% in January 1998. 
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63 In the remaining Member States, significant progress has  been achieved with inflation 
performance and,  with the exception of Greece, they have succeeded in reducing their 
rates of  inflation to below 2%. In Portugal, where inflation stood at 2.5% in early 1996, a 
containment of wage increases, continued strong productivity gains and subdued import 
prices have supported disinflation. Against a background of robust economic growth but 
helped  by  sterling  appreciation,  the  United Kingdom  has  succeeded  in  achieving  a 
satisfactory degree of price stability and inflation convergence. Having hovered around 
3%%  throughout most of 1996,  inflation in  Spain dropped rapidly  in 1997.  In Italy, 
following  a  blip  in  1995,  which  to  a  large  extent  reflected  the  impact  of currency 
depreciation,  inflation has  fallen  steadily and  significantly over the  last two  years.  In 
Spain and Italy, these favourable developments were brought about under the combined 
influence of  a steadfast stability-oriented monetary policy and structural improvements in 
the functioning of labour, product and service markets. Finally, in Greece, inflation has 
shown a further convergence with the other Member States. It declined from about 8% in 
early 1996 to 4.3% in January i998 against a background of  broad exchange rate stability 
and further budgetary consolidation. Continued high wage pressure, however, hindered 
more visible headway towards price stability. 
3.2.2. Inflation developments in relation to th.e reference value 
The assessment of the price convergence criterion as laid down in Protocol No 6 of the 
Treaty requires an operational definition encompassing two elements: first, the definition 
of "the  average  rate  of inflation,  observed  over  a period of one  year  before  the 
examination",  and,  secondly,  the  calculation  of the  reference  value  against  which 
Member States' price performance will be assessed. 
In this report, in continuation of  the practice followed in previous reports1, the following 
operational  definitions  have  been  used.  A  Member  State's average  rate  of inflation, 
observed  over  a  period  of one  year,  is  measured  by  the ·percentage  change  in  the 
arithmetic average of  the last 12 monthly indices relative to the arithmetic average of the 
12 monthly  indices of the previous  period2.  The  reference  value  is  ci:Uculated  as  the 
unweighted arithmetic average of  the inflation rates of  the three best performing Member 
States plus 1.5 percentage points. 
See ."&eport  on  convergence  in  the  European  Union  in  1995",  published  in  European  Economy, 
Supplement A,  No 1,  January 1996,  and "Report on  convergence  in  the  European  Union  in  1996", 
COM(96)560, published in European Economy, Supplement A, No 1, January 1997. 
2  . This measure has been retained as it captures inflation trends over a period of  one year as requested by 
the provisions of  the Treaty. The commonly used inflation rate  is calculated as the percentage change 
in  the  consumer price  index  of the  latest  month  over  the  index  for .the  equivalent  month  of the 
previous year.  However,  this  inflation rate  may  vary importantly from  month to  month  because  of 
possible base effects due to exceptional factors such as changes in indirect taxes. 
64 Over  the  year  from  February 1997  to 
January 1998,  the  three  best  performances  in 
terms  of price  stability  were  seen  in  France, 
Ireland and Austria (see Table 3.1).  The mean 
of the  three  best-performing  Member  States' 
inflation  rates  was  1.2%.  This  results  in  a 
reference  value  of  2. 7%.  In  January 1998, 
14 Member States had an average inflation rate 
well  below the  reference  value,  the  exception 
being  Greece.  It  is  worth  noting  that  if the 
reference  value  was  to  be  measured  by  the 
country with the lowest inflation rate  (namely 
Austria) plus 1.5 percentage points, the strictest 
possible way in which the reference value could 
be  defined,  inflation  in  all  these  14 Member 
States  would  still  stand  below  the  reference 
valueJ. 
Over the period for which a reference value can 
be  calculated  using  the  HICPs,  the  reference 
value  edged  up  marginally  from  2.5%  in 
December 1996  to  2. 7%  in  January 1998  (see 
Table 3.2).  This  gradual  increase  does  not 
reflect  signs  of any  rekindling  of inflationary 
pressures in the Community, but rather a gentle 
upward movement from the exceptionally low 
rates  of inflation  observed  in  some  Member 
States at the beginning of the period. Over the 
period  under  review,  the  composition  of the 
reference  group  of the  three  best  performers 
remained  unchanged  from  December 1996  to 
September 1997  but  changed  frequently 
thereafter.  No  Member  State  has  belonged 
unfailingly to the reference group. 
Convergence  in  price  inflation,  which  was 
already quite remarkable at the end of 1996, has 
strengthened  further  over  the  last  12 months._ 
Whereas  11 Member  States  recorded  an 
average inflation rate below the reference value 
Table 3.1 
Inflation convergence 
(Inflation measured by the percentage 
change in the HICP) •> 
January 1998 
Three best performers : 
A  1.1 
F  1.2 
IRL  1.2 
Reference value bJ  1.7 
Member States below reference value 
B  1.4 
DK  1.9 
D  1.41 
E  1.8 
F  1.2 
IRL  1.2 
I  1.8 
L  1.4 
NL  1.8 
A  1.1 
p  1.8 
FIN  1.3 
s  1.9 
UK  1.8 
Member State above reference value 
EL  5.2 
a)  Measured by the arithmetic average of 
the latest 12 monthly indices relative 
to the arithmetic average of  the 12 
monthly indices of  the previous 
period. 
b) Unweighted arithmetic average of  the 
three best performers in terms of 
inflation plus 1.5 percentage points. 
Source: Commission services. 
in December 1996,_this group was extended to  13  in June 1997 and 14 in July 1997, as 
first  Italy  and  Portugal,  and  then  Spain,  succeeded  in  bringing  down  their  average 
inflation rate to, or below, the reference value (see Table 3.2. and Graph 3.2). 
3  Consequently,  alternative  methods  for  calculating  the  reference  value,  as  detailed  in  the  1996 
Convergence Report,  would give an identical number of  countries below the reference value. 
65 Table 3.2 
Evolution of  the inflation reference value and of  the group of 
countries respecting it •> 
Three best  Reference  Number of Member States respecting 
performers  value b)  reference value 
Dec.  96·  L, FIN,S  2.S  11  B,DK,D,F,IRL,L,NL,A,FIN,S,UK 
Jan.  97  L,FIN,S  2.S  11  "  " 
Feb.  97  L, FIN,S  2.S  II  "  " 
Mar.  97  L, FIN,S  2.6  11  "  " 
Apr.  97  L, FIN,S  2.6  11  "  " 
May  97  L, FIN,S  2.S  II  "  " 
Jun.  97  L, FIN,S  2.6  ll  B,DK,D,F,IRL,I,L,NL,A,P,FIN,S,UK 
Jul.  97  L, FIN,S  2.6  14  B,DK,D,E,F,IRL,I,L,NL,A,P,FIN,S,UK 
Aug.  97  L, FIN,S  2.7  14  "  " 
Sep.  97  L,FIN,S  2.8  14  "  " 
Oct.  97  F, A, FIN  2.8  14  "  " 
Nov.  97  F, A, FIN  2.8  14  "  " 
Dec.  97  IRL, A, FIN  2.7  14  "  " 
Jan.  98  F, IRL,A  2.7  14  "  " 
a)  Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of  the latest 12 monthly indices 
relative to the arithmetic average of  the 12 monthly indices of  the previous period. 
b)  Unweighted arithmetic average ofthe three best performers in terms of inflation plus 
l.S percentage points. 
Source: Commission services. 
Greece has made substantial progress in reducing inflation and converging towards the 
low inflation rates  reached in the other Member States.  Over the past  12 months,  the 
difference  from  the reference value shrank by  2.8 percentage points.  Nevertheless,  the 
average inflation rate of 5.2% in January 1998  still exceeded the  referenc~ value by a 
considerable margin. 
66 Graph 3.2 
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Comparison of Member States' average Inflation rates 
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67 3.3.  Inflation performance during the second stage of EMU 
Table 3.3 
Private consumption deflator 
The  limited  time-span 
covered  by  the  HICP 
series  does  not  allow 
recent  inflation 
developments to  be seen 
in  a  medium-term 
perspective. Accordingly, 
national  private 
consumption  deflators4 
are  utilised  to  examine 
medium-term  trends,  as 
part of the assessment of 
the  sustainability  of the 
inflation performance. 
(national currency, annual percentage change) 
Following  a  setback 
during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s,  the  inflation 
performance  of  the 
CommUnity  improved 
continuously  and 
substantially  in 
subsequent years.  After a 
peak of  5.6% in 1991, the 
inflation rate  declined  to 
4.1%  in  1993  and 
decelerated further during 
the second stage of  EMU, 
reaching an historical low 
of  2.1%  in  1997,  as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
The  favourable  inflation 
1993  1994  1995 
B  3.5  2.8  1.7 
OK  0.6  1.6  2.0 
D  4.0  2.8  1.9 
EL  14.2  11.0  8.6 
E  - 5.6  4.8  4.7 
F  2.2  2.1  1.6 
IRL  1.9  2.7  2.0 
I  5.4  4.6  5.8 
L  4.1  2.3  2.1 
NL  2.1  2.8  1.5 
A  3.3  3.3  1.5 
p  6.6  5.1  4.2 
FIN  4.2  1.4  0.3 
s  5.7  3.0  2.7 
UK  3:4  2.2  2.6 
EUR  4.1  3.2  3.0 
Standard deviation 
15 Member 
States  3.2  2.3  2.1 
14Member 
States  1.7  1.1  1.5 
(excl.EL) 
.· 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
1996  1997 
2.3  1.6 
2.1  2.3 
1.9  1.9 
8.5  5.5 
3.4  2.5 
1.9  l.l 
1.1  1.4 
4.3  2.4 
1.6  1.4 
l.3  2.2 
2.5  1.8 
2.6  2.1 
1.6  1.4 
1.2  2.2 
2.6  2.3 
2.6  2.1 
1.8  1.0 
0.9  0.5 
1998. 
1.3 
2.1 
1.7 
4.5 
2.2 
1.0 
3.3 
2.1 
1.6 
2.3 
1.5 
2.2 
2.0 
1.5 
2.3 
1.9 
0.9 
0.6 
performance observed in the Community as a whole during Stage Two has been shared 
by all Member States, although to varying degrees. Their performances at the start of  the 
second stage also differed considerably.  In this context,  three  groups  of countries can 
usefully be distinguished. 
4  The  deflators  of private  consumption exhibit a higher degree of cross-country comparability  than 
national consumer price indices. Their measurement is based on the national accounts methodology 
which  has  been  harmonised  across  the  Community  in  the  framework  of the  European  System  of 
Accounts (edition 1979). 
68 In a first group, comprising 11  Member States, the inflation rate in 1994 was close to or 
below the upper limit of  the 2 to 3% range proposed by the 1993 Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines  as  a  step  towards  price  stability.  In  the  following  years,  these  co'untries 
succeeded  in either maintaining  or  further  improving  upon  their  already  good  initial 
inflation performances. As a result, in virtually all these countries inflation was close to 
or below 2% in 1997. To this group belong the seven Member States which have long 
participated  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism  (ERM)  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and Austria, whose currency remained 
fully  stable  against  the  DEM  for  more  than  a  decade.  These  countries  have  also  in 
common that they have enjoyed a long track record of  rather low inflation. 
This  was  not the  case  in  the  other three  Member  States  completing  the  first  group 
(Finland,  Sweden and the United Kingdom).  These countries experienced quite  strong 
inflationary pressures during the late 1980s and early 1990s due to an overheating of the 
economy  allied  with  excessive  wage  itlcreases.  They  achieved,  however,  a  marked 
convergence in terms of price stability towards the other sub-group during the first stage 
of EMU. This slowdown was mainly due to the very severe recessions and the moderate 
development of unit labour costs and occurred despite the cost pressures from the large 
depreciations of their currencies.  Although price developments were somewhat erratic, 
-these three countries managed to control inflation throughout the second stage.  Indeed, 
especially in Finland and Sweden, inflation rates were very low over several years. 
A second group of countries {Spain,  Italy  and Portugal)  still  suffered  from  relatively 
strong inflationary pressures just prior to the second stage, with inflation rates ranging 
between 512 and 612%. Remarkable progress has been made in reducing inflation in these 
three countries during the second stage. The disinflation process was initially rather slow 
and was hampered in 1995 by the combined impact of  currency depreciations and indirect 
tax increases, which especially in Italy led to a temporary pick-up in inflation. However, 
thanks to a determined implementation of  a comprehensive strategy aimed at tackling the 
root causes of structurally high price increases,  inflation declined rapidly over the  last 
two years.  As a consequence, in all three countries inflation fell  to  2.5% or below in 
1997. 
69 Finally, although the inflation rate declined substantially at the beginning of the  1990s, 
Greece still recorded a double-digit inflation rate at the start of the second stage.  Since 
then,  significant  and  steady  progress  has  been  made  in  reducing  inflation,  though 
Greece's inflation performance is not yet satisfactory. 
The  generalised and  impressive  reduction in inflation throughout the  Community has 
been accompanied by remarkable progress in inflation convergence over the last couple 
of years.  One indication of how inflation differentials have narrowed between Member 
States is provided by the standard deviation of individual inflation rates around the EC 
average.  The  standard  deviation  for  inflation,  measured  by  the  private  consumption 
deflator, declined from 3.2% in 1993 to 1.0% in 1997. If  Greece is excluded, the standard 
deviation declined to  0.5% in  1997 ·compared to  1. 7%  in  1993, which means that the 
dispersion between the inflation rates of 14 of  the Member States is very narrow. 
3.4.  Underlying factors and sustainability of inflation performance 
The  Treaty not only requires  Member States to  have achieved a high  degree of price 
stability but also  calls for  a price performance that is  sustainable (Protocol No 6).  The 
requirement  of sustainability  aims  at  ensuring  that  the  degree  of price  stability  and 
inflation convergence achieved in previous years will be maintained during the third and 
final  stage  of EMU.  This  implies  that  the  satisfactory  inflation  performance  must 
essentially be due to the adequate behaviour of input costs and other factors influencing 
price developments in a structural manner rather than reflecting the influence of either 
cyclical  conditions  or temporary  factors  (such  as  a  fall  in  indirect  taxes· and  import 
prices). 
The track record of inflation shows  that price  stability has  prevailed in a majority of 
Member States for a rather prolonged period. The fact that a culture of  price stability has 
increasingly gained ground and that the  disinflation process withstood several adverse 
economic circumstances (such as German unification, a general cyclical overheating and 
exchange rate turbulence) suggests that the present low inflation and the high degree of 
price convergence rest on structural factors that are strong, well anchored and likely to 
in~uence  inflation trends favourably in the medium term. 
The  satisfactory inflation performance observed  in the  Community during  the  second 
stage is alsp due, in part, to cyclical factors. Although recovery has been under way since 
the spring of 1996, output has continued to be below potential and unemployment has 
remained high. This situation has exerted a strong disincentive for firms to raise prices or 
to  allow significant wage  increases.  However, a major part of the  process of inflation 
convergence in the  Community stems from  fundamental  changes in the attitude of all 
economic actors towards inflation. 
• 
70 3.4.1. Price stability as the primary objective of  monetary policy 
In the  Community there  is  unanimous  consensus on price  stability being the primary 
objective  of monetary  policy.  This  consensus  is  enshrined  in  the  Treaty  and  in  the 
successive  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines,,  which  the  Council  has  adopted 
unanimously since 1993. This common consent reflects both the recognition that inflation 
is ultimately a monetary phenomenon and the conviction that price stability is a condition 
for sustainable and employment-creating growth. 
The task of the monetary authorities in pursuing a stability-oriented monetary policy has 
been facilitated by several institutional changes required by the Treaty for this purpose. 
The most crucial is the granting of independence to central banks (see Chapter 2). Other 
important institutional  changes,  which entered  into  force  with the  start of the  second 
stage of  EMU, include the prohibition of monetaiy financing of  government deficits and 
the prohibition of  privileged access of  public authorities to financial institutions. 
The above modifications 'have helped to  strengthen the effectiveness, the transparency 
and the credibility of a stability-oriented monetary policy in the Member States. This in 
tum has contribl;lted importantly to reducing inflation expectations (see also Chapter 6 on 
long-term interest rates) which play a key role in achieving and maintaining appropriate 
wage developments. 
3.4.2.  Disinflation process supported by adequate wage behaviour 
Developments  in unit labour costs,  i.e.  costs of labour per unit of output,  take  on a 
particular importance in the inflation process. They reflect trends in labour productivity 
and  nominal  compensation  per  head.  The  latter  not  only  play  a  key  role  in  the 
determination of  input costs and thus of consumer prices, but also reflect private agents' 
inflation expectations. They therefore serve as an important indicator, amongst others, of 
the credibility of the anti-inflationary policy pursued by the monetary authorities and of 
the sustainability of  the inflation performance. 
71 -
As shown in Table 3.4 and Graph 3.3, significant wage moderation contributed strongly 
to the good inflation performance achieved during the second stage. In the Community as 
a whole, the rate of  increase in unit labour costs decelerated rapidiy from the beginning of 
the decade and the descent was actually faster than the drop in the rate of  inflation. W\lile 
the  rate  of increase  of unit  labour  costs  in  the  early  1990s  was  quite  high  in the 
Community (average annual growth rate of  just below 5%), it was very subdued during 
the second stage (average annual growth rate of  just above 1  %). On the basis of  currently 
availa~le information, unit labour costs will continue to rise at a very moderate pace in 
the  near future,  thereby  remaining  consistent  with  favourable  inflation trends  in  the 
Community. 
Table3.4 
Labour costs 
(percentage change, total economy)  • 
·Nominal compensation  Labour productivity growth  Nominal unit labour costs 
per employee 
1990  1994  1997  1998*  1990  1994  1997  1998*  1990  1994  1997  1998* 
·93 a)  -97a)  -93 a)  -97a)  -93 a)  -97a) 
B  6.1  2.9  3.2  2.1  1.1  2.1  2.5  1.6  4.9  0.8  0.7  0.5 
OK  3.6  3.6  4.0  4.3  2.2  1.9  0.7  1.5  1.4  1.7  3.2  2.7 
D  6.4  2.9  1.8  2.0  2.4  2.9  3.7  2.7  3.8  0.0  -1.8  . -0.6 
EL  14.8  11.8  10.7  6.9  0.1  1.3  3.0  2.7  14.6  10.4  7.4  4.0 
E  9.0  2.7  2.7  2.6  1.4  1.3  0.8  1.2  7.5  1.4  1.9  1.5 
F  4.1  2.5  2.5  2.7  1.0  2.0  2.5  1.8  3.1  0.5  0.0  0.9 
IRL  5.6  2.9  5.5  5.3  3.3  5.4  6.6  5.0  2.2  -2.4  -1.1  0.3 
I  7.2  4.4  4.6  2.9  1.2  2.2  1.4  .  2.0  5.9  2.2  3.1  0.9 
L  5.6  2.8  3.3  3.6  2.2  1.3  1.8  1.9  3.3  1.5  1.5  1.7 
NL  3.9  2.4  2.7  3.3  l.l  1.7  1.1  1.6  2.8  0.6  1.6  1.7 
A  5.6  2.4  1.6  2.2  1.6  2.3  2.7  2.3  3.9  0.0  -1.1  -0.1 
p  14.8  6.5  4.3  3.9  2.1  - 2.3  1.8  2.7  12.4  4.1  2.5  1.2 
FIN  4.4  3.0  1.3  3.4  2.0  3.8  3.8  2.4  2.4  -0.8  -2.4  1.0 
s  6.6  4.5  3.8  2.7  1.8  2.9  2.9  2.0  4.7  1.6  0.8  0.7 
UK  6.7  3.8  4.3  4.6  \.4  2.2  1.9  \.2  5.2  \.6  2.4  3.4 
EUR  6.4  3.3  3.1  3.0  1.6  2.3  2.3  \.9  4.8  1.0  0.8  1.0 
•>  average annual percentage change. 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services.· 
72 Developments at the country level show a clear convergence between Member States 
toward a low rate of growth in unit labour costs. In the  11 Member States with HICP 
inflation below the reference value over the entire period for which a reference value can 
be calculated,  unit  labour costs  decreased  in Ireland  (reflecting  sizeable  productivity 
gains)  and  Finlan4,  remained  broadly  unchanged  in  Germany,  and  increased  very 
moderately in the other countries during the second stage. Looking ahead, there seems to 
be  little  evidence of emerging cost pressures.  In most of these countries,  the rate of 
increase in unit labour costs is expected to be limited in 1998. 
In the Member States where inflation fell below the reference value only more recently 
(Spain, Italy and Portugal), trends in unit labour costs during the second stage exhibited a 
marked break with the  past pattern of high  rates  of increase  ..  Following  a  dramatic 
deceleration in 1994-95, unit labour costs tended to accelerate subsequently in Spain and, 
especially,  Italy,  reflecting  in  part  a  partial  catch-up  on  previous  years'  losses  in 
employees'  purchasing power.  However,  in both countries, moderate increases in unit 
labour costs are  expected to prevail in the near future.  A similar, though less erratic, 
pattern was discernible in Portugal. In contrast, in Greece, despite considerable progress 
in  recent  years,  increases  in  unit  labour  costs  have  not  yet  decelerated  to  a  range 
compatible with achieving and maintaining price stability. 
Changes  in  unit  labour  costs  are  determined  by  labour  productivity  growth  and  by 
changes in nominal compensation per employee. The observed slow-down in unit labour_ 
costs may thus result from either an acceleration in labour productivity or a deceleration 
in nominal compensation per employee. Apart from the usual cyclical pattern, growth in 
labour productivity has remained fairly stable in the Community. With an average annual 
growth rate of  just above 2%, labour productivity growth during the second stage was in 
line with the long-term trend observed in the Community since the first oil price shock. 
At the country level too, labour productivity increases did not show any significant shifts 
in trend in recent years. A cyclically induced rebound in productivity growth has been 
quite  perceptible  in  nearly  all  the  countries  of the  Community.  In many  countries 
(Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom), this rebound has only 
brought productivity back to its secular trend. The rise was above the trend in Germany 
and Sweden, and even more markedly in Finland and in Ireland. However, this cyclical 
effect now appears to have come to an end in the latter four countries. 
As a result, the slowdown in unit labour costs originated predominantly from moderate 
increases  in  nominal  wages  per  head.  After  having  risen  by  6.4%  per year  at the 
Community  level  over  the  1990-93  period,  nominal  compensation  per  employee 
increased at an annual average rate of  3.3% over the period 1994-97. This deceleration in 
wage  growth over the  1990s  was  common to  all  Member States,  though  to  varying 
degrees.  The  most spectacular progress has  been registered  in Spain,  where nominal 
compensation per employee rose by less than 3% per year over the period 1994-97, i.e. 
below the Community average.  In Italy and Portugal, the improvement has also been 
sizeable with the average annual increase in wages per head decelerating to 4.4% and 
6.5%  respectively  during  the  period  1994-97  (against  ab'!ve  7%  and  close  to  15% 
respectively in the period 1990-93). 
73 Graph 3.3  Inflation and wage trends 
(3-year moving average of  annual percentage change) 
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74 Graph 3.3  continued 
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75 Several factors  seem to  explain the generally observed moderation in nominal wages. 
Firstly, the two sides of  industry appear to have attached greater credibility to the resolve· 
and ability of monetary authorities to  achieve price stability.  Hence,  over the last few 
years,  in all  Member  States  inflation  expectations  underlying  wage  agreements  have 
become  increasingly  consistent  with  the  monetary  authorities'  announced  inflation 
objectives.  Secondly,  this  enhanced  credibility  has  been  accompanied  by  profound 
changes in wage-setting procedures with a view to ensuring continued appropriate wage 
developments. These institutional modifications include the removal of automatic wage  · 
in~exation in Italy and the implementation in Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland 
of  innovative multi-year wage agreements involving not only the Social Partners but also 
the  government.  Other  countries  have  oriented  their  wage  settlements  towards 
safeguarding  and  improving  external  competitiveness  (e.g.  Belgium,  Denmark  and 
France).  Thirdly,  wage  negotiations  seem  to  have  increasingly  taken  into  account 
developments on the real side of  the economy (overall productivity growth, labour market 
situation, profitability concerns). Finally, Member States have stepped up their efforts to 
improve  the  employability  and  adaptability  of labour.  These  structural  measures  are 
essential to improve job opportunities but they will also help to avoid excessive upward 
pressure on wages when the recovery strengthens. In some Member States (e.g. Denmark, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), these measures seem to have already had a 
tangible p<)sitive effect as the unemployment rate has come down significantly without 
any major acceleration in wage increases. 
76 3.4.3. Appropriate domestic reaction to changes in import prices 
Given the high degree of  openness of  the economies of  the Member States, the evolution 
of import prices plays an important role in domestic price fonnation. Changes in import 
prices are the result from several different factors: changes in international prices and the 
value of the exchange rate,  the  geographical composition of imports, the price-setting 
behaviour of foreign suppliers and domestic demand conditions. In due course, changes 
in import prices are likely to feed through, at least partially, to final prices. The degree of 
this  pass-through  depends  on  the  prevailing  economic  situation,  the  stance  of 
macroeconomic  policy  and  the  structure  of the  economy.  For  the  purpo~ of the 
assessment of  a country's inflation performance and of  its sustainability, it is important to 
examine  whether  external  price  pressures  have  led  to  domestically  generated  pri~e 
increases. 
In  eight  of  the  14 Member 
States  showing  infl~tion rates 
below  the  reference  value 
. (namely  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Germany,  France, 
Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland), increases 
in import prices have generally 
been  low  during  the  period 
1994-96. This was due to both 
the  very  moderate  rise  in 
international commodity prices 
during most of this period and 
the strength of their currencies. 
Mainly  as  a  result  of  the 
substantial  appreciation  of the 
US dollar  against  their 
currencies,  these  countries 
(with  the  exception  of 
Luxembourg,  Austria  and 
Finland)  experienced  a 
noticeable  acceleration  in 
import price increases in 1997. 
Table 3.5 
Import prices 
(percentage change in the deflator of  imports of  goods and services, 
in national currency) 
1993  1994  199S  1996  1997  1998• 
B  -2.6  0.9  1.0  2.0  4.S  1.1 
DK  -1.1  0.7  1.0  0.8  3.7  0.9 
D  -1.4  o.s  0.6  0.7  3.0  1.2 
EL  7.8  S.6  6.6  3.8  2.7  7.4 
E  6.S  S.1  4.2  2.4  4.1  1.9 
F  -2.S  1.7  1.3  1.2  Z.l  0.8 
IRL  4.4  2.8  4.2  -0.7  0.3  3.7 
I  12.1  4.9  12.1  -1.9  -0.6  1.1 
L  1.6  6.4  0.8  0.3  -0.1  2.4 
NL  -2.3  0.1  0.9  0.7  3.1  1.8 
A  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.2  0.7  1.0 
p  4.8  4.8  3.4  0.3  1.1  l.S 
FIN  8.7  -0.3  0.4  1.8  1.6  104 
s  14.S  3.S  4.6  -4.9  2.0  0.7 
UK  8.S  2.9  7.2  0.4  -6.S  -2.3 
EUR  3.0  2.3  3.9  o.s  0.8  0.8 
* Spring I  998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
77 In Ireland, import price increases were also generally moderate in 1994 and 1995. But, 
owing to the appreciation of the Irish punt, they were negative in 1996 and flat in 1997, 
thereby exerting a moderating impact on overall consumer price increases over the last 
two years. 
In the five other Member States with inflation below the reference value, import prices 
rose  quite  substantially at  the  beginning of the  second  stage  following  a pronounced 
weakening of their currencies.  For some of these countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal), 
this explains to some extent the rather slow progress with disinflation during these years. 
Import price increases were high in Spain and Italy in 1994 and 1995, in Portugal in 1994 
and in Sweden and the United Kingdom in  1995.  In all these countries, in contrast to 
previous episodes of sharp currency depreciation, only a small part of import price rises 
was passed on to consumer prices. The limited knock-on effect on domestic inflation was 
due partly to the weak growth environment prevailing in these countries but particularly 
to a non-accommodating stance of monetary policy. With the renewed strength of these 
countries' currencies, import price inflation was low or negative in 1996 and 1997 (with 
the exception of Spain in 1997), thereby exerting a restraining impact on domestic price 
pressure.  1)ris  was  particularly  the  case  in  the  United Kingdom,  where  the  marked 
appreciation of sterling led to a significant fall in import prices in 1997. 
In Greece, import price inflation was high throughout the second stage but it decelerated 
and was less than consumer price inflation throughout the period. While initially rather 
slow, the pace of deceleration quickened in  1996 and  1997 under the influence of the 
"hard drachma" policy. 
3.5.  Sustainability of price performance reinforced by EMU 
In the course of the second stage of EMU,  all  Member States,  with the  exception of 
Greece,  have  succeeded in achieving and/or maintaining low and convergent inflation 
rates. While cyclical factors such as the prolonged period of sluggish economic activity 
certainly contributed to easing price and cost pressures, a number of structural changes 
played a key role in the impressive performance on the inflation front. First and foremost, 
there is the acceptance of  price stability as one of  the major objectives of  economic policy 
in general  and  the  determined  orientation  of economic  policies,  especially  monetary 
policy, towards that objective. This process has been underpinned by the trend towards 
granting  independence  to  national  central  banks.  Secondly,  wage  developments  have 
strongly supported the disinflation process. The consistent deceleration, and subsequent 
maintenance at a low rate, of inflation, wages and unit labour costs suggest that wage 
settlements have internalised the target of low inflation, which in turn is testimony to the 
increased credibility of  a stability-oriented policy framework. This process has also been 
underpinned by important institutional modifications to the wage formation process. 
78 While these structural factors suggest that the current price performance is sustainable, it 
should  be  emphasised  that  EMU,  through  its  implied  institutional  changes  and  new 
economic environment, is likely to safeguard and reinforce the results achieved in teims 
of  price stability. 
The Treaty guarantees the independence of the European Central  Bank and bestows it 
with  the  clear objective  to  maintain  price  stability.  The  Treaty  provisions  on  public 
finances, as complemented by the Stability and Growth Pact, will ensure the consistency 
of budgetary policy with a low inflation environment. As a result of this framework, the 
single  currency regime  will  secure  low and  more  predictable  inflation.  The  enhanced 
credibility  of the  price  stability  objective  will  foster  low  and  stable  inflationary 
expectations and is thereby likely to strengthen wage and cost discipline. The incentives 
for  wage  discipline  will  also  be  improved  since  inappropriate  wage  increases  will 
continue not to be accommodated by monetary, budgetary or exchange rate policies. An 
increase in wages faster than warranted by growth in productivity  in a country (or region) 
would  lead  to  a  deterioration  in  competitiveness  and  investment  profitability  and 
therefore to reduced attractiveness· as a production location. The country's (or region's) 
export  performance  would  suffer,  investment  would  be  deterred  and  unemployment 
would increase. For these reasons, EMU is likely to result in a sust~ined wage behaviour 
consistent with job creation. 
Furthermore, the exposure to imported inflation is likely to diminish in the third stage of 
EMU. Around 65% of total EC imports originate from EC countries. By definition, the 
implementation of  a single currency will remove variations in intra-EC import prices due 
to  exchange  rate  fluctuations  between  single  currency  participants,  while  the  price 
stability that is, expected to prevail in the Community should prevent any large increases 
in individual Member States' intra-EC import prices. 
Extra-EC imports will still remain subject to fluctuations due to changes in international 
commodity  prices  and  variations  in  the  euro  exchange  rate  against  other  currencies, 
especially the US dollar. However, with extra-EC imports representing only some 10% of 
Community  GDP,  these  factors  will  have  to  undergo  large  gyrations  in  order  to 
substantially affect Member States' domestic prices: Moreover, if a larger proportion of 
imports is,  in the future,  invoiced in euro, then inflation developments in the euro-area 
will be less likely to suffer from possible fluctuations in other currencies, especially the 
US dollar. 
79 Annex: The harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 
1. Reasons for the construction of  the HICP5 
The HICP has  been set up in order to meet two requirements resulting from  the EMU 
process. Firstly, the Treaty, especially Protocol No 6, stipulates that inflation should be 
measured by means (i) of the  consumer price  index,  (ii) which  is  comparable  among 
Member  States,  although  taking  into  account  differences  in  national  definitions. 
Secondly, by definition, monetary policy will be conducted at the level of  the EMU area. 
This requires indicators consistent amongst Member States, not only for comparison, but 
also in order to construct aggregate indicators at the EMU level. Among these indicators, 
a reliable and comparable consumer price index is clearly one of  the most important. 
2.  Basic concepts underlying the construction of the IDCPs 
The requirements of  the Treaty detailed above are being met through the implementation 
ofHICPs which are as far as possible based on national CPis. 
Firstly, the new index measures changes in consumer prices. This implies that it covers 
the trend over time of actual prices of goods and services faced by consumers on the 
economic territory.  The concept adopted for  delimiting the coverage of the HICP can 
therefore be defined as "final monetary consumption expenditure of households".  This 
includes all the monetary transactions made by households for goods and services directly 
satisfying  consumer  needs.  Non-monetary  transactions  are  transactions  that  do  not 
involve the exchange of  cash, assets or liabilities denominated in units of  currency. 
Secondly,  the  HICPs  are  comparable.  The  comparability was  defined  in  the  Council 
Regulation  concerning  the  HICPs  as  follows:  "HICPs  shall  be  considered  to  be 
comparable if they  reflect  only differences  in price  changes  or consumption patterns 
between countries." This means that HICPs are based on comparable concepts, methods, 
and practices in their definition and compilation. The HICPs currently provide the best 
statistical basis for comparisons of  consumer price inflation in the Member States. 
s  The present annex is a short summary of the "Progress Report on Harmonization of Consumer Price 
Indices in the European Union", drafted by the Commission (Eurostat). The report deals in detail with 
all the issues related to the HI  CPs. 
80 As far as possible, the Commission Regulation which implemented the detailed rules for 
constructing the HICPs are based on the best of current practices allowing for legal and 
institutional  circumstances  existing  in Member States6.  The general  approach  to  the 
implementing  regulations  could  be  characterised  by the  term  "minimum  standards". 
"Minimum standards" in the sense that banning acknowledged bad practices  has the 
effect of not only achieving convergence on good practices but also raising the general 
level of standards and,  on the other hand,  in the sense that the  regulationS  generally 
specify outputs rather than inputs. They say what is required rather than how to achieve 
the requirement, the detail of which is left to Member States, sometimes in agreement 
with the Commission (Eurostat). 
In view of  the need to assess price performance over one year, Member States have been 
asked to provide retrospective data going back to January 1995. 
All these provisions have been formally laid down in a series of  Commission Regulations 
implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2494/95 7• 
3.  Major fields subject to harmonisation 
At the outset, it was clear that the completion of the harmonisation process would last 
beyond the start of the EMU in January 1999. The intermediate objective was thus to 
focus on the key fields where harmonisation had to be achieved in order to ensure a level 
of  comparability sufficient to meet the provisions of  the Treaty. The following areas have 
been identified and their harmonisation requirements have been defmed in Commission 
regulations: 
•  A common coverage and common classification (COICOPIHICP) of goods and 
services. 
•  Minimum standards for sampling: ensuring that samples of prices are properly 
representative. 
•  Minimum standards for the treatment of  prices. 
•  Using comparable formulae for calculating price changes. 
•  Minimum standards for procedures of  quality adjustment, i.e. making appropriate 
allowance for quality change of  goods and services purchased. 
•  Timely incorporation of  newly significant goods and services in the HI  CPs. 
•  Minimum standards for the quality of  weights minimising disparities arising from 
different up-date frequencies. 
6  These  regulations  are  elaborated  by  a  Working  Party  including  representatives  of the  National 
Statistical Offices and of  the main users (central banks, EMI), under the leadership of  the Commission 
(Eurostat). 
7  Requirements of the Council Regulation have been specified by three Commission Regulations: 
• Commission Regulation {EC) No 1749/96 on initial  implementing measures for Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2494/95 concerning HICPs.  · 
•Commission Regulation (EC) No 2214/96 concerning transmission and dissemination of sub-indices 
of  the HICP. 
• Commission  Regulation  {EC) No 2454/97  laying  down  detailed  rules  for  the  implementation  of 
Council  Regulation  (EC) No 2494/95  -~ regards  minimum  standards  for  the  quality  of HICP 
weightings. 
81 The  final  objective is  to  cover 
household  final  monetary 
consumption  expenditure 
(HFMCE)  as  a  whole.  As  it 
was  unrealistic  to  attempt  to 
solve all the technical problems 
before  the  decision  on  EMU 
participants,  one  intermediate 
goal  was  that  all  the  HICPs 
should at least cover the  same 
categories  of  goods  and 
services, and that this coverage 
should be as  large as  possible. 
The  weights  assigned  to  each 
category of goods and services 
vary  from  country  to  country, 
reflecting  the  relative 
importance  of  consumers' 
expenditure  on  each  good  or 
service  in  each  country.  As 
Table 3.6  shows,  the  current 
HICP  coverage  in  percent  of 
the HFMCE is already high for 
most  of the  Member  States. 
The  table  compares  actual 
HICP coverage and that of the 
national CPI with HFMCE full 
coverage. 
In addition to  the  extension of 
the  iriitial  HICP  coverage  to 
full  HFMCE  coverage,  other 
methodological  aspect  will  be 
the subject of harmonisation in 
the  near  future,  i.e.  the 
harmonisation  of  the 
geographic  and  population 
coverage of  the HICPs. 
Table 3.6 
B 
Comparison of coverage of harmonised 
and national consumer price indices 
(coverage ofHFMCE;  approximate weights per 1000, 
annual 1996) a) 
Expenditure covered by: 
HICP initial 
coverage as of  HFMCE but  CPI but 
Jan.97  excluded from  excluded from 
CPI  HFMCEh> 
952  0  II 
DK  903  82  114 
D  953  2  114 
EL  875  69  0 
E  954  0  5 
F  847  87  0 
IRL  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
I  973  0  48 
L ~>  725  275  0 
NL  886  84'  173 
A  960  132  86 
p  943  0  77 
FIN  930  0  0 
s  896  0  165 
UK  917  124  96 
HFMCE:  Household final monetary consumption expenditure. 
a) 
b) 
~) 
The  reference  expenditure  is  household  final  monetary 
consumption expenditure which  should  be fully  covered  by 
the HICP from December 1999. This is set as weight of 1000. 
The weights are  rough estimates which refer to  the average 
price level of  the year 1996. 
Most commonly: imputed rents, mortgage interest, games of 
chance. 
For Luxembourg the HICP and CPI are identical. 
Source: Commission services , Eurostat. 
82 4.  The aggregate indices based on the IDCPs 
The HI  CPs are - and will be - used for the construction of  various aggregate indices at tlie 
.  European level. 
(i)  The  European Index  of Consumer Prices  (EICP)  is  calculated  as  a  weighted 
average of the HI  CPs of  the 15 Member States. The index is computed as an annual 
chain index allowing for  changes in country weights each year.  The weight of a 
Member State is its proportion of  fmal consumption expenditure of  households in the 
EU total. The values of fuuil consumption in national currencies are converted into 
purchasing  power standards  (PPS)  using  the  purchasing  power parities  of final 
consumption. 
(ii)  The European Economic Area Index of Consumer Prices (EEAICP) is calculated 
in the same way, with the inclusion oflceland and Norway. 
(iii) The forthcoming Monetary Union  Index of Consumer Prices (MUICP) will  be 
calculated as a weighted average of  the HI  CPs of  Member States participating in the 
single currency. The index will be computed as an annual chain index allowing for 
changes in country weights each year. The weight of  a country will be its proportion 
of final  consumption expenditure of households in the EMU total.  The  values of 
final consumption in national currencies will be converted using the conversion rates 
which will be announced at the time of the decision on which Member States will 
adopt  the  single  currency,  and  in  euros  from  January 1999.  The  Commission 
(Eurostat) will start to publish the MUICP for the first time in May 1998, just after 
the decision on the participating countries. The time series for the MUICP will be 
calculated back to January 1995. 
83 5.  Numerical comparison between ffiCPs and CPis 
·As detailed  above,  HICPs  diverg~  from 
national  CPis  as  a result  of differences  in 
concepts, methods, defmitions and practices. 
The  fact  that  the  differences  in  the  results 
obtained using HICPs and using CPis are not 
of the  same  sign  and  magnitude  across 
countries  highlights  the  fact  that  the 
methodology  underlying  national  CPis 
differs across Member States. 
In most Member States, differences between 
the two indices are not important. Table 3.7 
shows  that,  for  1997,  the  numerical 
discrepancy  is  in  the  range  of 
±0.1 percentage  point  for  eight  Member 
States  and  in the  range  of ±0.3 percentage 
point  for  another  four  countries.  Only  in 
Sweden  and  the  United Kingdom  does  the 
discrepancy  amount  to  about  1 percentage 
point (but with a different sign). This results 
from  major  differences  in  coverage  (the 
inclusion of mortgage rates in the  CPis for 
both countries) and  in methodology for  the 
United Kingdom. 
Table3.7 
Difference between HICPs 
and CPis in 1997 
(percentage change) 
HICP  CPI  Difference 
HICP-CPI 
B  l.S  1.6  -0.1 
DK  1.9  2.2  -0.3 
D  1.5  1.8  -0.3 
EL  5.4  5.5  -0.1 
E  1.9  2.0  -0.1 
F  1.3  1.2  0.1 
IRL  1.2  1.5  -0.3 
I  1.9  2.0  -0.1 
L  1.4  1.4  0.0 
NL  1.9  2.3  -0.4 
A  1.2  1.3  -0.1 
p  1.9  2.2  -0.3 
FIN  1.2  1.2  0.0 
s  1.8  1.0  0.8 
UK  1.8  3.1  -1.3 
EUR  1.7  2.0  -0.3 
Source: Commission services , Eurostat. 
84 4.  GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY POSITION 
4.1.  Excessive deficit procedure 
According to the second indent of Article 109j(l), fulfilment by a Member State of the 
criterion on the sustainability of the government financial position  " .. :will be apparent 
from having achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive 
as determined in accordance with Article 1  04c(6) ".  Furthermore, Protocol No 6 on the 
convergence criteria states in Article 2 that: 
"The criterion on the government budgetary position referred to in the second indent of 
Article 109j(1) of  this Treaty shall mean that at the time of  the examination the Member 
State is not the subject of  a Council decision under Article 1  04c(6) of  this Treaty that an 
excessive deficit exists". 
The  convergence  assessment  in  the  budgetary  area  is  thus  directly  linked  with  the 
excessive  deficit  procedure  of Article 104c  of the  Treaty.  The  main  features  of this 
procedure during the second stage of EMU are described in the box on the "Excessive 
deficit procedure". Failure by a Member State to fulfil the requirements under either or 
both of the criteria on the government deficit ratio and the government debt ratio could 
lead, following the steps of the procedure, to a decision by the Council on the existence 
of an excessive deficit. When a Member State has, in the view of  the Council, corrected 
the excessive deficit, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, abrogates 
its earlier decision. 
The  excessive  deficit  procedure  has  been  implemented  by  the  Commission  and  the 
Council  each year since the relevant provisions of Article 1  04c  and of the  associated 
Protocol No 5  came  into  effect  at  the  beginning  of the  second  stage  of EMU  in 
January 1994. Each year the various steps of the procedure have been applied following 
the  March  reporting  of budgetary  data  by  Member  States,  as  specified  in  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. 
85 Box: Excessive deficit procedure 
The excessive deficit procedure set out in Article 1  04c of the Treaty and the associated 
Protocol No 5 determines the steps to be followed to reach a decision by the Council that 
an excessive deficit exists. 
The Commission is required (in paragraph 2 of Article 1  04c) to monitor the development 
of  the budgetary situation and of  the stock of  government debt in the Member States with 
a view to identifying gross errors. In particular, compliance with budgetary discipline is 
to be examined by the Commission on the basis of  the following two criteria: 
"(a)  whether the  ratio of  the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product exceeds a reference value (specified in the Protocol as 3%), unless: 
- either the  ratio  has  declined substantially and continuously and reached a 
level that comes close to the reference value; 
- or,. alternatively,  the  excess of the  reference  value  is  only exceptional and 
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value; 
(b)  whether  the  ratio  of government  debt  to  gross  domestic  product  exceeds  a 
reference value (specified in the Protocol as 60%), unless the ratio is sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. " 
The Commission is required to  prepare a report if a Member State does not fulfil  the 
requirements under one or both of these criteria. The report shall also take into account 
whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and all other 
relevant  factors,  including the  medium-term  economic  and  budgetary  position  of the 
Member State (paragraph 3). 
Subsequent steps in the procedure include the formulation by the Monetary Committee of 
an opinion on the report of the Commission (paragraph 4); the addressing of an opinion 
to  the  Council  by  the  Commission,  if it  considers  that  an  excessive  deficit  exists 
(paragraph 5); and then a decision by the Council after an overall assessment whether an 
excessive  ·deficit  exists  <Paragraph 6).  Finally,  the  Council  makes  non-public 
recommendations to the Member State for which the existence of  an excessive deficit has 
been decided  with  a  view to bringing that situation to  an  end within a given period 
(paragraph 7). The Council may subsequently make its recommendations public, where it 
establishes that there has been no effective action in response to  its  recommendations 
within  the  period  laid  down  (paragraph 8).  When,  in  the  view  of the  Council,  the 
excessive  deficit  in  the  Member  State  concerned  has  been  corrected,  the  Council 
abrogates its decision (paragraph 12). 
The provisions of Article 104c in paragraphs 9 and  11  (which can lead to sanctions) are 
not  applicable  during  the  second  stage  of EMU.  Furthermore,  in  the  second  stage 
Member States shall endeavour to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 109e(4)), 
the full  force of Article 1  04c(l) that  "Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits " only applying from the beginning of  the third stage. 
86 Considerable efforts have been made during the second stage of EMU by all the parties 
involved to improve the quality and comparability of data on Member States' budgetary 
positions.  In  particular,  Eurostat,  after consultation of national  statistical  offices,  has 
issued a series of rulings on the appropriate treatment of certain transactions within the 
general government accounts in order to ensure a common and harmonised interpretation 
of  the ESA-1979 accounting rules for the compilation of  the deficit and debt figures. This 
has led to the establishment of comparable time series for budgetary data in all Member 
States  and  the  analysis  given  in  this  report  is  based  on  these  figures.  The · close 
examination by Eurostat of the figures reported by the Member States has allowed the 
ruling  out of cases  where  the  accounting  treatment  was  ~ot in  accordance  with  the 
ESA-1979 rules.  The  statistical revisions  introduced by the  Member States to  comply 
with  the  ESA-1979  rules  and  with  Eurostat's  decisions  led  in  a  number of cases  to 
non-negligible retroactive modifications of previously published figures, which entailed 
both  upward  and  downward  revisions  of the  deficit  and  debt  data.  The  Annex  on 
"Budgetary  surveillance  and  comparability of figures"  gives  more  information  about 
these developments. 
In the first application of  the excessive deficit procedure in 1994 the Council decided  1 in 
accordance with Article 1  04c( 6) on the existence of an excessive deficit in 10 of  the then 
12 Member States. Only Ireland and Luxembourg were not the subject of such a decision. 
For these two countries, the Commission had not .initiated the procedure. In Ireland the 
government deficit was below the reference value of 3% of GDP  and the government 
debt  ratio,  while  above  the  reference  value  of 60%  of GDP,  had  been  declining 
significantly. In Luxembourg the government balance was in surplus and the debt ratio 
was far below the reference value. All the other 10 Member States did not satisfy one or 
both of  the criteria for government deficit and debt. 
- In 1995  the  procedure was  applied  for the first time to  the  three new Member States 
(Austria, Finland and Sweden) and the Council decided2 that an excessive deficit existed 
in  each  of  them.  At  the  same  time  the  Council  decided3  in · accordance  with 
Article 104c(12)  to  abrogate  the  decision  on  Germany:  the  government  deficit  in 
Germany had fallen below the reference value in 1994 and was expected then to remain 
below in 1995, and the government debt ratio remained below the reference value. 
2 
3 
Council decisions of26 September 1994. 
Council decisions of 10 July 1995. 
Council decision of 10 July 1995. 
87 In the application of the procedure in 1996 the Council adopted a new decision4 on the 
existence of  an excessive deficit in Germany: as it had turned out, the government deficit 
in Germany rose above the reference value in 1995 and was expected to remain above in 
1996. The German debt ratio, even though increasing sharply, remained below the 60% 
of GDP reference value in 1995. The Council also, decided' to abrogate the decision on 
Denmark: the government deficit in Denmark fell well below the reference value in 1995 
and was expected to remain at a low level in 1996, and the government debt ratio, while 
still above the reference value, declined significantly in 1994 and 1995. 
In the application of  the procedure in 1997 the Council decided6 to abrogate the decisions 
on the Netherlands and Finland. In the Netherlands the government deficit fell below the 
reference value in 1996 and was expected to decline further in 1997, and the government 
debt ratio, while still above the reference value, had peaked in 1993 and declined in 1994 
and  1996. In  Finland the government deficit was estimated at the time7  to have fallen 
below the reference value in 1996 and was expected to decline further in 1997, and the 
government debt ratio remained below the reference value. 
Thus, following the decisions of 1997 and earlier years, five Member States (Denmark, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland) are not the subject of a decision on 
the existence of an excessive deficit. Decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit 
still apply to the other 10 Member Sta~s. 
Data on government deficits and debt and nominal GDP were reported by Member States 
to the Commissions by the beginning of  March 1998 in accordance with the requirements 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93.  Eurostat has confirmed that these data are in 
conformity with the ESA-1979 rules and with the decisions it has issued. 
4 
s 
6 
Council Decision of27 June 1996 (96/421/EC); OJ L 172, 11.7.1996, p. 26. 
Council Decision of27 June 1996 (96/420/EC); OJ L 172, 11.7.1996, p. 25. 
Council decisions of  30 June 1997 (97 /416/EC and 97  /417/EC); OJ L 177, 5. 7.1997, p. 23 and p. 24. 
7  .  In the September 1997 reporting from  Finland the estimate for the government deficit in  1996 was 
revised upwards to 3.1% of  GOP (from 2.6% in the March 1997 reporting). The revised 1996 outturn 
still represented a significant decline from the deficit of 5% of GOP recorded in 1995 and a further 
reduction to  well  below 2% of GOP w&S expected  in  1997.  The  Commission  did not reopen the 
8 
procedure. 
Article 4 of Protocol No 5 on the excessive deficit procedure specifies that the statistical data to be 
used for the procedure are provided by the Commission. 
88 The 1998 application of the excessive deficit procedure is being carried out concurrently 
with  this  convergence  assessment.  The  following  sections  of this  chapter  examine 
budgetary  developments  in the  Member  States  during  the  second  stage,  in particular 
results in 1997 and expected developments in 1998, and also look at different aspects of 
the sustainability of public finances. Detailed evidence is then presented for each of the 
Member States which are at present the subject of  _an excessive deficit decision and have 
achieved correction of  their budgetary imbalances. 
In  the  light  of this  examination  and·  of the  budgetary  adjustment  achieved,  the 
Commission  is  adopting,  at  the  same  time  as  this  report,  recommendations  for  the 
Council to abrogate the decisions on the existence of  an excessive deficit in a further nine 
Member States (Belgium, Germany, Spain,  Franc~, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and 
the  United Kingdom).  If these  recoinmendations .are  acted  upon  by the Council,  then 
14 Member States (all  except  Greece)  will  not be  the  subject of an excessive  deficit 
decision and are to be considered as fulfilling the criterion on the government budgetary 
position. 
The  budgetary  correction  already  achieved  in  Greece  is  not  considered  by  the 
Commission to be sufficient for it to recommend abrogation this year of the excessive 
deficit decision relating to  Greece.  In  the framework of this year's application of the 
excessive deficit procedure, the Commission will adopt in May a recommendation for a 
new Council recommendation to Greece in accordance with Article 1  04c(7) with a view 
to bringing the excessive deficit situation to an end. 
4.2.  Overview of the budgetary situation in the Member States 
The convergence criterion concerning the government budgetary position imposed by the 
Treaty has undeniably set off a genuine budgetary adjustment process in the  Member 
States.  The  determination  with  which  most  governments  have  undertaken  budgetary 
adjustment policies since the start of  the second stage of  EMU and the magnitude of  these 
adjustments have been quite remarkable.  Even though the adjustment process has  been 
difficult and gathered pace mainly towards the end of the period; it represents a genuine 
break with past budgetary  behaviour and  constitutes  a  major  step towards  budgetary 
discipline  among  Member  States.  The  scale  of the  adjustment  has  been  particularly 
important  in  those  Member  States  which  at  the  start  of the  second  stage  of EMU 
experienced the most serious public finance imbalances. 
89 Even though a small part of the  impro~ement in Member State government deficits can 
be  ascribed to  the  recovery in the  economic  situation since. the recession of the early 
1990s  or to  measures  having only  a temporarily beneficial  impact on their budgetary 
position, most of the improvement has resulted from the budgetary adjustment policies 
introduced.  Successful budgetary retrenchments are those that reduce the deficit mainly 
by cutting current primary expenditure, while non-lasting adjustments tend to rely more 
on tax increases or cuts in capital spending. The composition of the adjustments which 
took  place  in  most  Member  States  involved  important  reductions  in  primary· current 
government expenditure. Thus, the composition of these adjustments indicates that they 
were generally soundly based and therefore likely to be maintained in the future. 
The budgetary adjustment achieved so far will have to be pursued further in future years. 
The leeway provided by higher economic growth .and further falling debt service costs in 
the coming years should not lead to a relaxation of adjustment efforts. On the contrary, 
these  favourable  conditions  present  a  unique  opportunity  to  further  correct  existing 
budgetary  imbalances.  The  budgetary  targets  set  by  the  Member  States  in  their 
convergence programmes indicate that Member States are committed to reducing their 
government deficit and debt ratios further in coming years. 
This commitment was strengthened with the adoption of  the Stability and Growth Pact at 
the Amsterdam European Council  in June 19979.  Under the pact,  Member States will 
have to respect the medium-term budgetary objective of  positions "close to balance or in 
surplus". By continuing their adjustment efforts in the coming years, Member States will 
put  their  public  finances  in  a  more  favourable  position  to  face  the  budgetary 
consequences of  potential adverse economic developments. 
9  The Stability and Growth Pact consists of: 
- Resolution  of the  European  Council  on  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  of  17 June 1997 
(97/C 236/01); OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p.1; 
- Council  Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997  on the  strengthening of the  surveillance of 
budgetary  positions  and  the  surveillance  and  coordination  of economic  policies;  OJ L 209, 
2.8.1997, p.1;  . 
- Council  Regulation  (EC) No 1467/97  of  7 July 1997  on  speeding  up  and  clarifying  the 
implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure; OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p.6. 
90 4.2-.1.  Government deficit 
Respect of  the deficit criterion is quite clear in cases where the government deficit ratio 
does not exceed the reference value of 3% of  GDP in both the "actual" year (1997 in the 
present examination) and the "planned" year (1998).  The deficit criterion may also be 
satisfied in cases where the deficit ratio exceeds the reference value but in accordance 
with Article 104c(2)(a): 
"  either the  ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level 
that comes close to the reference value; 
or,  alternatively,  the  excess  over  the  reference  value  is  only  exceptional  and 
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value". 
In earlier applications of the excessive deficit procedure both "actual" and "planned" 
deficits were below the reference value  in relevant years for all those Member States 
which have either never been the subject of  an excessive deficit decision or have had the 
decisions concerning them abrogated. 
Respect of the deficit criterion, once it has been achieved, should be sustained in the 
subsequent years. Indeed, it would not be sufficient for budgetary adjustment efforts to 
concentrate solely on respect of this criterion in a  single year,  perhaps followed  by a 
relaxation of budgetary policies and a renewed widening of budgetary imbalances. It is 
for  this  reason that the  excessive deficit procedure examines  "actual" and "planned" 
deficits. The present report therefore looks at both the budgetary results achieved in 1997 
and those in prospect for 1998, as forecast by the Commission services. As the excessive 
deficit procedure also makes reference to the magnitude and pace of the improvement in 
the budgetary situation of  the Member States, such features of the budgetary adjustment 
processes  which have  taken place  in most Member States  are  also  examined  in this 
report. 
91 In  1997  three  Member  States 
.(Denmark,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg) had a surplus on 
their government accounts, four 
Member  States  (the 
Netherlands,  Finland,  Sweden 
and the United Kingdom) had a 
government deficit of less than 
2.0%  of GDP  and  a  further 
seven  Member  ·  States 
(Belgium,  Germany,  Spain, 
France,  Italy,  Austria  and 
Portugal)  had a  deficit  greater 
than 2.0% of  GDP but no more 
than  3.0%  of GDPto.  Greece 
had a deficit of  4.0% of  GDP in 
1997.  Thus  14 of the  Member 
States  had  a  government 
balance  in  1997  which  was 
better  than  or  equal  to  the 
reference  value  for  the  deficit 
of3% ofGDP (see Table 4.1). 
Member  States  have  also 
reported  to  the  Commission 
their planned deficits for 1998. 
Table 4.1 
Government surplus I deficit 
(General government net lending (  +) I net borrowing (-) , 
as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  199!5  1996  1997  1998* 
B  -7.1  -4.9  -3.9  -3.2  -2.1  -1.7 
OK  -2.8  -2.8  -2.4  -0.7  0.7  1.1 
D  -3.2  -2.4  -3.3  -3.4  -2.7  -2.!5 
EL  -13.8  -10.0  -10.3  -7.!5  -4.0  -2.2 
E  -6.9  -6.3  -7.3  -4.6  -2.6  -2.2 
F  -!5.8  -!5.8  -4.9  -4.1  -3.0  -2.9 
IRL.  -2.7  -1.7  -2.2  -0.4  0.9  l.l 
I  -9.!5  -9.2  -7.7  -6.7  -2.7  -2.!5 
L  1.7  2.8  1.9  2.!5  1.7  1.0 
NL  -3.2  -3.8  -4.0  -2.3  -1.4  -1.6 
A  -4.2  -!5.0  -!5.2  -4.0  -2.5  -1.3 
p  -6.1  -6.0  -!5.7  -3.2  -2.!5  -2.2  . 
FIN  -8.0  -6.4  -4.7  -3.3  -0.9  0.3 
s  -12.2  -10.3  -6.9  -3.!5  -0.8  0.!5 
UK  -7.9  -6.8  -!5.!5  -4.8  -1.9  -0.6 
EUR  -6.1  -!5.4  -!5.0  -4.2  -2.4  -1.9 
*  Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
These data have been taken into account by the Commission services in their forecasts for 
1998 (also shown in Table 4.1).  In several cases Member S.tates have reported for 1998 
the  deficit  targets  first  adopted  in  their  draft  budget  in  Autumn 1997.  Differences 
between the data for 1998 reported by the Member States and the forecasts used here may 
be  explained  by  the  incorporation  of more 1ecent  information  by  the  Commission 
services, especially concerning the 1997 deficit outturns and recent ~owth  developments. 
Government deficits in 1998 are expected to decline further in all Member States still in 
deficit, except the Netherlands. Sweden and Finland are expected to move into surplus in 
1998. For the three Member States already in surplus in 1997, a widening of  the surplus 
is expected in Denmark and Ireland while some narrowing of the  surplus is likely for 
Luxembourg. None of  the 15 ·Member States is expected to have a government deficit in 
excess of  the reference value of3% ofGDP in 1998. 
10  It may be noted that Article 1 of  Protocol NoS on the excessive deficit procedure deflnes the reference 
value for  the ratio of the government deficit to GOP as  3%, without specifying a  figure  after the 
decimal point. The above analysis uses data providing one figure after the decimal point. 
92 Most  Member  States  have  achieved  substantial  improvements  in  their  budgetary 
positions since the beginning of  the second stage of  EMU. The starting positions differed 
markedly among Member States:  whereas  government deficits  were  swollen  in most 
countries  in  1993  by  the  effects  of the  recession  and  often  also  by  the  legacy  of 
inappropriate budgetary policies in earlier years, other countries had already carried out a 
budgetary retrenchment during the preceding years and therefore started from a  more 
favourable position. Clearly the scale of the adjustment aimed for and achieved since 
1993  has  depended  to  a  considerable  extent  on  the  seriousness  of the  budgetary 
imbalances existing at the time of  entry into the second stage of  EMU. 
The government deficit for the total of Member States declined from a peak of 6.1% of 
GDP in 1993 to 2.4% in 1997 and a further decline tq 1.90/o of  GDP is expected in 1998. 
_  Among  the individual  Member States very  large reductions  in the  deficit took place 
between  1993  and  1997  in  Sweden  (by  11.4 percentage  points  of GDP),  Greece 
(9.8 percentage points), Finland (7.1 percentage points) ·and Italy (6.8 percentage points). 
Substanti~  reductions  took  place  in  the  United Kingdom  (6.0 percentage  points), 
Belgium (5.0 percentage points), Spain (4.3 percentage points, or 4.7 percentage points 
from  the  peak  deficit  in  1995),  Portugal  (3.6 percentage  points)  and  France 
(2.8 percentage points).  Reductions  were  also  achieved  over this  same  period  in  the 
Netherlands  (1.8 percentage  points,  or 2.6 percentage points  from  the peak  deficit  in 
1995), Austria (1.7 percentage points, or 2.7 percentage points from the peak deficit also 
in 1995), and Germany (0.5 percentage points, or 0. 7 percentage points from the peak 
deficit in 1996). In Denmark, which is now estimatedll to have had a deficit below the 
reference  value  in  1993,  there  was  an  improvement  in the  government  balance  of 
3.5 percentage points by 1997, and in Ireland, which also had a-deficit already below the 
reference value in 1993, the improvement in the government balance was 3.6 percentage 
points. Luxembourg remained in surplus throughout the period. 
11  Earlier estimates available when the excessive deficit procedure was  implemented in  1994 to 1996 
showed the government deficit in Denmark exceeding the reference value in  1993  and 1994.  Since 
then,  the  data have  been revised  to  comply  with  the  ESA-1979  accounting  rules  and  Eurostat's 
decisions concerning these rules. 
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EL  .E  F  IRL  L  NL  A  p  FIN  s  UK 4.2.2.  Government debt 
Respect of the debt criterion is clear in cases where the debt ratio does not exceed the 
reference value of 60% of GDP. The debt criterion may also be satisfied in cases where 
the  debt  ratio  exceeds  the  reference  value  but  it  is  judged  in  accordance  with 
Article 1  04c(2)(b)  that  " ... the  ratio  is  sufficiently  diminishing  and approaching  the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace". 
The government debt criterion should be assessed not orily by examining the path of  the 
government debt ratio  but also  by analysing its underlying dynamics.  Once continued 
deficit reductions  and  economic  growth have  b~cmne the  main driving  forces  of the 
decline in the debt ratio, countries with high debt ratios should be able to achieve larger 
reductions in their debt ratio over several years than countries with a debt ratio close to 
the 60% of GDP threshold. Indeed, the reduction in the debt ratio - based on identical 
deficit ratios and nominal GDP growth rates- is more pronounced when the initial level 
of the debt ratio is high than when the ratio is close to the 60% of GDP reference value. 
For countries where the debt ratio has only just started to decline, there should be clear 
prospects for further reductions in the debt ratio due to the continuing reduction of the 
government deficit and to economic growth. 
General  government  gross  debt 
ratios are shown in Table 4.2.  At 
the end of 1997, the debt ratio was 
below the reference value of 60% 
of GDP  in  four  Member  States 
(France, Luxembourg, Finland and 
the  United Kingdom).  The  debt 
ratio was in the  range of 60% ·to 
70%  of  GDP  in  Denmark, 
Germany,  Spain,  Ireland,  Austria 
and Portugal  and in the  range  of 
70%  to  80%  of  GDP  in  the 
Netherlands  and  Sweden.  The 
debt  ratio  in  Greece  was  below 
110% of  GDP and in Belgium and 
Italy it was above 120% ofGDP. 
Table 4.2 
Government debt 
(General government consolidated gross debt, as% ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
8  135.2  133.5  131.3  126.9  122.2  118.1 
DK'>  81.6  78.1  73.3  70.6  M.1  59.5 
D  48.0  50.2  58.0  60.4  61.3  61.2 
EL  111.6  109.3  110.1  111.6  108.7  107.7 
E  60.0  62.6  65.5  70.1  68.8  67.4 
F  45.3  48.5  52.7  55.7  58.0  58.1 
IRL  96.3  89.1  82.3  72.7  66.3  59.5 
I  119.1  124.9  124.2  124.0  121.6  118.1 
L  6.1  5.7  5.9  6.6  6.7  7.1 
NL  81.2  77.9  79.1  77.2  72.1  70.0 
A  62.7  65.4  69.2  69.5  66.1  64.7 
p  63.1  63.8  65.9  65.0  62.0  60.0 
FIN  58.0  59.6  58.1  57.6  . 55.8  53.6 
s  75.8  79.0  77.6  76.7  76.6  74.1 
UK  48.5  50.5  53.9  54.7  53.4  52.3 
EUR  65.9  .68.0  71.0  73.0  72.1  7(};5 
•>  Government deposits with the central bank, government 
holdings of  non-governmental bonds and public enterprises 
related debt amounted  to some 13 percent of  GDP in 1997. 
*  Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
95 The budgetary consolidation efforts pursued by Member States in recent years have led 
first to a slowing and then in most cases to a reversal of  the upward trends in debt ratios 
generally evident since the first oil crisis in the early  1970s.  For the Community as a 
whole the debt ratio declined in 1997 for the first time since 1988 and 1989 (which were 
years of  very rapid economic growth). The level of  the debt ratio for the Community as a 
whole amounted to 72.1% of GOP in 1997 and as such was much higher than during 
previous decades. 
Among those Member States with debt ratios higher than the reference value, the debt 
ratio declined in 1997 in all of  them except Germany. Among Member States with debt 
ratios below the reference value, the debt ratio also declined in 1997 in Finland and the 
United Kingdom  but  it  rose  in  France,  while  it  remained  at  a  very  low  level  in 
Luxembourg. 
Forecasts by the Commission services for  1998 (also given in Table 4.2.) show that the 
debt  ratio  is  expected  to  decline  in  all  Member  States  with a  debt  ratio  above  the 
reference value, as well as in Finland and $e United Kingdom and in the Community as 
a whole. In Denmark, Ireland and Portugal this decline is likely to take the debt ratio to or 
below the 60% of  GOP reference value in 1998. 
In Ireland the debt ratio has been on a downward trend since 1988, but it rose temporarily 
in  1993;  between  1993  and  1997  the  debt  ratio  has  been  reduced  very  rapidly  by 
30.0 percentage points ofGDP. The debt ratio peaked in 1993 in Belgium, Denmark and 
the Netherlands;  since  then the  debt  ratio  has  declined  by  13.0 percentage  points  in 
Belgium,  by  16.5 percentage points  in Denmark and  by  9.1  percentage  points  in the 
Netherlands. In Italy and Sweden the debt ratio peaked in 1994 and has since declined by 
3.3  and 2.4 percentage points respectively. In Portugal the reduction in the debt ratio 
from the peak reached in 1995 is 3.9 percentage points. In Greece, Spain and Austria the 
debt ratio reached its peak in 1996 and has so far declined for only one year. In Germany 
the debt ratio has continued to rise throughout the second stage, although at a slower pace 
in 1997; the debt ratio was below the reference value until it rose slightly above the 60% 
of  GOP threshold in 1996. 
96 The above analysis shows that developments concerning government debt particularly in 
Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  Italy,  Austria  and  Sweden  require  further  scrutiny.  The 
government  debt  ratio  in  Belgium  is  still  at a  very  high  level,  even  though  it  fell 
continuously  during  each  year  of the  second  stage  and  the  overall  reduction  was 
important. The debt ratio in Germany continued to  increase, although at a decelerating 
pace, until 1997. The German debt ratio has been swollen by the inclusion of  unification-
related  liabilities  amounting  to  around  10%  of GDP.  Without  the  inclusion of these 
liabilities, the German debt ratio would have remained well below the reference value 
and  even  when  they  are  included,  the  debt  ratio  remains  close  to  the  60%  of GDP 
threshold.  In Italy,  the  debt  ratio has  been falling during the  past three years  but the 
overall decline was small and the debt ratio is still at a very high level. However, the pace 
of debt reduction is  expected to accelerate in Italy in the coming years in view of the 
further  fall  in debt service costs, the upturn  in economic' growth and continuing high 
primary  surpluses.  Since  its  peak  in  1994,  the  debt  ratio  in  Sweden  has  fallen  only 
slightly.  However,  in view of the  expected surpluses in  1998  and  subsequent years as 
well as  improved economic growth, the prospects are for a continued reduction in the 
debt ratio in the coming years. In Spain and Austria, the debt ratio has declined during 
one year so far. However, in both countries the debt ratio remains not far above the 60% 
of GDP  reference  value  and,  given  the  favourable  growth  expectations  and  further 
reductions in the government deficit, is projected to continue on a downward path in the 
coming  years.  The  cases  of these  Member  States  are  examined  in  more  detail  in 
Section 4.4. 
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L  NL  A  p  FIN  s  UK 4.2.3.  Government investment expenditure 
In  its  monitoring  of  budgetary 
developments  for  the  excessive 
deficit procedure the Commission, as 
well  as  examining  compliance  with 
the  government  deficit  and  debt 
criteria, has also to take into account 
whether  the  government  deficit 
exceeds ·  government  investment 
expenditure  (Article I 04c(3)). 
Investment is defined in Article 2 of 
Protocol No 5  to  mean  gross  fixed 
capital formation. 
Table 4.3  shows  government 
investment expenditure  as  a percent 
of GDP in the Member States in the 
years 1993 to  1997. Data for years in 
which  government  investment 
expenditure was greater than or equal 
to the government deficit are  shown 
with an asterisk (*). 
There  has  been  some  tendency  in 
recent  years  for  government 
investment expenditure to be reduced 
relative  to  GDP.  Some  of  this 
reduction  is  due  to  sales  of capital 
assets  (recorded  as  negative 
investment  expenditure)  and  to  a 
Table 4.3 
Government investment expenditure 
(General government gross fixed capital formation, 
as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
B  I.S  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.4 
DK  1.9  1.9  1.9  .  2.1•  1.8• 
D  2.5  2.4•  2.2  2.0  1.8 
EL  3.1  3.0  3.2  3.1  3.3 
E  4.0  3.9  3.7  3.0  2.9• 
F  3.3  3.2  3.1  2.7  2.8 
IRL  2.2  2.3•  2.2•  2.2•  2.2• 
I  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.3  2.3 
L  5.4•  4.4•  4.7•  4.7•  4.9• 
NL  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7•  2.7• 
A  3.2  3.2  3.0  2.8  2.6• 
p  4.0  3.6  3.7  4.0•  4.3• 
FIN  2.8  2.8  2.6  2.7  2.7• 
s  1.1  3.1  2.9  2.1  2.5• 
UK  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.3  1.0 
EUR  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.2  2.1 
•  Denotes that government investment expenditure 
is greater than or equal to the government 
deficit. 
Source: Commission services.  , 
shift towards the private financing and operation of  public infrastructure investments. For 
the  Community  as  a  whole  the  government  investment  share  fell  since  1993  by 
0.6 percentage points to 2.1% ofGDP in 1997. However, with the successful curtailing of 
deficits, nine Member States (Denmark,  Spain, Ireland,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden) had government investment expenditure in 1997 
greater  than  or  equal  to  the  government  deficit  (or  were  in  surplus).  Ireland  and 
LUxembourg have been in this position throughout the period since 1994, and Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Portugal since 1996. 
Portugal in 1996 is the only example of  a Member State with a government deficit higher 
than 3.0% of GDP  but with investment expenditure greater than the deficit.  In all the 
other cases mentioned above the government deficit was less than 3.0% ofGDP. 
99 4.3.  Sustainability of  the government financial position 
"Sustainability" is  mentioned in Article 109j(l) of the Treaty, which specifies that the 
Commission has to examine whether Member States have achieved  "a high degree of 
sustainable  convergence "  and  that  the  convergence  criterion  for  the  public  finances 
relates to "the sustainability of  the government financial position". No specific definition 
of "sustainability"  is  given  in  the  Treaty,  but  Article 109j(l)  specifies  further  that 
budgetary sustainability will be apparent when a Member State is ·not  in a position of 
excessive deficit. Therefore, if  a Member State meets the budgetary convergence criteria 
and is not the subject of a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, the Treaty 
assumes  as  a  matter  of principle  that  its  public  finances  are  sustainable.  Moreover, 
Article 104c(3)  of the  Treaty  specifies  that  for  the  examination  of the  government 
budgetary position  " ... all other relevant factors,  including the medium-term economic 
and budgetary position of  the Member State " should be taken into account. 
In  assessing  convergence  achievements  and  readiness  for  participation  in  the  single 
currency, it is of utmost _importance that sound government budgetary positions shall be 
achieved durably and that Member States shall be in a position to ensure on a continuing 
basis that they "avoid excessive government deficits " in the third stage of  EMU. 
When assessing the  sustainability of the public finances,  the following issues must be 
addressed: 
The  state  of the  public  finances  is  influenced  by  the  economic  cycle:  during 
recessions, the cycle exerts a negative influence on the government budget but this 
influence is reversed and even becomes positive during phases of economy recovery. 
To  be sustainable, the improvement in Member States'  budgetary positions  should 
result mainly from budgetary adjustment measures and should thus be of a structural 
nature instead of  resulting predominantly from the recovery in cyclical conditions. The 
influence of the  cycle  on budgetary positions in the  Member States is  explored in 
Section 4.3.1. 
- There is concern that there may have been over-reliance on measures to reduce the 
deficit which are of a "one-oft" nature, only reducing the deficit in a single year and 
not of a structural nature with lasting impact. It is essential, when one-off measures  . 
have  been resorted to, that they should be  replaced by measures of a more  lasting 
nature in subsequent years. This subject is considered further in Section 4.3.2. 
- There is increasing support for the view that the success of budgetary consolidation 
efforts is linked to their size and to the composition of  the adjustment measures taken, 
with measures reducing current expenditure appearing to give more successful results 
than  revenue  increases  or  cuts  in  capital  spending,  the  latter  corresponding  to 
government  investment  and  capital  transferS.  Section 4.3.3  looks  at  the  size  and 
composition of  the Member States' budgetary adjustments achieved so far. 
100 - For 1998 and beyond, an indication of where Member States are aiming to take their 
public finances is given by the  medium-t~rm objectives set out in their convergence 
programmes. These are looked at in Section 4.3.4. 
- Finally, the sustainability of public finances can also be  assessed by examining the 
factors which determine the underlying dynamics of the path of the government debt 
ratio.  These are:  the primary balance which corresponds to the  government budget 
balance  excluding  interest  payments,  the  contribution  of debt  service  costs  and 
nominal  GDP  growth  or  so-called  "snowball  effect",  and  other  factors  which 
contribute to changes in the stock of government debt. Section 4.3.5 examines these 
elements in more detail. 
4.3.1. Influence of  the cycle 
I 
The state of the public finances is influenced by the cyclical position of the economy: 
during recessions, the cycle exerts a negative influence on the government budget and 
widens  the  deficit  by  depressing  revenues  and  pushing  up  social  expenditure.  This 
influence is reversed and even becomes positive during phases of economic expansion.-
During recessions, the actual government deficit is larger than the deficit corrected for the 
influence of  the cycle, while the reverse is true during expansions. 
During most of this decade,  the  cycle has had an adverse  impa.Ct  on Member States' 
government deficits. During the recession of  the early 1990s, the influence of  the cycle on 
Member States'  government budgets  became negative.  Since then,  actual  government 
deficits have been larger than the underlying cyclically adjusted deficits in most Member 
States.  Indeed,  calculations  based  on  the  Commission  services'  cyclical  adjustment 
method12 show that the actual deficit for the Conuilunity as a whole has remained larger 
than the cyclically adjusted deficit from 1993 onwards and is expected to remain so even 
in 1998 (see Table 4.4). 
When the economy recovers from a recession, the negative impact of the cycle on the 
government budget gradually diminishes and these changing cyclical conditions therefore 
contribute  to  an  improvement  in  the  actual  deficit.  To  be  sustainable,  however,  the 
improvement of the deficit should not be  pr~dominantly the result of a recovery in the 
cycle  but should  mainly  derive  from  budgetary  adjustment  measures  of a  structural 
nature. 
12  See Commission of the European Communities (1995), "Technical note:  the  Commission  services' 
method  for  the  cyclical  adjustment  of government  budget  balances",  European  Economy,  No 60, 
November. The cyclically adjusted deficit figures published by international organisations such as the 
IMF and the OECD are generally lower than those calculated by the Commission services and present 
a more favourable picture. 
101 Table4.4 
Influence of  the eyele on government surplus I deficit 
(General government net lending(+) I net borrowing(-), as o/o ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Adull  Cyclical  Cyclically  Adull  Cyclical  Cyclically  Adual  Cyclical  Cyclically  Aaual  Cyclical  Cyclic:aJJy  Aaual  Cydii'U  Cyclically  Al:lual  Cyclical  CydicaUy 
balmce  ~  odjustcd  balance  COIIIpOIICIII  adjusted  balmce  ~  .tjusted  balmce  c:ompoaall  odjustcd  balmce  c:ompoaall  odjusted  balmce  COIIIpOIIeDI  lllljustcd 
balance  balanc:e  balanc:e  balance  babnce  balanc:e 
B  -7.1  -1.0  -6.1  -4.9  -0.6  -4.3  -3.9  -0.6  -3.3  -3.2  -1.0  -2.2  -2.1  -0.6  -1.5  -1.7  -0.4  -1.3 
DK  -2.8  -1.9  -0.9  -2.8  -0.6  -2.2  -2.4  -0.3  -2.1  -0.7  -0.2  -0.5  0.7  0.0  0.7  1.1  0.1  1.0 
D  -3.2  0.0  -3.2  -2.4  0.2  -2.6  -3.3  0.0  -3.3  -3.4  -0.5  -2.9  -2.7  -0.6  -2.1  -2.5  -0.5  -2.0 
EL  -13.8  -0.8  -13.0  -10.0  -0.9  -9.1  -10.3  -1.1  -9.2  -7.5  -0.9  -6;6  -4.0  -0.5  -3.5  -2.2  -0.1  -2.1 
E  -6.9  -0.9  -6.0  -6.3  -1.2  -5.1  -7.3  -1.1  -6.2  -4.6  -1.3  -3.3  -2.6  -0.9  -1.7  -2.2  -0.5  -1.7 
F  -5.8  -1.0  -4.8  -5.8  -0.6  -5.2  -4.9  -0.6  -4.3  -4.1  -0.8  -3.3  -3.0  -0.7  -2.3  -2.9  -0.3  -2.6 
IRL  -2.7  -2.7  0.0  -1.7  -2.3  0.6  -2.2  -0.4  -1.8  -0.4  0.0  -0.4  0.9  1.0  -0.1  1.1  1.2  -0.1 
I  -9.5  -1.0  -8.5  -9.2  -0.7  -8.5  -7.7  -0.1  •  -7.6  -6.7  -0.6  -6.1  -2.7  -0.7  -2.0  -2.5  -0.4  -2.1 
L  1.7  :  :  2.8  1.9  :  2.5  0.0  2.5  1.7  -0.1  1.8  1.0  -0.1  1.1 
NL.  -3.2  -0.6  -2.6  -H  -0.4  -3.4  -4.0  -0.8  -3.2  -2.3  -0.6  -1.7  -1.4  -0.3  -1.1  -1.6  0.1  -1.7 
A  -4.2  0.0  -4.2  -5.0  0.0  -5.0  -5.2  -0.1  -5.1  -4.0  -0.6  -3.4  -2.5  -0.5  -2.0  -2.3  -0.3  -2.0 
p  -6.1  0.0  -6.1  -6.0  -0.9  -5.1  -5.7  -1.3  -4.4  -3.2  -1.0  -2.2  -2.5  -0.6  -1.9  -2.2  -0.2  -2.0 
I 
FIN  -8.0  -5.9  -2.1  -6.4  -4.2  -2.2  -4.7  -2.3  -2.4  -3.3  -1.7  -1.6  -0.9  0.3  -1~2  0.3  1.1  -0.8  I 
s  -12.2  -4.1  -8.1  -10.3  -2.5  -7.8  -6.9  -0.5  -6.4  -3.5  -0.8  -2.7  -0.8  -0.8  0.0  0.5  -0.1  0.6 
I  UK  -7.9  -2.0  -5.9  -6.8  -0.9  -5.9  -5.5  -0.4  -5.1  -4.8  -0.3  -4.5  -1.9  0.3  -2.2  -0.6  0.1  -0.7 
EUR  -6.1  -1.0  -5.1  -5.4  -0.6  -4.8  -5.0  -0.4  -4.6  -4.2  -0.6  -3.6  -2.4  -0.5  -1.9  -1.9  -0.2  -1.7 
* Spring  1998  economic forecasts 
Source : Commission services 
--
102 With  the  recovery  in  1994  and  1995,  cyclical  conditions  improved  slightly  in  most 
Member States and more than half of  the deficit reduction in the Community as a whole 
during  this  period  originated  from  improving cyclical  conditions.  Cyclical  conditions 
worsened again, however, during the growth pause between mid-1995 and mid-1996 and 
held back the reduction in government deficits which took place in almost all Member 
States. The actual deficit for the Community as a whole was reduced by 0.8 percentage 
points of GDP in 1996, whereas the improvement in the cyclically. adjusted deficit was 
even larger and amounted to 1.0 percentage point. 
With actual  growth returning above  its  trend growth· rate  in 1997,  cyclical conditions 
improved again and helped to reduce the government deficit in most Member States. The 
actual deficit for the Community as a whole improved by  1.8 percentage points of GDP 
in  1997, of which 0.1  percentage points were due to  improved cyclical conditions and 
1. 7 percentage points to the reduction in· the cyclically adjusted deficit. As actual deficits 
in 1997 were equal to or below the 3% of GDP threshold in all Member States except 
Greece, cyclically adjusted deficits were sitUated even lower in those countries where the 
cycle continued to exert a negative influence on the government deficit. The cyclically 
adjusted deficits in Ireland, Finland and the United Kingdom - Member States where the 
cycle  had  a  positive  influence  on  the  government  budget  in  1997  due  to  vigorous 
economic  growth - were  situated  above  the  actual  budget  positions but also  in  these 
countries they remained well below the  3% of GDP threshold, while in Denmark both 
balances were in surplus. 
For  most  Member States,  the  largest part of the  progress  in  reducing  budget deficits 
which has been achieved over the period 1993-97 results from discretionary tightening 
while only a minor part can be ascribed to the cyclical upturn since ·1993. Only in Ireland 
can the  improvement in the  government deficit be  principally attributed to  beneficial 
cyclical  developments,  while  in  Denmark  and  Finland  the  improvement  in  cyclical 
conditions also contributed to a large extent to the reduction in the government deficit. 
Cyclically  adjusted  deficits  are  expected  to  stabilise  or  to  decline  slightly  in  most 
Member States in 1998 and adjustment efforts are thus not being relaxed. As economic 
growth  is  forecast  to  remain  vigorous  in  1998,  cyclical  conditions  are  expected  to 
contribute to the further improvement in actual deficits. 
4.3.2.  One-off  measures 
In  several  Member  States  the  governments  have  included  among  their  adjustment 
measures the adoption .of one-off measures with only a temporarily beneficial impact on 
the budgetary situation. In some cases, because of the unusual or complex nature of the 
transactions  involved,  it  was  necessary for  Eurostat to  give a ruling  on whether such 
transactions should be accounted for as reducing the deficit (see Annex). 
103 One-off measures  only  temporarily  reduce  the  government  deficit,  by  concentrating 
revenue  in one  year  or a  limited  number of years  only,  postponing  expenditure  or 
asymmetrically recording the receipts and expenditure aspects of a budgetary operation; 
one-off measures thus do not generally correct underlying public finance imbalances. As 
they only have a temporary effect on the budget, these operations need to be replaced by 
measures of a more durable nature with lasting impact. When undertaken at the start of 
the consolidation process, however, such measures may contribute to a rapid reduction of 
the  deficit and thereby  help to  reverse  expectations of a  further  deterioration of the 
government's budgetary position, while during economic slowdowns they may restrain 
the worsening of  the government deficit and thereby prevent it from getting out of  hand. 
In  general,  it is  common  practice  for  government  budgets  to  include  several  such 
measures and the magnitude of  each of  these measures usually remains small. 
One-off  operations on the revenue side include the collection in one year of  receipts from 
the sale of  buildings and intangible assets, such as for example the sale of mobile phone 
licences in Belgium and Austria, or receipts from temporary fiscal measures, such as the 
euro-tax package in Italy.  On the expenditure side, they include the  postponement of 
government investment spending or delays in payments. The exceptional payments made 
by TeleDanmark in Denmark, France  Telecom  in France, the Postsparkasse  in Austria 
and the Banco  Nacional  Ultramarino  in Portugal to the government are  examples of 
measures which have a  temporary positive effect on the budget at the cost of future 
expenditure. In return for these exceptional receipts, the governments in these Member 
States took over future pension payments to the employees of  these enterprises. Through 
these operations, receipts were recorded in the government accounts in one particular 
year only while  additional pension payments will have to be made in future years. 
Even though one-off measures have made some contribution to the deficit reductions 
achieved  since  the  start  of the  second  stage  of EMU  and  several  of them  were 
concentrated in 1997, the scale of  these measures can be regarded as small relative to the 
overall adjustment effort. Both the Commission's forecasts  for  1998 and the medium-· 
term  budgetary  projections  provided  by  the  Member  States  in  their  convergem~e 
programmes  indicate  that  governments  are  replacing  these  temporary  measures  by 
measures of  a more durable nature. These budgetary projections confirm that the ongoing 
trend of deficit and debt reduction is planned to  be continued in future  years.  In  the 
detailed presentation for  each Member State  in Section 4.4,  reference  is  made to  the 
larger one-off transactions as well as to their importance relative to the total adjustment 
achieved. 
104 4.3.3. Size and composition of  budgetary adjustment 
There is ample evidence that both the size and composition of  budgetary adjustments are 
important in determining whether they will be successful in having a durable impact on 
the government's budgetary position and thus in shifting the government debt ratio onto a 
declining path. Large and persistent adjustment efforts tend to be more successful, and 
deficit reductions which take place through cuts in current primary expenditure rather 
than tax  increases  are  less  likely to  be  reversed  in the  future.  Budgetary adjustments 
strongly  based  on  cuts  in  current  primary  expenditure  are  often  more  difficult  to 
implement and their adoption is therefore a clear sign of the government's commitment 
to budgetary discipline and of  its determination to maintain these efforts in the future. 
The  scale of budgetary consolidation achieved can best be assessed by looking at the 
improvement  in  the  cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance,  which  corresponds  to  the 
government balance excluding interest payments and adjusted for  the  influence of the 
cycle.  Unlike the overall unadjusted balance which  includes  interest payments .  on the 
government  debt  and  is  subject to  the  influence  of the  cycle,  the  cyclically  adjusted 
primary  balance  is  more  directly  controlled  by  the  budgetary  authorities.  During  the 
second  stage,  five  Member  States  - Greece, . Spain,  Italy,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom - have  implemented  a  major  budgetary  adjustment  and  achieved  an 
improvement  in  their  cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance  of more  than  3 percentage 
points  of trend  GDP  (see  Table 4.5).  In  most  other  Member  States,  the  size  of the 
retrenchment  was  situated  between  1.5  and  3 percentage  points.  Some  budgetary 
loosening took place in Denmark and Ireland, while  the Netherlands only implemented a 
relatively minor retrenchment, but large budgetary adjustments had already been carried 
out in these countries during preceding years. The size of  the consolidation thus depended 
on the initial conditions at the start of Stage Two of EMU:  countries with high public 
finance imbalances were obliged to implement a sharp retrenchment to meet the Treaty's 
budgetary criteria while  less  adjustment was  required  in countries which had  already 
carried out a budgetary adjustment during  previous years  and which therefore  started 
from a more favourable budgetary position. 
105 Table 4.5 
Composition of budgetary consolidation between 1993 and 1997 
(Cyclically adjusted, as% of  trend GDP) 
of which:  of which:  ofwfiich: 
Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in 
overall  interest  primary  revenue  primary  current  capital 
balance  payments  balance  expenditure  primary  expenditure 
expenditure 
(1)=(3)-(2)  (2)  (3}={4)-(5)  (4)  (5)=(6}+(7)  (6)  (7) 
B  4.6  -2.6  2.0  1.2  -0.8  -0.6  -0.2 
DK  ·1.5  -1.8  -0.3  -0.5  -0.2  0.2  -0.4 
D  1.1  0.4  1.5  -1.3  -3.0  -1.6  -1.4 
EL  9.2  -2.9  6.3  3.2  -3.0  0.6  -3.6 
E  4.3  -0.7  3.6  -1.6  -5.2  -3.5  -1.7 
F  2.4  0.3  2.7  1.4  -1.3  -0.5  -0.8 
IRL  -0.1  -1.8  -1.9  -2.1  -0.2  -0.7  0.5 
I  6.4  -2.6  3.8  0.5  -3.3  -1.7  -1.6 
L  :  : 
NL  1.6  -1.0  0.6  -4.2  -4.7  -4.2  -0.5 
A  2.3  -0.3  2.0  0.0  -2.1  -1.3  -0.8 
p  4.3  -1.9  2.4  4.6  2.2  2.8  -0.6 
FIN  0.6  1.3  1.9  0.1  -1.8  -1.6  -0.2 
s  7.7  0.3  8.0  2.4  -5.5  -2.9  -2.6 
UK  3.4  0.8  4.2  2.3  -1.8  -0.4  -1.4 
EUR  3.2  -0.4  2.8  Q.O  -2.8  -1.5  -1.3 
Note:  The primary balance does not include interest payments. It is obtained by deducting primary expenditure from 
revenue.  Primary  expenditure  can  be  decomposed  further  into  current  primary  expenditure  and  capital 
expenditure. Due to the rounding of  figures, the components may not exactly add  to totals. 
Source: Commission services. 
Several  Member  States  relied  on  revenue  increases  to  achiev.e  correction  of their 
budgetary imbalances but only in Belgium, Greece, France and the United Kingdom did 
the  increase  in revenue  outweigh  cuts  in  primary  expenditure.  In  Italy,  Finland  and 
Sweden, there was also an increase in the ratio of  revenue to GDP but it was smaller than 
the cut in primary expenditure, while the increase in revenue in Portugal more than offset 
the rise in primary expenditure. There was a decline in the revenue share in Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Cuts  in  current  primary  expenditure  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  deficit 
reduction in most Member States. However, several Member States also relied on cuts in 
capital  expenditure to  bring down their deficits.  In  Denmark,  Greece,  France  and the 
United Kingdom, reductions in capital spending were the major source of  adjustment on 
the primary expenditure side and they were also important in Germany, Italy and Sweden. 
106 Reduced interest payments more than outweighed improvements in the primary balance 
in Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  and  more  than  offset the  small  deterioration of the 
primary balance  in  Denmark.  Interest  payments  increased  during  the  second  stage  in 
Germany, due to the take-over of  unification-related debts by the government, as well as 
in France, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The increased interest payments in 
Finland and Sweden resulted from the sharp rise in government debt, which was partly 
due to the support to the banking sector during the severe 1991-93 recession. 
The budgetary adjustments which took place in most Member States involved important 
reductions in current primary government expenditure. Only in a few Member States did 
the retrenchment occur essentially via revenue increases.  There were important cuts in 
capital spending in several Member States but only in a few Member States were they the 
major  source  of adjustment  on the  expenditure  side.  Thus,  the  composition of these 
adjustments suggests that they were generally soundly based and therefore likely to be 
sustained in the future. 
107 4.3.4. Medium-term prospects 
Since  1993  Member  States 
have  been  presenting  at 
Community  level 
convergence  programmes, 
setting  out  their  medium-
term strategies for achieving 
and  maintaining  respect  of 
the  convergence  criteria. 
The  submission  of  such 
programmes  was  not 
COIJ?.pulsory  but  took  place 
at  the  own  initiative  of 
Member  States.  These 
programmes  were  assessed 
by the Commission services 
and  discussed  in  the 
Council.  Most  of  the 
programn'les  have  had·  a 
particular  focus  on  the 
public  finances,  given  the 
adjustment  needed  in  this 
area.  Updated  programmes 
have .  been  presented  on  an 
annual  basis  by  some 
Member  States,  while  new 
or revised programmes were 
also  submitted  to  take . 
account  of  the  latest 
Table 4.6 
Convergence programme projections for 
government surplus/deficit 
(General government net lending (  +) I net borrowing (  ·) , as % of GOP) 
Date  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  submitted 
B  1/97  -2.9  -2.3  -1.7  -1.4 
DK">  6/97  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.1 
ob>  1/97  ·2.9  -2~  -2  -1~ 
EL  7/97  -4.2  -2.4  -2.1 
E  4/97  -3.0  -2.S  -2.0  -1.6 
F  1/97  -3.0  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -1.4 
IRL  12/97  0.4  0.3  0.7  • 
I  6/97  -3.0  -2.8  -2.4  -1.8 
NL  12/96  -2.2  -2~ 
A  10/97  -2.7  -2.S  -2.2  -1.9 
p  3/97  -2.9  -2.S  -2.0  -l.S 
FIN  9/97  -1.3  -0.1  0.3  1.0  1.9 
s  9/97  -1.9  0.6  o.s  l.S 
UK•>  9/97  -1.6  -0.3  -0.1/0.4  O.Sil.S  0.9/2.4 
•> Government surplus of2.8% ofGDP projected for 2005. 
b) Revised estimates submitted by the German. authorities in February 1997. 
•> Financial years. 
Source: National convergence programmes. 
economic and budgetary developments and of newly introduced measures, or following 
the election of  new governments. 
Table 4.6 shows for the most recently submitted versions of  convergence programmes the 
objectives for·the government budget balance projected for future years (in most cases up 
to the year 2000 or beyond). These programmes were submitted during the period from 
December  1996  to  December 1997;  the  month  of submission  of each  programme  is 
shown in the table. Only Luxembourg has never submitted a convergence programme, its 
strong performance over many years in relation to  convergence indicators making this 
unnecessary. The French convergence programme still dates from before the change in 
government in June 1997. 
108 The programmes generally aim for a continuing improvement in budgetary positions in 
1998 and future years based on underlying projections of vigorous economic growth and 
further falls in interest costs. By the year  2000, deficits less than 2% of GDP are aimed 
for by all the Member States that give projections that far.  Indeed, by 1999 already five 
Member States (Denmark,  Ireland,  Finland,  Sweden and the United Kingdom)  expect 
their government accounts to be in surplus or balance. 
Corresponding to the planned further improvement in budget balances, government debt 
ratios  are  projected  to  continue  declining,  or to  start  declining  where  they  have  not 
already done so, in all Member States during the years covered by their programmes. 
While not all the measures necessary for achieving the objectives of these programmes 
have been introduced and in several countries more adjustment efforts will be necessary 
in the budgets for 1999 and later years, there is a clear commitment in all Member States 
to pursue policies for budgetary consolidation in the coming years. These commitments 
will be reinforced once the Stability and Growth Pact enters into force.  Under this pact 
and in the framework of the stability and convergence programmes, Member States will 
have to pursue budgets which are "close to balance or in surplus" over the medium term. 
4.3.5. Sustainable debt trends 
The widespread progress in reducing budget deficits has allowed government debt ratios 
to come down in almost all Member States in 1997. The driving force behind the debt 
reduction for most Member States came from the combined contribution of GDP growth 
and deficit reductions and only in a few 'Member States - mainly Austria and Portugal -
can the debt reduction in 1997 be attributed to a large extent to "stock-flow adjustment" 
measures. 
109 The  so-called  "stock-flow  adjustment"  regroups  factors,  other  than  the  government 
deficit, which contribute to the variation in the stock of government gross debt: included 
are  changes  in  the  net  holdings  of financial  assets,  changes  in  the  value  of debt 
denominated  in foreign  currency  and  other statistical  adjustments.  Whereas  in  earlier 
years these factors contributed to  increasing the government debt ratio in most Member 
States,  governments  in  recent  years  have  taken  measures  to  limit  their  level  of 
government debt via a more careful management of their financial assets.  Indeed, over 
recent years governments cut their extension of loans and accelerated the reimbursement 
of outstanding loans. They also reduced their liquid working balances on bank accounts 
and  increased  operations  which  allow  for  the  consolidation  of claims  and  liabilities 
within  the  government  sector.  In  addition,  important  privatisation  operations  were 
launched in most Member States. Following the 
ESA-1979  accounting  rules  and  Eurostat's 
decisions,  the  proceeds  of these  privatisation 
operations  could  not  be  booked  as  revenue 
influencing  the  government  deficit  but  could 
only  be  used  to  redeem  the  outstanding 
government  debt.  These  sales  of government-
owned public enterprises often also  contributed 
to  increasing  the  efficiency  of the  economic 
system  and  induced  a  durable  reduction  of 
government transfers to these enterprises. 
Whereas  over  the  period  1990-93,  the 
"stock-flow  adjustment"  factors  added  more 
than 3 percentage points on average each year to 
the government debt ratio, their annual average 
effect  over  the  period  1994-97  has  become 
negligible  or  even  negative  in  most  Member 
States,  except  for  Germany  (where  the  large 
unification-related  debt  assumptions  were 
regrouped  in  this  category),  Greece  and 
Luxembourg (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 
Factors, other than the deficit, 
adding to the debt stock 
(Stock-flow adjustment , as % of  GDP) 
1990-93  1994-97 
annual average  annual  average 
8  1.6  -1.7 
DK  5.2  -1.5 
D  2.4  2.2 
EL  10.2  3.0 
E  2.8  0.8 
F  0.6  0.4 
IRL  2.0  -0.5 
I  2.0  0.9 
L  2.4  2.7 
NL  0.2  -1.5 
A  1.4  -0.5 
p  2.1  -0.3 
FIN  8.3  -0.9 
s  5.1  -1.7 
UK  0.3  -0.7 
EURa)  3.1  0.0 
a) Unweighted average. 
Source: Commission services. 
110 The primary surplus which Member States have to maintain in order to put their debt 
ratio on a downward path increases with the level of  their outstanding debt and with the 
speed at which the debt ratio must come down. Primary surpluses were sufficiently large 
in  1997  for  the  debt  ratio  to  come  down  in  most  Member  States,  the  stock-flow 
adjustment not being taken into account (see Table 4.8). Especially Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece and Italy achieved large primary surpluses while in Denmark, Greece and Ireland 
the  primary  surplus  was  much larger than that needed  to  stabilise  the  debt  ratio.  In 
Germany and France the primary surplus was not sufficiently large in 1997 to put the 
debt ratio on a declining path; the debt ratio remained below the 60% of GDP threshold 
in France. 
Table 4.8 
Sustainability of debt trends 
Government  Change in  Actual  Debt  Debt  Number of  Year when 
debt ratio  debt ratio  primary  stabilising  stability  years  the debt 
in  1997  1996-97  balance  primary  gap a)  needed to bring  ratio falls 
(as %of  (as%of  in 1997  balance  in 1997  the debt ratio  below60% 
GDP)  GDP)  (as%of  in 1997  (as%of  below 60011, of  ofGDP b) 
GDP)  (as%of  GDP)  GDPb) 
GDP) 
(l)  (2)  (3)=(2)-(l) 
B  122.2  -4.7  5.8  2.7  -3.1  14  20ll 
DK  65.1  -5.5  6.5  1.9  -4.6  1  1998 
D  61.3  0.8  1.1  2.1  1.0  4  2001 
EL  108.7  -2.9  5.6  -1.0  -6.6  10  2007 
E  68.8  -1.3  1.9  0.7  -1.2  6  2003 
F  58.0  2.4  0.6  1.8  1.2  Debt<60%  Debt<60% 
IRL  66.3  -6.4  5.2  -2.4  -7.6  1  1998 
I  121.6  -2.4  6.8  4.S  -2.3  19  2016 
L  6.7  0.1  2.1  -0.1  -2.2  Debt<60%  Debt<600AI 
NL  72.1  -s.o  3.9  1.3  -2.6  5·  2002 
A  66.1  -3.4  1.6  l.S  -0.1  7  2004 
p  62.0  -3.0  1.9  0.8  -1.1  1  1998 
FIN  55.8  -1.8  4.5  1·.6  -2.9  Debt<60%  Debt<600AI 
s  76.6  -0.1  5.4  4.2  -1.2  4  2001 
UK  53.4  -1.3  1.6  0.3  -1.3  Debt<60%  Debt<60% 
EUR  72.1  -0.9  2.6  1.3  -1.3  7  2004 
a)  A negative sign means that the actual primary balance is sufficiently large to bring down the debt ratio in 1997. 
The stock-flow adjustment is not taken into account for these calculations. 
b)  The calculations have been made as follows : Spring 1998 economic forecasts for the debt ratio until 1999 and 
projections thereafter, fixing interest rates on government debt at a common level of  6o/o,  inflation rates at 2%, 
stock-flow adjustments at zero and keeping real GDP trend growth rates and primary balances . constant at  th~ 
levels forecast for each Member State in 1999. 
Source: Commission services. 
111 Based  on  the  Commission  services  forecasts  for  the  debt  ratio  until  1999  and  on 
mechanical  projections  thereafter  -fixing interest  rates  on the  government  debt  at  a 
common level of6%, inflation rates at 2%, the stock-flow adjustment at zero and keeping 
real  GDP trend growth rates and primary balances constant at their levels forecast  for 
1999 - the debt trajectory for each Member State can be calculated and the year when the 
debt ratio is projected to fall below the 60% of  GDP reference value can be determined. 
It would take seven years or less to bring the debt ratio below the 60% of GDP threshold 
for those Member States which currently have a debt ratio in the 60% to  80% of GDP 
range,  (see  Table 4.8).  For the  highly-indebted Member States with· a debt  ratio  over 
100% of GDP,  reducing the debt ratio  to  acceptable  levels  will  obviously take  much 
longer. The speed at which the debt ratio will decline in these countries depends on future 
growth  performance  and debt service costs - in  Several  Member  States the  latter are 
coming down rapidly - as well as on expenditures and revenues being kept under control. 
However,  the  level  of surplus  on  the  primary  balance  already  achieved  in  Belgium, 
Greece and Italy should ensure a steadily continuing reduction in the debt ratio.  Under 
these conditions,  the  debt  ratio  in these  countries  could fall  below the  60% of GDP 
threshold within less than 20 years (see Table 4.8). If Ireland's debt ratio falls below the 
reference value in 1998, as is forecast by the Commission services, it would have taken 
Ireland only 11 years to bring down its debt ratio from a peak of around 115% of  GDP in 
1987  to  less  than  60%  in  1998.  The  main  factors  which  contributed  to  this  rapid 
reduction  in  Ireland's  debt  ratio  were  the  major  budgetary  retrenchment  which  it 
implemented at the end of  last decade and which has not been reversed since then as well 
as its high real GDP growth rates over the last few years. 
4.4.  · Member  States  now  considered  ready  for  abrogation  of excessive  deficit 
decisions 
From the information presented in the previous sections of  this chapter it can be seen that 
the  budgetary  positions  of the  five  Member  States  not  at  present  the  subject  of an 
excessive deficit decision (Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland) 
have improved further or remained satisfactory in 1997 and are likely to do so again in 
1998. There is no reason for the Commission to reopen the excessive deficit procedure 
for any of  these five countries. 
112 Greece  has  made  substantial  progress  in  reducing  the  large  imbalances  in  its  public 
finances since the early 1990s. It  has reduced the government deficit from almost 14% of 
GDP  in  1993  to  4.0%  in  1997  and  is  expected  to  reach  2.2%  in  1998;  the  high 
government debt ratio which had been on a strongly rising trend has been stabilised and a 
first reduction took place in  1997 when the debt ratio fell  by 2.9 percentage points to 
108.7% of GDP. However, the budgetary correction already achieved is not considered 
by  the  Commission to  be  sufficient for  it to  recommend  abrogation  this  year of the 
excessive deficit decision relating to Greece. 
For  Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Austria,  Portugal,. Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom, which at present still are the subject of an excessive deficit decision, 
the Commission considers that the excessive deficit has been corrected. The Commission 
is therefore recommending to the Council the abrogation of  the decision on the existence 
of an excessive deficit for  these Member States.  The budgetary correction achieved in 
each of  these countries is examined in detail below. 
113 4.4.1.  Belgium 
The  budgetary  position  of Belgium 
was  not  satisfactory  at  the  start  of 
Stage Two. Due to adverse economic 
conditions  and  despite  significant 
adjustment measures, the government 
deficit amounted to 7.1% of GDP  in 
1993  and the  government debt ratio 
reached 135.2% ofGDP. 
Since  1993  and in the framework of 
two  convergence  programmes,  the 
Belgian authorities have carried out a 
substantial  consolidation  effort  in 
order  to  correct  the  budgetary 
imbalances  and  to  prepare  the 
country  to  participate  in  the  third 
stage of  EMU. Significant adjustment 
measures  have  been  adopted  since 
1993, bringing down the government 
deficit  to  2.1%  of GDP  in  1997. 
There  was  a  continuous  fall  in  the 
deficit in the intermediate years. This 
substantial  reduction  in  the 
government  deficit  was  due  to  the 
combined  effect  of  high  primary 
surpluses  and  of  lower  interest 
payments. 
A multi-annual plan of measures was 
Graph 4.3  Belgium : government deficit and debt 
140 
130 
110 
110 
100 
90 
10 
70 
60 
50 
Actual and cycUcaUy adjuted deficit ( % of  GDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1991 (I) 
- Ad•al dellcit  I!Z3 CydicaUy adJ•oted dellcit  - Rel'ereace value 
Government debt 
( •;. ofGDP) 
--------
1993  1994  199S  1996  1997  1991(1) 
(1}8prlng 1111 economic forecuta 
Source: Commlulon HMCH 
included  in  the  1993  budget  and  set  a  double  norm  of keeping  primary  expenditure 
unchanged in real  terms  and of stabilising revenue  as  a percent of GDP.  New saving 
measures were adopted in November 1993  within the framework of the global plan for 
employment, competitiveness and social security. These measures included new taxes but 
also  expenditure  measures  concerning  the  social  security  system,  in  particular  the 
limitation of  real annual growth in health care spending to 1.5%. In general, however, the 
budgetary consolidation effort over the years 1993-96, which was the period covered by 
the first convergence programme, mainly relied on raising revenues. 
114 Further tightening measures were adopted in the 1997 budget and, combined with more 
favourable economic developments, brought about a reduction of the government deficit 
from 3.2% of GDP in 1996 to 2.1% in 1997. These measures included revenue increases 
but also substantial cuts in primary expenditure of  the federal government and the social 
security system. The measures adopted in the 1997 budget are expected to yield further 
results in the coming years.  In particular, the effects of the measures on pensions and 
family  allowances  are  expected to  Build  up·  ove~ the  medium term.  This  package  of 
measures was aimed at increasing the primary surplus of  the federal government and the 
social security sector combined from 5.1% of  GDP in l996 to 5.3% in 1997. As cyclical 
conditions continued to exert an adverse impact on the government budget, the cyclically 
adjusted deficit remained below the actual  deficit and fell  further to a  low level  (see 
Graph 4.3). 
For 1998, the Commission services forecast the deficit to fall  further to  1.7% of GDP. 
The second convergence programme, which was submitted in January 1997 and covered 
the period 1997-2000, .projected a further reduction in the government deficit to 1.4% of 
GDP by the year 2000. The convergence programme retained the intermediate target of 
maintaining a primary surplus on the combined accounts of the federal government and 
social security sector of 5.3% of GDP over the projection period. Interest payments as a 
percent of GDP are expected to continue to fall  in the .coming years as a result of the 
effect of the current low level of interest rates combined with the further decline in the 
government debt ratio. 
115 ·  The government debt ratio fell by 13.0  percentage points from 135.2% ofGDP in 1993 
to 122.2% in 1997 (see Table 4.9). This outcome complied with the government's target 
for reducing the debt ratio by at l~ast 10 percentage points of GDP over this period. This 
decline in the debt ratio is the result of a sustained policy of budgetary consolidation, 
which kept the primary surplus above 5% of GDP during the second stage. In the period 
1996-97, financial operations aimed at reducing the government debt ratio amounted to 
over 4% of GDP  and consisted of:  first,  proceeds· of gold sales by  the central  bank ; 
second, increased holdings of government debt within the government sector and, third, 
privatisation receipts . 
Over  the  period  from  1997  to  2000,  covered  by  the  January 1997  convergence 
programme, the Belgian government aims for a further reduction in the government debt 
ratio; the decline is foreseen to lie between 6 to 10 percentage points ofGDP, depending 
on  the  prevailing  economic  conditions.  The  Belgian  government  has  recently  re-
confirmed  its  commitment,  which  had  already  been  given  in  the  1997  convergence 
programme, to maintain the primary surplus of  the general government at a high level of 
some 6% of GDP over the medium term. In addition, the Belgian government over past 
years has succeeded in reducing the exposure of the debt to  interest and exchange rate 
variations and to lengthen the average maturity of  the debt. 
Since  1993  the  government  deficit  in  Belgium  has  declined  substantially  and 
continuously and in  1997 it reached a level below the 3% of GDP reference value.  A 
further decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio is still at a 
very high level but it has been declining every year since  1993.  Provided the  primary 
surplus remains at a high level and in view of  the expected favourable growth conditions, 
the government debt ratio is expected to decline further in 1998 and future years. In view 
of  these developments, the Commission considers that the excessive deficit situation has 
been  corrected  and  that  an  excessive  deficit  no  longer  exists  in  Belgium.  The 
Commission is therefore recommending to the Council the abrogation of the decision on 
the existence of  an excessive deficit for Belgium. 
Table 4.9  Belgium: government debt dynamics 
( as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Change in debt ratio:  6.2  -1.7  -2.2  -4.3  -4.7  -4.2 
- Contribution of  primary balance  -3.6  -5.1  -5.1  -5.3  -5.8  -6.0 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  7.4  3.9  4.1  4.6  2.7  2.7 
- Stock-flow adjustment  2.3  -0.4  -1.3  -3.6  -l.S  -0.9 
Government debt ratio  135.2  133.5  131.3  126.9  122.2  118.1 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
116 4.4.2.  Germany 
Compared  to  most  other  Member 
States,  G~rmany  had  a  relatively 
favourable  budgetary position at  the 
start  of Stage Two.  In spite  of the 
recession, the government deficit was 
only  3.2%  of  GDP  in  1993  and 
budgetary  performance  turned  out 
even  better  than  expected  in  1994 
when the deficit dropped to 2.4% of 
GDP.  A  deterioration  occurred, 
however, in both 1995 and 1996 with 
budgetary  outcomes  - a  deficit  of 
3.3% ofGDP in 1995 and of3.4% in 
1996 - overshooting  the 
government's initial projections. 
Tax  revenues  were  repeatedly 
overestimated in the  course of 1995 
and  1996,  as  nominal  GDP  growth 
turned  out  lower  than  expected  in 
both  years.  Moreover,  the  frequent 
changes  in  several  German  tax 
regulations  over  the  previous  years 
made it more difficult to estimate tax 
revenue.  There  was  an  unforeseen 
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117 The budgetary deterioration was ·halted in 1997 when the deficit was brought down to 
2.7% of GDP.  Budgetary spending remained well under control in 1997:  spending on 
social  security,  government  sector  employment  and  administrative  costs  practically 
stabilised  and  there  were  further  cuts  in  transfers  to  enterprises  and  government 
investment. A budget freeze - reinforcing the control of the Finance Minister over large 
expenditure items - was introduced by mid-year and was tightened further at the end of 
the year. The sharp rise in unemployment in 1997 seemed to affect the deficit somewhat 
less than expected, as part of the increased unemployment resulted from a shift out of 
government-funded employment schemes in the new Lander.  Interest payments by the 
special funds managing the unification-related debts - such as the German Unity Fund or 
the Debt Redemption Fund - also turned out lower than expected. There continued to be 
important unforeseen shortfalls on the revenue side, part of  which, however, were due to 
higher-than-expected use of  tax allowances by individuals and enterprises. 
Cyclical conditions made a negative contribution to the government deficit during most 
of the period under examination. However, the marked deterioration in the 1995 deficit 
can  only  to  a  limited  extent  be  attributed  to  worsening  economic  conditions  (see 
Graph 4.4). The decrease in the government deficit between 1996 and 1997, on the other 
hand, was brought about by a discretionary budget tightening, as the contribution of the 
cycle to the budget remained virtually unchanged. 
In order to bring the  national  accounting  system  in line  with the  ESA-1979  rules,  a 
statistical  reclassification  of public  hospitals  outside  the  government  sector  was 
introduced in 1997, which entailed a· downward revision of the government deficit by 
around  0.1 percentage  points  of GDP  in  both  1996  and  1997  and  by  even  more  in 
previous years. 
The deficit is forecast by the Commission services to  fall  further to 2.5% of GDP in 
1998. Transfers to enterprises and government investment are expected to remain under 
control, while spending on transfers to households and government consumption could 
pick up slightly.  The VAT standard rate will be increased from  15% to  16% in April 
1998, the proceeds of  which will be used to cover shortfalls in the social security pension 
system. The effect of  the reduction in the solidarity tax from 7.5% to 5.5% is expected to 
remain small. The cyclically adjusted deficit will continue to lie below the actual deficit 
in 1998. 
118 The  revised  German  convergence  programme  submitted  in  January 1997  projected  a 
further gradual reduction of the government deficit over the period 1998-2000, with the 
deficit reaching 1  Y2% of GDP by the year 2000. The government's budgetary strategy, as 
outlined  in  the  programme,  is  to  reduce  the  expenditure,  tax  and  social  security 
contribution ratios while simultaneously diminishing the government deficit. The aim is 
to  reduce the expenditure ratio by the  year 2000 to its pre-unification level of 46% of 
GDP. This should be achieved by limiting the growth rate of  nominal general government 
expenditure to 2 percentage points below the projected annual nominal GDP growth rate. 
The government debt ratio increased by more than 13 percentage points over the period 
1993-97 -from 48.0% ofGDP in  1993  to 61.3% ofGDP in 1997. A major part of this 
debt  increase  is  due  to  the  take-over  by  the  government  of the  debt of the  German 
railways  in  1994  - amounting  to  2.0%  of GDP - and  to  the  assumption  of the 
unification-related debts from the Treuhandanstalt and the eastern housing companies in 
1995 amounting to 6.6% ofGDP. 
The government debt ratio rose just above the 60% of GDP reference value for the first 
time  in  1996 and continued to  increase,  at a decelerating pace,  in  1997.  The primary 
surplus was not sufficiently large in 1997 for the debt ratio to be put on a downward path, 
even  though  privatisation  receipts  and  other  operations  more  than  offset  the 
debt-increasing effect of  further debt take-overs from East German agencies - amounting 
to 0.3% of GDP- and the build-up of financial assets by the social security funds (see 
Table 4.1 0). 
The increase of  the debt ratio is expected to be reversed in 1998: the debt ratio is forecast 
by the Commission services to be reduced by 0.1 percentage points to 61.2% of GDP in 
1998. The convergence programme submitted in January 1997 projected the government 
debt ratio to decline marginally but to still be slightly above the 60% of GDP threshold 
by the year 2000. 
The exceptional event of German unification in 1990 continues to have profound effects 
not  only  on  the  German  economy  but  also  on  the  government  budgetary  position. 
Transfers of financial  resources  from  the old to the new Lander continue to  impose a 
heavy burden on the government budget:  net transfers amounted to  around 4% of GDP 
per year over the period 1991-97. Interest payments on the unification-related debts also 
had a significant negative effect on the government deficit- amounting to around 0.6% of 
GDP in 1997 - and, in tum, led to a higher government debt ratio than would otherwise 
have been the case. These budgetary costs of unification explain the government deficits 
which occurred during recent years. In addition, without inclusion of unification related 
liabilities,  the  German debt ratio  would  have  remained  well  below the  60%  of GDP 
reference value. 
119 Despite  the  continuing  heavy  burden  on the  budget  resulting  from  the  exceptional 
circumstances of  German unification, the government deficit in Germany was reduced in 
1997 below the reference value. A further decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The 
government d~bt ratio has been rising during the second stage and surpassed the 60% of 
GDP  reference  value  in  1996.  The  debt  ratio  continued  to  rise  in  1997  but  at  a 
decelerating pace and exceeded the 60% of GDP reference value only by a small amount. 
The debt ratio is forecast to decline in 1998 and is expected to return below the reference 
value soon. In view of  these developments, the Commission considers that the excessive 
deficit  situation  has  been corrected  and  that an  excessive  deficit no  longer exists  in 
Germany. The Commission is therefore recommending to the Council the abrogation of 
the decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit for Germany. 
Table 4.10  Germany: government debt dynamics 
(as %ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  3.9  2.2  7.8  2.4  0.8  -0.1 
- Contribution of  primary balance  -0.1  -1.0  -0.5  -0.3  -1.1  -1.2 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  2.1  1.0  1.9  2.3  2.1  l.S 
- Stock-flow adjustment  1.9  2.2  6.4  0.4  -0.1  -0.4 
Government debt ratio  48.0  50.2  58.0  60.4  61.3  61.2 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
120 4.4.3. Spain 
The budgetary position of Spain was 
not  satisfactory  at  the  beginning  of 
Stage Two. Due to the recession, the 
govelll)llent deficit amounted to 6.9% 
of GDP in 1993. The deficit was cut 
to 6.3% of GDP in 1994 but widened 
again to  7.3%  in  1995.  Part of this 
increase was due to the disclosure in 
1996  of a  number  of unregistered 
operations  for  1995.  A  substantial · 
budgetary  adjustment  took  place  in 
1996 and 1997. The strongest deficit 
reduction occurred in 1996, bringing 
down  the  deficit  to  4.6%  of GDP. 
Budgetary  adjustment  continued  in 
1997,  when the  deficit  was  reduced 
to 2.6% ofGDP. 
.  The  budgetary  adjustment  was 
brought  about  by  a  tightening  of 
expenditure. The strong reduction in 
budgetary imbalances was in no way 
due  to  the  cyclical  component  in 
1996 and was only to a minor extent 
supported  by  the  favourable 
development of  cyclical conditions in 
1997 (see Graph 4.5). 
In  1996,  current  government 
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expenditure rose less than nominal GDP, due to a fall in interest payments and in current 
transfers to enterprises and to low growth in government consumption. Both government 
investment and capital transfers were cut sharply.  Moreover, in 1996 revenue increased 
faster  than  nominal  GDP,  mainly  due  to  higher  revenues  from  social  security 
contributions and a rise in excise taxes. The primary balance turned into a small surplus 
in 1996. 
121 In  1997,  the  deficit  reduction  was  mainly  due  to  discretionary  measures  to  contain 
expenditure, based on a freeze in civil servants' wages and on restraints in the purchases 
of  goods and services and of  capital expenditure. A significant fall in interest rates largely 
offset the impact on interest payments of  the debt increase in 1996. Strong tax revenues, 
linked to strong growth, also contributed to. the reduction in the. deficit in 1997. 
In 1998, the government deficit is forecast by the Commission services to reach 2.2% of 
GDP. This reduction is due to limited growth in social expenditure, in interest payments 
and in government consumption. Total revenue is due to grow in line with nominal GOP, 
partly due to an additional increase in indirect taxes, mainly excise duties. Government 
investment is expected to rise more rapidly than nominal GOP. 
The Spanish convergence programme of April 1997 aims for the government deficit to 
fall further to 1.6% of  GOP by the year 2000, in a context of  sustained economic growth. 
The government is committed to reduce the expenditure-to-GOP ratio by 1.8 percentage 
points  of GOP  to  41.9%  by  the  year 2000,  while  the  revenue-to-GOP  ratio  would 
decrease  only  slightly.  The  reduction  in  government  expenditure  is  concentrated  on 
current expenditure - as a result of major efforts to curb government consumption but 
also due to the decline in debt costs -,  while government investment should rise faster 
than nominal GOP. The reduction in the government deficit is to be shared by all levels 
of  general government. In this context, an agreement inspired by the Stability and Growth 
Pact  has  been  reached  between  the  central  government  and  the  Autonomous 
Communities, setting ceilings to the budget deficits of  the regional governments. 
122 The government debt ratio increased by  10.1 percentage points from 60.0% of GDP in 
1993  to  70.1% in  1996. In 1996, most of the increase in the government debt ratio was 
due to stock-flow adjustments (see Table 4.11). These were the result of: first, the issue 
of debt by the Treasury for an amount higher than strictly necessary because of portfolio 
reasons and in order to take advantage of the low interest rates prevailing at the end of 
1996,  and  second,  the  need  to  fund  the  uncovered  expenditure  liabilities  detected 
mid-1996. 
In 1997, the previous upward trend in the government debt ratio was halted and the debt 
ratio fell  by  1.3 percentage points to  68.8% of GDP.  This improvement is explained by 
the further increase in the primary surplus and  by the  negative stock-flow adjustment, 
resulting mainly from privatisation proceeds. The reduction in the debt ratio is expected 
to continue in 1998, mainly owing to a further improvement in the primary surplus and 
strong  economic  growth.  The  reduction  in  the  government  deficit  is  projected  in the 
convergence programme to  lead to  a steady decline in the debt ratio  to  approximately 
65% of  GDP by the year 2000. 
The  government deficit in  Spain has  declined  substantially since  1995  and  in  1997  it 
reached a level below the reference value. A further decline in the deficit is expected for 
1998. The government debt ratio had been rising until 1996 and declined for the first time 
in  1997.  However,  in a context of expected strong economic growth and  low interest 
rates, the government debt ratio is expected to remain on a downward path in the coming 
years.  In  view  of these  developments,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  excessive 
deficit situation has been corrected and that an excessive deficit no longer exists in Spain. 
The Commission is therefore recommending to the Council the abrogation of  the decision 
on the existence of  an excessive deficit for Spain. 
Table 4.11  Spain: government debt dynamics 
(as %of  GOP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in de.bt ratio:  12.0  2.6  2.9  4.6  -1.3  -1.4 
- Contribution of  primary balance  1.7  I.S  1.8  -O.S  -1.9  -2.1 
- Interest and nominal GOP growth contribution  3.7  1.3  1.1  1.7  0.7  0.3 
- Stock-flow adjustment  6.6  -0.2  0.0  3.4  -0.1  0.4 
Government debt ratio  60.0  62.6  6S.S  70.1  68.8  67.4 
• Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
123 4.4.4.  France 
The budgetary position of  France was 
unfavourable  at  the  beginning  of 
Stage Two.  Mainly as a result of the 
recession,  the  government  deficit 
reached  a peak of 5.8%  of GDP  in 
1993. In 1994 the government deficit 
remained at the same level as  in the 
previous  year,  partly  due  to  the 
cancellation  of the  debt  of former 
colonies which  increased the  deficit 
by  0.3%  of GDP.  Clear progress  in 
budgetary consolidation was made in 
1995 and  1996, with the government 
deficit  falling  to  4.9%  of GDP  in 
1995  and  to  4.1%  in  1996,  in  line 
with  the  government's  objectives. 
The  government  deficit  declined 
further in 1997 to 3.0% ofGDP. 
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124 The reduction in the deficit during the second stage has been largely due to discretionary 
measures; cyclical factors contributed little to the budgetary adjustment (see Graph 4.6). 
In  1994 the positive effect of the economic  recovery on the deficit was offset by the 
impact of the measures taken to stimulate activity, in particular the reduction of income 
taxes and the fourfold increase in school expenses payments. However, since 1995 the 
reduction in the cyclically adjusted deficit has been significant. Adjustment was achieved 
through expenditure tightening as well as tax increases. The discretionary measures and 
reforms  adopted  since  1995  laid  the  foundations  for  gradual  and  lasting  budgetary 
consolidation in subsequent years. First, the government put the emphasis on controlling 
government expenditure as a means of  reducing the deficit and with a view to reversing 
the upward trend in the ratio of government expenditure to GDP; a series of measures 
were taken to control central government expenditure together with local  government 
spending. Second, the government undertook a far-reaching reform of  the social security 
system in 1996 in order to bring the social accounts back to balance on a durable basis. 
Measures to curb spending were complemented by tax increases in order to achieve the 
deficit targets. To lessen the tax burden on the economy, a reform of  the personal income 
tax system has been initiated and the health insurance contributions of employees have 
been progressively reduced by shifting the financing of  health care to a tax on a broader 
range of  income. 
The deficit reduction in 1997 stemmed in part from the tight control of  state expenditures 
and measures to consolidate the social accounts. In the course of  the year 1997, following 
the presentation of  the audit of  the public fmances which had revealed a marked slippage 
in  the  state  budget  deficit,  the  government  adopted  additional  adjustment  measures 
amounting  to  0.4%  of GDP.  These  corrective  measures  together  with  expenditure 
containment resulted in a lower than targeted state budget deficit. Furthermore, the tight 
spending norm set by Parliament for health care spending growth was respected in 1997. 
In addition, almost half of the deficit reduction between 1996 and 1997 was due to the 
one-off payment by France Telecom to a central government fund, amounting to 0.5% of 
GDP. 
125 Since 1996 some statistical changes were introduced mainly in order to bring the French 
accounting  system  in  line  with  the  ESA-1979  rules.  These  changes  contributed  to 
reducing the deficit by between 0.2% and 0.5% of  GDP per year. They consist of  changes 
in the booking of  certain items such as coupons courus and linear bonds and the correct 
treatment ofpubli~  hospital spending and subsidies to the aeronautical industry .• 
The government deficit is forecast by the Commission services to decline marginally to 
2.9% of GDP in 1998.  This implies that the one-off France  Telecom  transfer is  being 
replaced by  more  durable  measures  in  1998.  The  state budget and the  social  security 
fmancing  law  for  1998  give  a  clear  indication  of the  government's  commitment  to-
budgetary consolidation. The  1998 budget holds expenditure constant in real terms and 
includes new tax measures amounting to 0.15% of GDP.  As regards the social security 
system, Parliament has limited the increase in health care spending to 2.2% in 1998 and 
the government has taken additional adjustment measures amounting to  0.2% of GDP. 
Furthermore the government plans to bring the social accounts back to balance in 1999 
by proceeding with the implementation of  the reform of  the health care system introduced 
in 1996. 
During the second stage the government debt ratio  has  grown at a sustained, although 
decelerating, pace but it has remained below the 60% of GDP reference value;  it rose 
from 45.3% ofGDP in 1993 to 58.0% in 1997 (see Table 4.12). 
Since  1994 the government deficit in France has  declined substantially and in  1997  it 
reached  a  level  equal  to  the  reference value.  A further  small  decline  in the  deficit  is 
expected in  1998.  The government debt ratio has been rising but it remains below the 
60% of  GDP reference value. In view of  these developments, the Commission considers 
that the excessive deficit situation has been corrected and that an excessive deficit no 
longer exists in France. The Commission is therefore recommending to the Council the 
abrogation of  the decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit for France. 
Table 4.12  France: government debt dynamics 
( as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  5.5  3.2  4.2  2.9  2.4  0.0 
- Contribution of  primary balance  2.4  2.2  1.1  0.3  -0.6  -0.7 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  3.0  1.7  2.1  2.4  1.8  1.1 
- Stock-flow adjustment  0.2  -0.7  1.0  0.2  1.2  -0.4 
Government debt ratio  45.3  48.5  52.7  55.7  58.0  58.1 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
126 4.4.5. Italy 
Italy  entered  Stage  Two  of EMU 
with  an  unsatisfactory  budgetary 
position.  Due to the recession and 
despite  stem  retrenchment 
measures,  the  deficit  amounted  to 
9.5% of GDP in 1993. The surge in 
interest rates that accompanied the 
exit of the·  lira  from  the  ERM  in 
September  1992  pushed 
government interest payments to an 
unprecedented  high  level.  The 
consolidation effort was relaxed in 
1994  as  the  measures  behind  the 
sharp  increase  m  taxation 
introduced  in  1993  were  not 
extended  to  ·  1994  and  revenues 
relative  to  GDP  fell.  However, 
better  growth  conditions  allowed 
the deficit to be reduced slightly to 
9.2% ofGDP in 1994. 
In  1995,  budgetary  consolidation 
resumed, also assisted by vigorous 
economic  growth,  and  the  deficit 
fell  to 7. 7% of GDP.  This decline 
·  was  entirely obtained through cuts 
in non-interest expenditure. During 
the  same  year  a  far-reaching 
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pension reform was approved, which transformed the general pension system from an 
earnings-based into a contribution-based scheme. The new system, however, applies fully 
only to new entrants into the labour market, so that its full impact will only be felt in the 
long term. The reduction in government debt service costs and the increase in revenues, 
recovering part of  the decline previously recorded, played a major role in further reducing 
the deficit to 6.7% ofGDP in 1996. 
127 The largest budgetary consolidation effort, however, was made in 1997 when the deficit 
was  reduced  by  no  less  than  4.0 percentage  points  of GDP  to  2.7%  of GDP.  The 
government  introduced  measures  to  reduce  tax  allowances,  increased  social  security 
contributions  and  cut  current  and  capital  transfers  to  enterprises.  Some  temporary 
measures  - amounting  to  1.1%  of GDP - were  also  introduced.  These  temporary 
measures, such as  for  example the euro-tax, were mostly concentrated on the  revenue 
side. A crucial role in accomplishing the budgetary objectives for the year was played by 
the strict limits which were  set by the Parliament on the cash budget.  This prevented 
budget  appropriations  from  being  transfonned  into  liquidity  available  to ·government 
agencies.  As a result, many government agencies ran down their outstanding liquidity 
reserves,  which had accumulated during past years.  However, the size of the  unspent 
appropriations - the residui passivi - grew significantly. As these residui passivi can be 
carried over to the following budget, there is  a risk that they might lead to  increased 
expenditure in the future. As long as the Parliament continues to impose severe limits on 
the cash budget, this risk is limited.  The Budget Law for  1998  specifies that the cash 
constraints which were imposed in 1997  are to  be  maintained for the  following three 
years. Recent decisions already brought down the outstanding stock of residui passivi by 
2 percentage points of GDP. In addition, the  governm~nt intends to gradually phase out 
the outstanding stock of  residui passivi and is currently preparing new legislation to limit 
the proportion of  residui passivi that can be carried over to the following year. 
Throughout  the  second  stage,  economic  activity  has  remained  below  trend  and  the 
cyclically  adjusted  deficit  was  therefore  consistently  below  the  actual  deficit  (see 
Graph 4. 7).  As  cyclical  conditions  continued  to  exert  a  negative  influence  on  the 
government budget,  the  cyclically adjusted deficit in  1997  was  lower than the  actual 
deficit.  The contribution of the cycle to  the budgetary improvement remained modest. 
The reduction in the deficit ratio from 9.5% of GDP in 1993 to 2. 7% in 1997 was almost 
entirely  due  to  expenditure  reduction.  The  single  largest  contribution  to  the  deficit 
reduction  was  given  by  lower  interest  payments.  Government  consumption  declined 
significantly while production subsidies, capital transfers to enterprises and government 
investment were also reduced. On the other hand, social security expenditure remained 
pratically unchanged and total  revenues  increased only slightly.  As  a  consequence  of 
these developments, the primary balance has been in surplus throughout the whole period 
and rose from 2.6% ofGDP in 1993 to 6.8% ofGDP in 1997. 
128 In 1997 some statistical revisions were introduced in order to ensure the compatibility of 
the national accounting system with the ESA-1979 rules. These changes consisted mainly 
of revisions in the recording of interest payments on postal bonds and the recognition of 
the debt of the railways as government debt.  The effect of these changes on the deficit 
figures for previous years ranged from increasing the deficit by 0.1 percentage points of 
GDP to a decrease by 0.4 percentage points ofGDP. 
The government deficit in  1998  is  forecast  by the Commission services to decline to 
2.5% of GDP. Discretionary measures amounting to  1.2% of GDP have been approved 
for  1998,  in  line  with the  indications of the  June 1997 convergence programme.  The 
VAT rate structure has been changed, cuts in transfers to public service agencies decided 
and  adjustments  to  the  pension  system  introduced.  These  measures,  mostly  of a 
permanent  nature,  replace  the  one-off  elements  of  the  1997  budget.  A  further 
considerable fall  in interest payments should also take place.  Two important structural 
reforms will be implemented in 1998: the reform of  the taxation system and the reform of 
the state budget. Although their impact on the accounts is estimated to be neutral in 1998, 
the budgetary consequences in the medium term are potentially significant, as should be 
the  favourable  implications  for  resource  allocation  and  the  efficiency  of the  entire 
economic  system.  The  convergence programme projects the  government deficit to  be 
reduced further to 1.8% of GDP by the year 2000. Since the adoption of  the convergence 
programme the Italian government has announced the commitment to a further decline in 
the deficit towards 1% ofGDP in 2001. 
The government debt ratio, which was already at a very high level, continued to increase 
to a peak of 124.9% of  GDP in 1994. Since then the debt ratio has been falling, driven by 
the  high  primary  surpluses  of recent  years.  However,  the  decline  in  the  debt  ratio 
remained small due to high debt service costs and, in most years, unfavourable growth 
conditions. The debt ratio started to decline in 1995, the only year with high nominal 
growth during this period. (see Table 4.13). The debt ratio continued to fall in 1996 when 
the primary surplus reached 4.1% of GDP and the stock-flow adjustment contributed to 
its decline. As the primary surplus reached a high level of  6.8% of  GDP in 1997, the debt 
ratio fell  further to  121.6% of GDP.  In that year, the primary surplus was sufficiently 
large to more than offset the snowball effect. The Commission services forecast the debt 
ratio to fall faster to 118.1% of  GDP in 1998 as the primary surplus will be kept at a high 
level, debt service costs are declining and economic growth is expected to recover. The 
June  1997 convergence programme for Italy projected the decline in the debt ratio  to 
accelerate further  in coming years.  The  Italian government recently  announced that it 
intends to bring down the debt ratio by some 3 percentage points of GDP per year and 
that the debt ratio should be reduced below 100% of  GDP by the year 2003 and renewed 
its commitment to maintain the primary surplus at an appropriately high level. 
129 In the past four years, developments in government debt have also been influenced by the 
privatisation  of state-owned  enterprises.  The  Treasury  realised  privatisation  receipts 
amounting to 0.4% ofGDP in 1994,0.5% in both 1995 and 1996 and 0.7% in '1997.  In 
the years 1999-2001 privatisation receipts. are expected to continue to lie within the range 
of0.5-0.75% ofGDP per year. 
A far-reaching budgetary consolidation has been accomplished in Italy since  1993,  in 
generally difficult economic conditions. The adjustment has been based on a substantial 
reduction  i~ government expenditure and has led to large and rising primary surpluses. 
The slowing of inflation has stabilised the currency and allowed for a marked reduction 
in interest rates. As a result of  the decline in interest rates which has occurred so far, the 
reduction in government debt service costs is likely to progress further in coming years. 
These  developments,  together  with  the  increase  in  the  average  maturity  of  the 
government  debt  pursued  in  recent  years,  justifies  the  expectation  that  government 
interest payments as a percentage of GDP will not climb back to the figures observed in 
the recent past. Three important structural reforms were decided during the second stage 
of  EMU: the reform of  the pension system in 1995 and/  the reforms of  the taxation system 
and state budget in 1997. Several important privatisation operations were also completed 
in the period. · 
Since  1993  there  has  been a  very  large  and  continuous  reduction  in the  government 
deficit in Italy and in 1997 the deficit reached a level below the 3% of GDP reference 
value. A further decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio is 
still at a very high level but it has been declining every year since  1994. The primary 
surplus has increased sharply in recent years and has been sufficiently large since 1995 to 
sustain the continuing reduction in the debt ratio. In view of expected further reductions 
in debt service costs, improving economic growth and provided that the primary surplus 
stays at a high level, the pace of the decline in the government debt ratio will accelerate 
in 1998 and in future years. In view of.these developments, the Commission considers 
that the excessive deficit situation has been corrected and that an excessive deficit no 
longer exists in Italy.  The Commission is therefore recommending to  the Council the 
abrogation of  the decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit for Italy. 
Table 4.13  Italy: government debt dynamics 
(as o/oofGDP) 
1993  1994  199S  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  10.4  S.8  -0.7  -0.2  -2.4  -3.S 
- Contribution of  primary balance  -2.6  -1.8  -3.7  -4.1  -6.8  -S.S 
- Interest and nominal GOP growth contribution  8.8  4.6  1.9  4.1  4.S  2.6 
- Stock-flow adjustment  4.2  3.1  1.0  -0.2  -0.1  -0.6 
Government debt ratio  119.1  124.9  124.2  124.0  121.6  118.1 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
130 4.4. 6.  Austria 
,  Austria's budgetary situation sharply 
deteriorated in the years preceding its 
membership of the European Union: 
between  1992  and  1994,  the 
government  deficit  rose  by 
3.0 percentage points of GDP to 5% 
of  GDP  in  1994.  This  budgetary 
slippage  was  triggered  by  the  1993 
growth  slowdown  and  was 
exacerbated  further  by  the  1994 
income  tax  reform.  When  Austria 
joined  the  Union  in  1995,  the 
government  deficit  continued  to 
increase slightly and reached a peak 
of5.2% ofGDP. 
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adjustment period, the  improvement in the  cyclically adjusted government deficit was 
larger than the reduction in the actual deficit (see Graph 4.8). 
131 The  measures  included  in the  Austrian government's  1996-97  federal  budget savings 
package  - which  was  the  framework  within  which  the  government  implemented  its 
consolidation  policy - consisted,  on  the  expenditure  side,  of a  stricter  control  of 
unemployment benefits, a tightening and streamlining of social transfers, a reduction in 
the number of government sector employees and control of the government wage bill. 
Measures  on the  revenue  side  included  the  suspension  of exemptions  on  wage  and 
corporate taxes as well as small increases in withholding tax rates, in motor vehicle and 
tobacco tax rates and the introduction of  a tax on electricity and gas. 
The 1997 budget also included one-off measures. The sale of government buildings and 
of  the third mobile phone licence each yielded around 0.1% of GDP. The Postsparkasse 
made a one-off payment to the government of  around 0.15% ofGDP, in return for which 
the  government  took  over  all  future  pension  payments  to  employees  of this  public 
enterprise. Moreover, the improvement in the budgetary balances of the Lander in 1997 
appeared to some extent to be attributable to a switch in the system for housing support 
from  grants  to  loans,  thereby  excluding  these  transfers  from  the  general  government 
deficit. The measures envisaged in the government's 1998 federal budget as well as in its 
1999 draft budget indicate, however, that the Austrian government is replacing the 1997 
one-off measures by measures of  a structural nature. 
The Commission services forecast the government deficit in 1998 to decrease further to 
2.3% ofGDP. The targets set in the October 1997 updated convergence programme show 
small further reductions in the government deficit of 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points of GDP 
per year over the projection period. The programme projects that a deficit of  just below 
2% ofGDP will be reached by the year 2000. 
Due to the budgetary deterioration at the beginning of  this decade, Austria's government 
debt ratio  breached the  60%  of GDP  threshold in  1993  and  steadily increased  in  the 
following years until it reached almost 70% of GDP in  1996.  Even though the primary 
balance was brought into surplus in 1996 and 1997, and was only just sufficient in 1997 
to  put  the  debt  ratio  on  a  downward  path  (see  Table 4.14).  However,  "stock-flow 
adjustment" measures amounting to  around 3% of GDP also contributed to bring down 
the debt ratio for the first time to 66.1% of GDP in  1997. These measures included the 
privatisation  of several  government-owned  enterprises  as  well  as  the  reclassification 
outside the government sector of municipal  utility agencies  and of the  road-financing 
agency  Asfinag.  Measures  of the  same  nature  are  also  expected  to  make  a  further 
contribution to the reduction in the debt ratio in 1998. 
132 The  October 1997  updated  convergence  programme  projects  the  debt  ratio  to  fall 
continuously to slightly below 65% of GDP by the year 2000. The programme expects 
economic  growth and  continued deficit reductions  to  be  the  main contributors to the 
decline in the debt ratio from 1999 onwards. 
The government deficit in Austria has been reduced since 1995 and in 1997 it fell below 
the reference value. A further decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government 
debt ratio continued to rise until 1996 but was reduced in 1997 for the frrst time. Given 
the expected upturn in economic growth in the coming years, the budgetary situation is 
expected to continue to improve steadily, with the debt ratio falling gradually. ·In view of 
these developments, the Commission considers that th! excessive deficit situation has 
been corrected and that an excessive deficit no longer exists in Austria. The Commission 
is therefore recommending to the Council the abrogation of  the decision on the existence 
of  an excessive deficit for Austria. 
-
Table 4.14  Austria: government debt dynamics 
(as %ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1993  1996  1997.  1998* 
Change in debt ratio:  4.6  2.7  3.8  0.3  -3.4  -1.4 
- Contribution of  primary balance  -0.1  0.9  0.8  -0.4  -1.6  -1.7 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  2.3  0.9  1.7  1.9  1.S  1.2 
- Stock-flow adjustment  2.3  1.0  1.3  -1.2  -3.2  -1.0 
Government debt ratio  62.7  63.4  69.2  69.3  66.1  64.7 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
133 4.4. 7.  Portugal 
Following the recession in 1993  and 
the slow recovery of the economy up 
to  1995,  Portugal's  government 
deficit reached 6.1% of GDP in 1993 
and declined only slightly to 5.7% of 
GDP  in  1995.  The  government 
deficit was brought down to 3.2% of 
GDP  in  1996,  due  to  the  gradually 
improving  economic  condition~  and 
the  consolidation  measures  adopted 
since 1994. 
Growth  in  government  expenditure 
slowed down in  1996  and  spending 
on  government  investment,  the 
public  wage  bill  and  subsidies  to 
enterprises  remained  restrained. 
Interest  payments  fell  sharply  in 
1996, due to falling interest rates and 
improved  debt  management.  The 
most  important' contribution  to  the 
marked reduction of the government 
deficit  came,  however,  from  a 
noticeable  improvement  in  the 
efficiency of the collection of taxes. 
Measures  were  taken  since  1994  to 
increase  sanctions  against  tax 
evasion,  to  close  tax  loopholes,  to 
step  up  the  recovery  of tax  arrears 
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and to implement a general overhaul of  the tax administration. 
134 A discretionary tightening already took place in 1994 and 1995 but there was only a small 
reduction in the actual  deficit due  to  the worsening economic conditions during these 
years  (see Graph 4.9).  The  substantial  reduction in the  government deficit which took 
place in 1996 was mainly brought about by an additional budgetary retrenchment, even 
though  improving  cyclical  conditions  also  contributed  to  this  result.  Since  1996 
government investment expenditure has been larger than the government deficit. 
In  1997, the government deficit fell  more than initially expected to 2.5% of GDP.  The 
further improvement in the 1997 deficit resulted mainly from economic growth and relied 
less on further structural consolidation. The measures included in the 1997 budget were 
similar to those implemented over the past years: better debt management to bring down 
interest payments,  control  of current primary expenditure and  further  increases  in tax 
receipts and social security contributions due to improved tax collection methods.  The 
measures to speed up the recuperation of  tax arrears which had been ~opted during the 
previous  year  generated  further  significant  increases  in  tax  revenue  in  1997  and 
government  investment  expenditure  remained  below  the  budgeted  targets.  Health 
expenditures, however, turned out higher than expected. 
In 1997, the pension fund of  the Banco Nacional Ultramarino made a one-off payment to 
the government of 0.3% of GDP,  in return for  which the government took over future 
pension payments to employees of  this publicly-owned bank. 
135 For  1998, the deficit is  forecast by the Commission services to  fall  further to  2.2% of 
GDP. Tax revenues and social security contributions are expected to remain buoyant, due 
to the improved effiCiency of  the tax administration and the social security system, while 
interest payments are  expected to  be  reduced  further  and  government  investment will 
remain  restrained.  The  cyclically  adjusted  deficit  is  expected  to  remain  broadly 
unchanged  in  1998  and  budgetary  adjustment  efforts  are  thus  being  maintained.  The 
. cyclically adjusted deficit will remain below the actual deficit. 
The  Portuguese  convergence  programme  of March 1997  projects  a  further  gradual 
reduction of the government deficit to  1.5% of GDP by the year 2000, in a context of 
continuously buoyant economic  growth.  Two  thirds of the  projected deficit  reduction 
would  come  from  further  reductions  in  interest  payments,  while  the  rest  would  be 
generated  by  the  limitation  of current  primary  expenditure.  The  programme  sets  an 
explicit limit for current primary expenditure and aims for a re-orientation of government 
expenditure towards increased spending on social security, education and investment. 
Following  its  sharp  increase  to  63.1%  of GDP  in  1993,  the  government  debt  ratio 
continued to drift upwards in 1994 and 1995, before starting to decline in 1996, when it 
fell  for  the first time to  65.0% of GDP.  The  debt ratio  fell  further  by  3.0 percentage 
points to 62.0% of GDP in  1997, due to the combined impact of the lower government 
deficit, higher GDP  growth and the use of substantial privatisation receipts to  redeem 
government debt (see Table 4.15). 
Part of  the receipts from the privatisation of  public enterprises in the telecommunications 
and electricity sector carried out in  1997  was  used to redeem government debt for  an 
amount of almost 4%  of GDP  in the  same  year.  These  debt-reducing  measures  were 
partially offset, however, by a net accumulation of financial assets by the social security 
sector and an increase in the national currency value of dollar-denominated outstanding 
debt, together amounting to around 2% of GDP.  As  a result, the stock-flow adjustment 
amounted to -1.9% ofGDP in 1997. 
136 For 1998, the Commission services forecast the government debt to fall further to 60.0% 
of GDP. The Portuguese government plans to realise around 2% of  GOP of  privatisation 
receipts in 1998, a large part of which will be used to  further redeem the government 
debt. 
The government deficit in Portugal has been reduced substantially and continuously since 
1993 and in 1997 it fell below the reference value. In view of the sustained buoyancy of 
economic growth and the further decline in interest payments, the government deficit is 
expected to  continue to decrease further in  1998.  The government debt ratio has  been 
declining since  1995  and exceeded the  60% of GOP  reference value by only a small 
amount in 1997. The government debt ratio is expected to equal60.0% ofGDP in 1998 
and  then  to  fall  below  the  reference  value.  In  view  of these  developments,  the 
Commission considers that the excessive deficit situation has been corrected and that an 
excessive  deficit  no  longer  exists  in  Portugal.  The  Commission  is  therefore 
recommending to  the  Council  the  abrogation  of the  decision  on  the  existence  of an 
excessive deficit for Portugal. 
Table 4.15  Portugal: government debt dynamics 
( as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  199S  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  3.0  0.7  2.1  -0.9  -3.0  -2.0 
- Contribution of  primary balance  -0.1  -0.2  -0.6  -1.6  -1.9  -1.6 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  2.8  1.2  u  1.0  0.8  -0.3 
- Stock-flow adjustment  0.3  -0.3  1.1  -0.4  -1.9  -0.2 
Government debt ratio  63.1  63.8  6S.9  6S.O  62.0  60.0 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
137 4.4.8. Sweden 
Due to the severe recession, Sweden 
suffered  a  dramatic  deterioration  in 
its  budgetary  situation  in  the  early 
1990s.  By  1993,  the  government 
deficit had reached a peak at  12.2% 
ofGDP. Since 1993, however, a very 
large  and  sustained  adjustment  has 
taken  place.  The  deficit  fell  by 
around 2 percentage points to  10.3% 
of GDP  in  1994.  The  improvement 
accelerated  sharply  in  the  next  two 
years, 1995 and 1996, over the course 
of  which  the  deficit  fell  by 
6.8 percentage points of GDP.  From 
1996  the  pace  of deficit  reduction 
eased  but  nevertheless  a  significant 
adjustment  amounting  to  2. 7%  of 
GDP  occurred  in  1997,  which 
brought the deficit down to  0.8% of 
GDP. 
Graph 4.10  Sweden: government deficit and debt 
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planned  in  the  years  1994-1998  and  the  deficit  was  to  be  eliminated  by  1998.  The 
measures were reinforced in 1996 when it appeared that the targets might not be  met, 
bringing the total value of  proposed measures to 8% ofGDP.  · 
138 Over  the  period  1993-1996  revenues  increased  significantly.  Apart  from  revenue 
buoyancy as the  economy recovered  from  recession,  there  were  increases  in personal 
taxation, soCial security contributions and corporate taxes. Expenditures were cut sharply 
as the costs of the bank rescue measures which were implemented in the early  1990s 
were phased out and due to changes in social welfare provisions and cuts in government 
sector employment. Owing to higher than expected unemployment, however, transfers to 
households fell less than expected. 
Deficit  reduction  continued  in  1997  at  a  slower  but  still  significant  pace.  However, 
revenue in relation to  GDP  stabilised as the effect of temporary and timing influences 
diminished while the expenditure ratio was reduced further.  In response to _higher  than 
expected unemployment and given that the consolidation programme's targets were being 
exceeded,  the  government  introduced  measures  to  alleviate  unemployment  while  still 
aiming for a balanced budget in 1998. 
Cyclical conditions were favourable  as  strong growth enabled the actual  deficit to  fall 
faster than the cyclically adjusted deficit up to  1995 (see Graph 4.1 0). In 1996, however, 
as  the  impact  of the  measures  in  the  consolidation  programme  gathered  pace  the 
cyclically adjusted deficit fell  sharply. Discretionary measures continued to be the main 
factor  in reducing the deficit in  1997.  As  economic activity remained below its  trend 
level and continued to have a negative influence on the government budget, the cyclically 
adjusted balance remained below the actual deficit. 
The Commission services forecast the deficit to turn into surplus in 1998. However, this 
includes the one-off sale of pension fund  real  estate, with a positive influence on the 
government balance oiD.9 percentage points ofGDP. 
In 1997, the government announced new targets for the government deficit after 1998 and 
these were included in the September 1997 review of the convergence programme. The 
government will aim for a budgetary surplus of 2% of GDP over the business cycle. In 
addition to  a balanced budget in 1998, a surplus of 0.5% and  1.5% of GDP would be 
aimed for in 1999 and 2000. Over the period to 2000 revenues would continue to decline 
relative to GDP and the entire burden of  adjustment would fallon expenditures which are 
expected to continue to decline relative to GDP. 
139 The  government  debt  ratio  continued  to  rise  in  the  early  years  of the  consolidation 
programme to reach a peak of79.0% ofGDP in 1994. Although it declined in each of  the 
next three years, by 1997 the debt ratio had fallen only slightly by 2.4 percentage points 
to  76.6% of GDP.  The primary deficit contributed strongly to  the  increase in the debt 
ratio in 1993 and 1994 but as the programme of consolidation measures came into effect 
there was a strong reversal in the primary balance which by  1997 was in surplus to the 
extent of  5.4% of  GDP (see Table 4.16). The achievement of a small surplus in 1998 and 
rising surpluses in 1999 and 2000 would ensure a continued fall in the debt ratio. 
Since  1993  there  has  been a  very  large  and  continuous  reduction  in  the  government 
deficit in Sweden. By  1997 the deficit was well below the 3% of GDP reference value 
and prospects are for a surplus in 1998. Despite the continuous decline in the deficit, the 
government debt ratio continued to rise to  a peak in 1994 and since then the debt ratio 
has  declined only slightly.  The prospects are  for  a further  continued reduction  in the 
government debt ratio in coming years. In view of these developments, the Commission 
considers that the excessive deficit situation has been corrected and that an excessive 
deficit no longer exists in Sweden. The Commission is therefore recommending to  the 
Council  the  abrogation  of the  decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  for 
Sweden. 
Table 4.16  Sweden: government debt dynamics 
(as %of  GOP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  8.9  3.2  -1.4  -0.9  -0.1  -2.5 
- Contribution of  primary balance  6".1  3.5  0.5  -3.7  -5.4  -6.8 
- Interest and nominal GOP growth contribution  6.0  2.5  0.7  5.3  4.2  2.9 
- Stock-flow adjustment  -3.1  -2.8  -2.6  -2.5  1.1  1.4 
Government debt ratio  75.8  79.0  77.6  76.7  76.6  74.1 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
140 4.4.9.  United Kingdom 
Following  the  recession  of  the 
previous years, the government deficit 
peaked  in  1993  at just under  8%  of 
GDP,  and since then the government 
deficit has been substantially reduced 
to 1.9% ofGDP in 1997. The pace of 
consolidation  has  not  been  uniform; 
the  deficit  was  still  around  5%  of 
GDP  in  1996  and  its  fall  in  1997 
amounted  to  almost  3 percentage 
points ofGDP. 
The  reduction  m  the  deficit  by 
6 percentage  points  of  GDP  since 
1993 was accompanied by a recovery 
in economic activity.  However,  most 
of  the  reduction  in  the  deficit  is 
attributable to discretionary measures 
(see  Graph 4.11).  The  government 
acknowledged in  1993  that measures 
were  required  to  bring  the  public 
finances back to health and successive 
budgets tightened budgetary policy. 
In  particular,  in  1993  and  1994, 
substantial tax rises were announced, 
including regular increases in tobacco 
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141 The fall  in the deficit in 1997 accounted for  almost half of the budgetary adjustment 
observed since 1993. The decline resulted, in part, from strong economic growth in 1997, 
which was well above trend, but most of it, over 2 percentage points of GOP, resulted 
from budgetary adjustment measures. The budget of  November 1996 raised taxation and 
constrained expenditure growth to below that of nominal GOP. The budget of mid-1997 
implemented additional tax rises, including a rise in road fuel and tobacco duties above 
that previously announced. 
Continued restraint of expenditure and the full-year effects of announced tax rises are 
expected to result in a further reduction in the deficit in 1998. The Commission services 
forecast the deficit to fall to 0.6% of GOP in 1998. Since the economy is operating near 
to its potential and forecast economic growth in 1998  is close to trend,  the cyclically 
adjusted deficit is similar to the actual deficit.  In 1998, the reduction in the deficit is 
expected to be fully achieved by discretionary adjustment measures. 
The  September 1997  convergence  programme  for  the  United  Kingdom  envisaged 
continued budgetary consolidation in the medium term and the budget is expected to be 
in balance by the turn of  the century and then to move into surplus due to further control 
of  expenditure growth and rises in excise duties. 
The deficits in 1997 and 1998 are reduced by a one-off 'windfall' tax on the profits of 
recently privatised utilities, amounting to 0.6% of GOP in total. The revenues from this 
are to be spent on helping the long-term unemployed obtain work. But the bulk will not 
be spent until after 1998 so the deficit is aided in the short term by these measures. In the 
medium term this positive effect will unwind as revenues are spent. 
The decline in the deficit since 1993 did not prevent a rise in the government debt ratio, 
which peaked at 54.7% of  GOP in 1996. However, in 1997 the debt ratio fell to 53.4% of 
GOP when the primary balance moved into surplus and more than offset the contribution 
of interest charges and GOP growth (see Table 4.17). The debt ratio is expected to fall 
further  in  1998.  In the  medium term,  the  path of the  deficit  in the  September 1997 
convergence programme results in a debt ratio that falls to around 45% of  GOP or less by 
the end of  the programme. 
142 Since 1993 the government deficit in the United Kingdom has declined substantially and 
continuously and in  1997 it reached a level well  below the reference value.  A further 
decline in the deficit is expected in 1998. The government debt ratio rose in the years to 
1996 but remained significantly below the 60% reference level. In 1997 the debt ratio fell 
slightly and it is expected to fall  further in  1998.  In view of these developments, the 
Commission considers that the excessive deficit situation has been corrected and that an 
excessive deficit no longer exists in the United Kingdom. The Commission is therefore 
recommending  to  the  Council .  the  abrogation of the  decision  on  the  existence  of an 
excessive deficit for the United Kingdom.  · 
Table 4.17  United Kingdom: government debt dynamics 
( as%ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998• 
Change in debt ratio:  6.7  2.0  3.5  0.8'  -1.3  -1.2 
- Contribution of  primary balance  5.0  3.6  2.0  l.l  ~1.6  -2.8 
- Interest and nominal GDP growth contribution  0.8  0.5  0.9  1.0  0.3  1.3 
- Stock-flow adjustment  0.9  -2.1  0.5  -1.3  0.0  0.4 
Government debt ratio  48.5  50.5  53.9  54.7  53.4  52.3 
* Spring 1998 economic forecasts. 
Source : Commission services. 
143 Annex : Budgetary surveillance and comparability of  figures 
Budgetary  surveillance  at  Community  level  requires  comparable,  transparent  and 
homogenous figures from Member States to be fully efficient. Such figures are important 
to  allow  for  equal  treatment  between  Member  States.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  has 
formalised the Commission surveillance of budgetary situations of the Member States in 
the  framework of the excessive deficit proceduret3.  A protocol annexed to  the Treaty 
provides  the  common  definitions  of government  deficits  and  debt  to  be  used  in  the 
monitoringt4. These provisions are supplemented by a secondary legislationts which lays 
down  the  precise  definitions  and  organises  the  provision  of budgetary  data  to  the 
Commission. 
1.  Budgetary surveillance refers  to  the European System  of Economic  Accounts 
(ESA) 
Figures presented by governments in their budget laws follow national practices where 
accounting  procedures,  methods  of compilation  of data,  as  well  as  the  coverage  of 
budgets usually differ among Member States. 
Therefore, to ensure comparability and usage of figures suitable for economic analysis, it 
has been decided to  use economic accounts as the accounting framework for budgetary 
surveillance.  More  specifically,  the  reference  is  the  European  System  of Economic 
Accounts (ESA)t6. The philosophy of an economic accounting system like the ESA is to 
record events in a meaningful and suitable way for  economic analysis, forecasting and 
policy making. 
13  Article 104c ofthe Treaty. 
14  Protocol No 5 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty. 
15  Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of22 November 1993 on the application of  the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ L 332, 
31.12.93). 
16  The ESA economic accounts  system currently  in  operation  is  the  European  System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts second edition (ESA-1979). A new system (ESA-1995) will become operational 
in 1999 and will be applied to the excessive deficit procedure in March 2000. 
144 The budget deficit  concept retained  in economic  accounting  is  net  borrowing  of the 
general government sector. Net borrowing refers to the excess of all current and capital 
expenditure over the corresponding receipts and excludes all financial transactions  I?. Net 
borrowing must not be confused with the borrowing requirement often used as reference 
in  budget  laws,  as  the  borrowing  requirement  normally  includes  some  financial 
transactions and usually only covers the central  government.  The general  government 
sector covers central government, local authorities and social security funds. The general 
government definition is not on an institutional basis but on a functional basis. Thus, only 
units of which the principal function  is the  production of non-market services or the 
redistribution of resources are included. Accordingly, publicly owned units dealing with 
commercial operations such as public enterprises are excluded. 
The system presently in use (ESA-1979) only records economic flows.  Since no stocks 
are  recorded,  there  are  no  balance  sheets  in the  system  and  thus  no  measurement of 
government debt.  Hence, a definition of government debt had to be agreed upon.  This 
was laid down in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure and specified in Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. The concept retained is general government gross debt at 
nominal  value,  consolidated  for  government  liabilities  held within the  sub-sectors of 
general government. The requirements taken into account by the legislators when they 
decided on the debt concept were that the definition needed to be transparent, simple and 
quickly operational. 
2.  Operational procedures to ensure methodological comp~rability of ESA figures 
Before the  Maastricht Treaty,  budgetary data following  economic  account  definitions 
were produced mainly for the purpose of economic analysis.  The figures,  viewed as a 
complement  to -national  budget  law  figures  and  targets,  were  considered  useful  for 
comparative  evaluations,  macroeconomic  forecasting  and  medium-term  projections. 
Nevertheless, the importance of economic account figures for budgetary policy purposes 
was limited in most Member States. 
17  A financial transaction is  the sale and purchase of financial assets, such as geld, currency, deposits, 
loans, equity and bonds. Financial transactions must not be confused with capital transactions which 
cover capital formation (investment) and capital transfers (such as investment grants and capital taxes). 
Capital transactions influence net borrowing. 
145 However, with the Maastricht Treaty provisions, the importance of budget figures based 
on economic accounts has increased substantially. National authorities not only have an 
increased interest to take them into consideration as early as  possible in their domestic 
budgetary policy setting, but also Member States have to  supply them to the European 
Commission twice a yearis. 
The obligation by Member States to report ESA based budgetary·figures twice a year in a 
timely way has put more focus on the technical aspects of  the production of data. In this 
respect,  it has  been  necessary  to  review  closely  the  statistical  quality  of the  figures 
reported to the Commission and their methodological compatibility with the accounting 
rules of the ESA system. This task has been performed by the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (Eurostat). 
Overall, the ESA system gives adequate methodological rules on the statistical treatment 
. to be followed. Nevertheless, the need has arisen for Eurostat to complement or to make 
more explicit some ESA accounting rules. 
Such guidance has been called for when the question arose whether a specific statistical 
treatment applied by a Member State was compatible with the ESA-1979 system, when 
there was ambiguity about the interpretation of an existing ESA-1979 rule, or when the 
ESA-1979 system currently in use needed further clarification given that it was initially 
written in the early  1970s.  In these cases, the  issue has been examined with Member 
States'  national  account experts  and  Eurostat has  ultimately decided  after a  thorough 
examination of  all the elements. 
3.  Clarification of accounting treatments has been completed 
Member States and Eurostat have clarified accounting treatments and made sure that the 
ESA framework is correctly applied. A large number of  methodological issues have been 
resolved and special attention has been given to areas where differing interpretations of 
the required accounting treatment could have had a significant quantitative impact on the 
size of  budgetary variables. When deciding upon the most appropriate treatment in cases 
where the ESA-1979 accounting rules need to be made more precise, guidance has been 
obtained from  the  new ESA-1995  system  and  from  looking  at the  broad rationale of 
economic accounts. 
IS  Before 1 March and 1 September, in accordance with Article 4(1) of  Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. 
146 The main accounting topics  subjected to  clarification can be  regrouped in three broad 
issues:  the  classification of units  inside or outside the general  government sector, the 
inclusion or not in the deficit of  specific types of  transactions, and the time of recording 
of  certain transactions. Each one is presented below with the most noteworthy examples. 
•  The classification of  units inside or outside the general government sector 
In economic accounts, the classification of units in the institutional sectors is made 
on the basis of  the economic function of  the unit. This is the reason why the general 
government  sector  only  includes  units  which  principally  produce  non-market 
services.  When  a  unit  performs  both  non-market  and  market  activities,  the 
classification of the unit inside or outside the general government sector is decided 
on the basis of the dominant share in its resources between non-market and market 
sources.  As  the  composition  of  resources  may  change  over  time,  sectoral 
reclassifications may be necessary.  Public hospitals have been reclassified into the 
corporate sector in Germany in 1997, as the main part of  their resources comes from 
the sale of services. Similarly in Austria a restructuring of a public agency in charge 
of financing and maintaining certain roads  (Asfinag) has  led to  its reclassification 
into the corporate sector and consequently to the reclassification of its debt outside 
general government. 
Questions were  also raised concerning the  classification inside  or outside  general 
government  of certain  pension  funds  in  Finland  which  mostly  operate  on  a 
pay-as-you-go  basis  but  also  rely  to  a  minor  extent  on  capital  funding.  The 
alternative was between a classification in the social security sub-sector of general 
government or in the insurance sector.  As these pension funds  were found  to  pay 
benefits without reference to  individual  exposure to  risk,  which means that these 
pension schemes have  collective characteristics, their classification in the  general 
government sector has been confirmed. 
•  The inclusion or not in the deficit of  soecific types of  transactions 
Many questions have arisen about the inclusion in the deficit or exclusion from it of 
certain types of government transactions. The net borrowing concept retained by the 
Treaty excludes all financial transactions, but the financial or non-financial character 
of  a set of  complex transactions is not always clear-cut. 
147 This is the case when the government receives proceeds from the sale by a public 
holding company of  one of  its subsidiaries (indirect privatisation). The receipt for the 
government  could  be  interpreted  as  a  financial  transaction  in  shares  and  other 
equities or viewed as a payment of  dividends which reduces the deficit. Eurostat has 
decided  that proceeds  from  an  indirect privatisation  must  be  treated  similarly to 
proceeds from direct privatisations, i.e. as financial receipts which do  not influence 
the deficit. This rule of general application has notably been applied to the indirect 
privatisations of  COER in Belgium and Repsol in Spain. 
A similar question was raised concerning the accounting treatment of central bank 
payments to the State which originate from the exceptional sale of gold and foreign 
exchange currencies, from the revaluation of foreign exchange reserves,  and  from 
capital gains realised by central banks on the exchange market. This issue came up in 
connection with the sale of  monetary gold in Belgium and the Netherlands, and with 
plans to revalue gold and foreign exchange reserves in Germany. It has been ruled 
that payments from central banks to the State involving these assets do not influence 
the deficit calculation.  This decision has  also  been applied in  Italy to  a payment 
made by the Ufficio Italiano dei Camhi (UIC) to the government following the sale 
of  its monetary gold to the Banca d'Italia. 
The same type of issue was raised in France when the government received in 1997 
an  exceptional  payment  from  France  Telecom  in  exchange  for  taking  over  the 
pension  obligations  on  employees  with  a  civil  servant  status.  Future  pension 
obligations on a pay-as-you-go basis are not recognised as financial liabilities in the 
ESA-1979  system  and  consequently  no  financial  transaction  can  be  recorded. 
Therefore it has been ruled that such transactions have a non-financial character and 
reduce the deficit.  Similar types of operations were carried through in Denmark in 
1995 and in Portugal and Austria in 1997. 
In Italy, the 1997 budget contains a package of new taxes ("Eurotax") including an 
income tax surcharge. Authorities have evoked the possibility of a partial refund of 
this surcharge in future years. In economic terms, a link between a surcharge and a 
refund  could  be  seen  as  a  forced  saving  scheme.  However,  such  broad  political 
intentions  cannot  be  recognised  in  accounting  terms.  There  were  therefore  no 
grounds to record the surcharge receipts in a way other than a tax. 
148 Another  borderline  case  which  needed  clarification  concerns  the  treatment  of 
assumption or cancellation by government of public corporation debt. In fact,  such 
operations  have  multiplied  recently  as  many  public  enterprises  have  been 
restructured,  often  in  relation  to  their  privatisation.  In the  ESA-1979  system  at 
present in force, there are no guidelines on how assumption of  debt must be treated. 
Therefore it has been decided that the provisions of  the new ESA-1995 system must 
be  used.  Although  the  general  rule  in  ESA-1995  is  that  the  counterpart .  of debt 
assumed or cancelled must be recorded as a transfer payment which influences the 
deficit,  ESA-1995  allows  for  exceptions  whereby  the  assumption/cancellation  of 
debt does  not influence the deficit.  This is the case when a public corporation is 
liquidated or is subject to an on-going process of privatisation to be achieved in a 
short-term perspective. These ESA-1995 exceptions have been applied to Germany 
in the case of  the assumption by the German government in 1995 of the debt of the 
Treuhandanstalt.  They  have  also  been  applied  to  other  operations  of 
assumption/cancellation of debt by  government,  for  example  in Ireland (for Irish 
Steel), Portugal (for the petrochemical company CNP), and the United Kingdom (for 
British Coal). 
•  The time of  recording of  certain transactions 
It is  sometimes difficult to  decide on the time of recording of certain transactions, 
and therefore on the year of registration into the deficit.  Such a problem arose in 
Ireland in  1995  in  relation  to  a  High  Court  decision  that  established  a  liability 
towards women which had accumulated since  1985.  It was decided that a transfer 
must be recorded at the time the claim/liability is established with certainty and the 
exact amounts are known. The Irish transaction was therefore recorded in the year 
1995. The same criteria have been applied in Italy to rulings by the Constitutional 
Court allowing to cumulate two pensions and have led to the recording of  the amount 
of  the recognised pension rights in the year 1995. 
149 Another area which is related to the question of time of recording is the treatment of 
interest on specific financial instruments, including some which did not exist at the 
time  the  ESA-1979  system  was  completed.  In  the  absence  of precise  enough 
guidelines,  Eurostat has  taken  a  series  of decisions  on  how  and  when  to  record 
capitalised  interest,  interest  on  zero-coupon  bonds,  deep-discounted  bonds, 
index-linked  bonds,  and  linear  bonds.  Depending  on  the  statistical  treatment 
previously used  in different Member  States,  the  impact on the  deficit  from  these 
decisions has varied. The impact of  the decisions on government interest expenditure 
has been especially noticeable in Denmark, Italy,  Portugal and Sweden,  and most 
countries have been affected. 
The time dimension is particularly complex in economic accounting terms in cases 
of large public  infrastructure  programmes  developed  with the  help  of the  private 
sector.  There has  been a need for accounting guidelines to record  such operations 
which  are  usually  conducted  over  several  years  and  often  involve  sophisticated 
fmancing  schemes,  like  concession  rights  and  handing  over  to  the  State  of the 
infrastructure  without  simultaneous  corresponding  payment.  The  accounting 
decisions concern programmes in many Member States, like the construction of the 
bridge  between  Sweden  and  Denmark,  the  bridge  built  over  the  Tagus  river  in 
Portugal,  the  private  finance  initiatives  (PFI)  in  the  United Kingdom  or the  pre-
financing of  roads in Germany and Spain. 
4. Conclusion 
All major· issues where differences in accounting treatments existed and hampered the 
comparability of figures  have  been reviewed and  settled.  The  way  has  therefore  been 
paved for Member States to report data with adequate comparability characteristics which 
thus allow for a proper evaluation by the Commission of the budgetary positions of the 
Member States. 
The long tradition of  national economic accounting in most Member States has permitted 
a smooth implementation of  the technical requirements of  the excessive deficit procedure 
since the start of the second stage of EMU, as initial differences in the interpretation and 
in the use of economic accounts among Member States were limited and identifiable. A 
dynamic process has taken place whereby the technical provisions of  the excessive deficit 
procedure have  provided a strong incentive for  Member  States to  set their respective 
practices of  monitoring budgetary developments and of  deciding budgetary priorities into 
a common framework. 
150 5.  EXCHANGE RATES 
5.1.  Treaty provisions and application of  the criterion 
The third indent of  Article 109j(1) of  the Treaty refers to the exchange rate criterion as: 
"the observance of  the normal fluctuation margins provided  for by the exchange-rate 
mechanism  of the  European  Monetary  System,  for  at  least  two  years,  without 
devaluing against the currency of  any other Member State; " 
Article 3 of  Protocol No 6 specifies that: 
"The  criterion  on participation  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism  of the  European 
Monetary System referred to in the third indent of  Article 1  09j(J) of  this Treaty shall 
mean that a Member State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided  for 
by the  exchange-rate mechanism of  the  European Monetary System  without severe 
tensions for at least the  last two years  before  the  examination.  In  particular,  the 
Member State shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against any 
other Member State 's currency on its own initiative for the same period. " 
Developments within the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) subsequent to the ratification 
of the  Treaty  on  European  Union  have  made  the  application  of the  criterion  more 
difficult. In this context, the decision in August 1993  to widen the obligatory marginal 
intervention thresholds or fluctuation margins around  ERM  central  rates to  a uniform 
15% is particularly significant. When this decision was made, the widening of the bands 
was meant to be temporary. Extensive and systematic use of the wider margins was not 
foreseen.  The intention in widening the margins was not to  facilitate greater exchange 
rate variability but rather to counter speculation against ERM currencies. However, the 
absence  of a  formal  commitment  to  observe  the  original  ±2.25%  margins  and  the 
presumption that the  wider margins  could  be  exploited,  at  least temporarily,  must be 
taken into account when assessing fulfilment of  the criterion. 
For the purposes of assessing fulfilment of  the criterion for each Member State currency, 
it is  necessary to  construct an operational framework  which is  considered to meet the 
technical  requirements of the  criterion and  which reflects  the  underlying  spirit of the 
Treaty.  This framework should verify participation in the ERM for at least the last two 
years  and assess  exchange rate  behaviour.  The  framework  used  in  this report may be 
outlined as follows 
151 •  A  verification of participation in the  ERM  during  the  two-year period before  the 
examination.  The  two-year  period  to  be  considered  extends  from  March 1996  to 
February 1998. 
•  The behaviour of a currency within the ERM is examined with respect to a chosen 
reference currency or benchmark  1• The benchmark is the median currency within the 
ERM  grid.  In  short,  the  median  currency  is  that which  has  an  equal  number  of 
currencies above and below it within the grid at the official ECU fixing on any given 
day.  The  use  of the  median  currency  is  preferred  to  the  alternatives  (e.g.  the 
strongest/weakest  ERM  currency,  the  ECU,  the  DEM)  as. it  establishes  as  the 
benchmark  the  currency  at  the  "centre"  of the  ERM.  The  median  currency  is 
conventionally used in realignments as the basis for the calculation of the new parity 
grid. It also allows every ERM currency to  be assessed relative to a representative 
currency within the mechanism. In this way, it ensures neutrality in the examination by 
assessing the behaviour of each currency in the context of the overall functioning of 
the mechanism. The rationale for choosing the median-currency approach is explained 
in more detail  in the  box, while the alternatives are  analysed in the  Annex to  this 
chapter. 
Several alternative options, each with advantages and drawbacks, could be used and some of  these are 
discussed in the Annex. 
152 •  The exchange rate  variability of a  currency is measured on the basis of a ±2.25% 
fluctuation range around its central rate against the median currency. This range, while 
corresponding  to  the  original  narrow  fluctuation  margins  of the  ERM,  allows for 
deviations  greater  than  2.25%  against  the  exchange  rates  of the  other  ERM 
currencies2. The original narrow margins of  the ERM were tighter in that they applied 
simultaneously  against  all  currencies  in  the  mechanism  and  not just against  one 
reference currency. However, the significance of the greater exchange rate variability 
permitted by the median approach should be considered in the context of  the widening 
of the fluctuation margins to ±15%. The important feature of the median currency 
approach is that it assesses favourably those ERM currencies which are clustered (i.e. 
within a range.of±2.25%) around the centre of  the mechanism. A currency is deemed 
to have enjoyed exchange rate stability in periods when it has traded within ±2.25% of 
its central rate against the median currency3.  This does not imply, however, that a 
larger  deviation is  automatical~y considered  as  indicative  of severe  tensions  for  a 
currency within the  ERM.  In  assessing  whether a  larger· deviation  corresponds  to 
severe tensions, a range of elements is taken into account. These include (i) duration 
and amplitude of  the deviation; (ii) the nature and extent of  any policy response, with 
particular reference  to  foreign  exchange  intervention and/or  changes  in short-term 
interest  rates4;  and  (iii) whether  the  pressure  has  been  towards  appreciation  or 
depreciation  of the  currency.  Indeed,  it  seems  appropriate  to  draw  a  distinction 
between  tensions  in  respecting  the  upper  and  lower  fluctuation  margins  which 
correspond, respectively, to relative strength and weakness of a currency. Given the 
implied linkage between severe tensions and devaluation in the wording of  the Treaty, 
it seems reasonable to exclude movements above the 2.25% range against the median 
currency as a possible cause for non-fulfilment of  the criterion. 
2 
3 
4 
See box. 
In the remainder of the chapter, and in particular in Section 5.3, all references to ±2.25% fluctuation 
range are made with respect to the central rate against the median currency, unless otherwise stated. 
It should be recalled that the  1987 Basle-Nyborg agreement called for " ...  a more active, flexible and 
concerted use of the  instruments available,  namely exchange-rate movements within the  fluctuation 
band, interest rates and intervention" (Press communique of 1;2 September 1987 from the Committee 
of Governors ofEC central banks). For completeness, any episodes of intervention within the ±2.25% 
limits have also been examined. 
153 Box: The medi"an currency approach to the assessment of 
exchange rate stability in t~e ERM 
The median currency approach takes the currency with the median percentage deviation from its 
ECU central rate as the reference currency to which all other ERM currencies are compared. As 
daily data are used in this report, the selection of the median currency is made on a day-by-day 
basis. 
Each day, the currencies are ranked according to the percentage deviation of  their ECU exchange 
rate  from  their ECU  central  parity.  The  median  currency  is  selected  as  the  currency  at  the 
mid-point in this ranking. Then, for each ERM currency, the percentage deviation of the market 
bilateral rate against the median currency from the central rate vis-a-vis the median currency is 
calculated (it will be zero for the median currency itself). These percentage deviations form the 
basis of the evaluation of exchange rate behaviour, which is assessed in the context of ±2.25% 
fluctuations  around  the  central  rate  against the  median  currency.  A  breach  of this  range,  in 
particular on the lower side (which corresponds to relative weakness in the ERM), is interpreted 
as an indication of  possible tensions. 
It should be noted that a fluctuation range of ±2.25% around the median currency allows for 
deviations greater than 2.25% against the exchange rates of the remaining ERM currencies. In 
the  extreme case  where two  currencies  are  trading  at opposite  fluctuation  limits  against the 
median currency,  their bilateral  exchange  rate would  be  about 4.5%  from  the  corresponding 
ERM central rate. 
The median currency approach offers several important advantages: 
1.  The. approach is  neutral,  in that it allows all currencies in  the ERM to be assessed on an 
equal  basis and  it  does  not  prejudge  the  position  of any  individual  currency  or bloc  of 
currencies in  the mechanism. This would not be  the case if the DEM (or any other ERM 
currency) were taken as the reference currency, a choice that would preclude an assessment 
of  the behaviour of  that particular currency. 
2.  The  purpose  of this  examination  is  to  express  a judgement on  the  stability of a  given 
currency in the context of the ERM.  The chosen approach should not lead to conclusions 
biased by the behaviour of  possible outlier currencies. In other words, the method should not 
consider an outlier currency as the norm and all the others as diverging currencies. In light of 
recent developments in the ERM, the latter would be the case if, for instance, an approach 
based on the comparison with the strongest currency  were to be adopted. 
3.  Using the median currency appears most consistent with the actual working of  the ERM after 
the introduction of  the ± 15% fluctuation bands in 1993. A review of recent developments in 
the ERM shows that in the presence of  a significant appreciation of the Irish punt, monetary 
authorities in other ERM countries did not feel  obliged to take offsetting policy action, as 
long  as  stability with  respect to  a  large  number  of currencies  was  ensured.  Again,  this 
consideration argues against an approach based on the strongest currency in the ERM grid. 
4.  Reference  to  the  ECU  basket  appears  equally  inappropriate,  given  that  its  value  is 
significantly affected by movements in exchange rates of non-ERM currencies, in particular 
sterling. 
5.  The approach maintains coherence with the realignment procedure which has traditionally 
used the least divergent currency in the system as a numeraire for its calculations. 
154 5.2.  Exchange rate behaviour of Member State currencies 
5.2.1.  Overall conditions in the EMS 
. Conditions in the EMS have been generally quite stable in the period from March 1996 to 
February 1998.  The  majority of Community currencies  have  traded  in  narrow  ranges 
against each other.  The more notable exceptions have been the pound sterling and the 
Irish punt, both of which have appreciated sharply against the other EMS currencies in 
the same period.  Within the EMS, ten currencies have participated in the ERM for  at 
least two years.  These are the Belgian franc!LlD{embourg  franc  (BEF  /LUF), the Danish 
krone  (DKK),  the  German mark (DEM),  the  Spanish  peseta (ESP),  the  French  franc 
(FRF), the Irish punt ·(IEP), the Dutch guilder (NLG), the Austrian schilling (ATS) and 
the Portuguese escudo (PTE).  The Finnish markka (FIM) entered the ERM in October 
1996,  while  the  Italian  lira  (ITL)  re-entered  the  mechanism  in  November 1996.  The 
Greek drachma (GRD), the Swedish krona (SEK) and the pound sterling (GBP) did not 
participate  in  the  ERM  during  the  review  period,  although  the  GRD  entered  the 
mechanism in March 1998. 
Two main developments since March 1996 have fostered a generally smooth functioning 
of the  ERM,  as  reflected  in  exchange  rate  stability  and  a  simultaneous  downward 
convergence in interest rates among the participating Member States. These are: 
•  Growing market expectations of  a timely launch of  EMU with a large participation of 
Member  States.  These  expectations  have  reflected  (i) the  achievements  of the 
Member States in controlling inflation and redressing budgetary imbalances, (ii) the · 
steady progress in legal, technical, and institutional preparations and (iii) the strength 
of  political commitment to EMU in the Member States; 
•  There has been a substantial appreciation of  the USD. Demand for the USD has been 
largely  underpinned  by  the  relative  strength  of the  US economy  as  mirrored  in 
differentials between Community and US interest rates. A strong USD tends to foster 
stability in the ERM because it is normally accompanied by a strengthening of other 
currencies against the DEM within the mechanism. Over the last two years, the USD 
gained 23% against the DEM, while the DEM aeclined by 3% in (nominal) effective 
terms against the other ERM currencies. 
155 The stability of the ERM in the review period meant that there were no realignments of 
ERM central rates and that the vast majority of participating currencies were clustered 
around their central rates.  The  only notable exception was  the  IEP,  which traded well 
above its central rate for most of the review period and was revalued by 3% against the 
other ERM currencies in March  19~8 i.e.  after the close of the review period.  Overall 
conditions in the ERM can be assessed by examining the spread between the strongest 
and the weakest currency in the grid as illustrated in Graph 5.1  5•  This spread indicates 
, the extent to  which currencies have exploited the  ± 15%  fluctuation margins.  Between 
Ap~l  and November 1996, the spread remained well  below 5%.  The  spread increased 
substantially from November 1996 reaching a high of 11.5% in July 1997 6.  Since then, 
the spread has narrowed markedly and was below 3% by end-February. 
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Graph 5.1  also illustrates how the ERM spread is smaller when the IEP is excluded from 
the calculation. Excluding the IEP, the spread indicates that for a substantial part of the 
period under review one or more ERM bilateral exchange rates have deviated by more 
than  2.25%  from  the  corresponding ·central  rates.  There  have  been  three  identifiable 
periods when the spread has tended to widen. The first period was the second quarter of 
1996 when the ESP moved to the top of the grid and the spread peaked at 3.6%.  The 
other  periods  were  January 1997  and  July 1997  when  the  FIM  strengthened  sharply 
within the grid and the spread peaked at 4.6% and 3.7% respectively.?  The last period 
represented  a  temporary  reversal  of a  steadily  narrowing  trend  in  the  spread.  The 
narrowing trend res~ed  subsequently and the spread (excluding the IEP) was below 1% 
at end-February 1998.  · 
5 
6 
7 
The ERM spread discussed here  does  not take  into  account the  FIM  and the  ITL  in  the  period 
preceding their participation in the mechanism. 
This figure  relates to the maximum deviation of the IEP/FRF market rate  from  the  corresponding 
central rate. The maximum deviation of the FRFIIEP market rate from the corresponding central rate 
was above 13%. 
In both of  these periods, the FRF was at the bottom of  the grid. However, the width of  the spread was 
attributable to the strength of  the FIM rather than to the weakness of  the FRF, which at the time was 
close to its central parity against the median currency. 
156 5.2.2. Developments in the ERM  currencies 
Table 5.1  presents summary statistics on the  general behaviour of each ERM currency 
with  reference  to  the  median  currency  in  the  two-year  period  to  end-February 1998. 
Graph 5.2 shows the percentage deviation of each ERM currency from its central rate 
against the median currency in the same period. In the case of  the FIM and ITL, the sub-
period preceding their ERM participation is assessed with reference to their current ERM 
central  rates  (while  taking  into  account  the  absence  of a  formal  commitment by  the 
national authorities to target their exchange rates). This allows all the ERM currencies to 
be assessed on a comparable basis. 
The evidence  indicates  that  a group  of six  currencies,  comprising the  BEFILUF,  the 
DKK, the DEM, the NLG and the ATS,  have experienced low and diminishing volatility 
in the review period. This group of  currencies has traded almost continuously within ±1% 
of their central parity against the median currency in the grid with none exceeding the 
±2.25% range at any time. Indeed, one of  these currencies has been the median currency 
during almost the entire period. The stability of exchange rates between these currencies 
has been reflected in very narrow differentials between both their short-term and their 
long-term interest rates. At end-February 1998, the DKK was the median currency in the 
grid, while the. other five currencies in the group were within 0.1% of their central rates 
against the DKK. 
Table 5.1 
Spread against median currency 
(March 1996 -February 1998, daily data) 
Average  Average  Maximum  Minimum  Standard  Days < -2.2S% 
of  deviation 
(%)  absolute  (%)  (%)  Number  As%of 
values  trading days 
(%) 
BEFILUF  -0.08  0.22  0.44  -0.44  0.23  0  0 
DKK  -0.46  0.47  0.04  -1.41  0.52  0  0 
DEM  -0.13  0.14  0.34  -0.46  0.12  0  0 
ESP  0.71  0.71  2.61  0.00  0.47  0  0 
FRF  -0.81  0.81  0.05  -2.35  0.56  2  0 
IEP  4.56  5.21  10.91  -4.24  4.17  32  6 
ITL 
1>  -0.77  1.57  1.84  -7.82  2.13  96  19 
NLG  0.15  0.25  0.93  -0.30  0.32  0  0 
ATS  -0.15  0.16  0.31  -0.47  0.13  0  0 
PTE  0.67  0.86  2.76  -1.36  0.88  0  0 
FIM
1>  0.54  1.26  3.74  ·4.21  1.44  39  8 
1> Figures for ITL and FIM are calculated as if they had participated in the ERM for the whole 
examination period at their present central parities. All days that ITL and FIM were below -2.2S% 
occurred before participation in the ERM. 
Source: Commission services. 
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158 At the beginning of the review period, the FRF came under some selling pressure related 
to the weakness of the economy and in the aftermath of work stoppages in the public 
sector.  The  FRF  fell  more  than  2.25%  below  its  centr~ parity  against  the  median 
currency for two days. However, evidence of economic recovery supported demand for 
the  FRF  from  March 1996 onward and the  French currency has traded less than  1% 
below its central rate throughout most of  the review period. In August 1996, the FRF fell 
Close to -2.25% against the median currency as political uncertainty interacted with thin 
trading volumes to exaggerate movements in the exchange rate. A trend decline in French 
short-term interest rates was temporarily interrupted and the Banque de France intervened 
in support of  the currency. Selling pressure on the FRF was short-lived and since then the 
currency has been stable within the grid. The FRF traded below its central parity against 
the median currency for almost the entire review period but had practically converged on 
its  central parity by end-February 1998,  having been the median currency for  a  short 
period in December 1997. 
The ESP has been above its central parity against the median currency throughnut the 
review period. In April 1996, the ESP was more than 2.25% stronger than  the median 
currency.  The  appreciation  in  the  ESP  reflected  heavy  capital  inflows  to  Spain  as 
investors were attracted by improved economic  fundamental~ and a significant interest 
rate  differential  relative  to  other  Member  States.  In  January 1997,  the  ESP  again 
strengthened rapidly within the grid and 1he Banco de Espana intervened to contain the 
pace of appreciation. By end-February 1998, however, the ESP was within 0.3% of its 
central  rate  against  the  median  currency.  The  stability  of .the- p-eseta  supported  the 
narrowing of long and short-term interest rate differentials between Spain and lower-
yielding Member States. 
The PTE was never more than 2.25% below its central parity against the median currency 
in the review period and  was  continuously above  its  central  rate  against the  median 
currency from September 1996 to the end ofthe examination period. In January 1997, the 
PTE exceeded +2.25% against the median currency amid a sharp appreciation which was 
successfully  contained  by  intervention  from  the  Banco  de  Portugal.  Thereafter,  the 
deviation of the PTE from its centrai rate against the median currency has progressively 
narrowed and was  close to zero  by  end-February 1998.  As  in the  case of Spain,  the 
stability of the exchange rate has favoured the convergence of Portuguese interest rates 
towards rates in the lower yielding Member States. 
159 The IEP has made greater use of  its fluctuation margins than any other ERM currency in 
the two years under review. The average deviation in the IEP from its central rate against 
the median currency was exceptionally high at 4.6% when compared to the other ERM 
currencies.  The IEP  was more than  2.25% below its  central  rate  against the median 
currency for the ftrst  32 days of the review period but appreciated sharply within the 
ERM between April and November 1996. This trend brought the Irish currency from the 
bottom to the top of the grid - where it has remained until the end of the examination 
period - and mirrored a corresponding strengthening in the GBP.  The IEP was strong 
· within the grid throughout most of 1997 and its deviation from its central rate against the 
median currency reached a peak of  almost 11%. Amid receding market expectations of  a 
revaluation of its ERM central rate ahead of the decision on participation in EMU, the 
IEP began to ease towards the end of 1997. Early in 1998, the Irish currency depreciated 
sharply  and  was  within  3%  of its  central  rate  against  the  median  currency  by 
end-February.  The  IEP  was  revalued  by  3%  against  the  other  ERM  currencies  in 
March 1998, i.e. after the close of  the review period. 
The evidence clearly indicates that the variability of the IEP  exchange rate has  been 
relatively high in the review period. For most of the period, the IEP was trading outside 
of  a ±2.25% range against the median currency. The main deviation in the IEP against the 
median currency has been on the positive side,  reflecting the relative strength of the 
currency. As already indicated, the strength of the IEP was attributable to  the tendency 
for the Irish currency to move in phase with the GBP but also to the buoyancy of  the Irish 
economy. The GBP moved sharply higher against the other Community currencies in the 
period and pulled up the IEP, although the degree of correlation between movements in 
the two currencies became progressively less  strong.  Meanwhile,  Ireland has  enjoyed 
very  high  economic  growth  combined  with  low  inflation  and  sustained  budgetary 
consolidation. 
160 The ITL has participated in the ERM from  25 No-vember 1996 onward, i.e.  for  longer 
than 15 months by end-February 1998. Having depreciated very substantially in 1992/93 
after  the  exit  from  the  ERM  and  again  in  the  first  quarter  of 1995,  the  ITL  then 
experienced an extended appreciation against the other ERM currencies. In March 1996, 
the  ITL  reached  a  low of about  8%  below its  future  central  rate  against the  median 
currency but by mid-May the deviation had narrowed to 2%. In July and August 1996, the 
deviation widened again to a peak of  3.4% and the ITL remained more than 2.25% below 
its future central rate against the median currency for about one month. The temporary 
weakness of the ITL was linked to a corresponding movement in the USD and brought 
about a pause in the declining trend in Italian. short-term and long-term interest rates. 
Subsequently,  the  ITL  resumed an  appreciating  trend  without interest rate  support or 
significant  foreign  exchange  intervention8•  The  ITL  was  more  than 2.25%  below  its 
central parity against the median currency for  a total of 96 days  in the review period. 
However, since re-entering the ERM, the ITL has been within ±2.25% of its central rate 
against the median currency and was only 0.4% above it by end-February 1998. 
The FIM has participated in the ERM from  14 October 1996 onward, i.e. for more than 
16 months by end-February 1998.  The FIM depreciated in the early part of the period, 
mainly  due  to  uncertain  growth  prospects  in the  Finnish  economy.  From  May 1996, 
however, an improvement in economic fundamentals resulted in a sharp reversal in trend 
and the markka moved from about 4.2% to 1  ~ 7% below its future central rate against the 
median currency between May  and  October  19969.  This  appreciation occurred  in the 
context of an easing of monetary policy, as very low inflation rates allowed the Suomen 
Pankki to lower interest rates significantly in the course of 1996. The FIM was more than 
2.25% below its central parity against the median currency for a total of 39 days in the 
review period. However, since entering the ERM, the FIM has always been stronger than 
its  central rate against the median currency and  has  been more than 2.25% above its 
central rate against the median currency on two occasions. The deviation from its central 
. rate reached 3. 7% in January 1997 when the FIM became the second strongest currency 
in the ERM amid a generalised appreciation of  the Nordic currencies. The strength of  the 
FIM reflected favourable growth prospects in the Finnish economy and the central bank 
intervened to  limit the appreciation in the currency.  The  FIM again moved more than 
2.25% above its central rate against the median currency in August 1997; when markets 
were speculating that the currency would be revalued. On this occasion, the central bank 
did not intervene. The FIM had converged to its central rate by end-February 1998. 
8 
9 
During the first half of 1996 the Banca d'Italia operated in the foreign exchange market so as to limit 
the  volatility of the  lira during the phase of appreciation and to enlarge substantially its holdings of 
foreign  exchange reserves.  In  July and  August 1996, the  central  bank supported the  lira by  simply 
suspending this kind of  "smoothing" intervention. 
When Finland joined the ERM in October 1996 the current market rate against the ECU was about 1% 
above the central rate. 
161 5.2.3.  Non-ERM  currencies 
The GRD, the SEK and the GBP did not participate in the ERM during the review period 
March 1996-February 1998, although the GRD entered the mechanism in March 1998. In 
the absence of  ERM central rates, it was not technically possible to assess their exchange 
rate behaviour on the same basis as the ERM currencies. Moreover, it seems appropriate 
that the exchange rate behaviour of  these currencies should be assessed in the context of 
the monetary policy strategies pursued by their respective authorities. The authorities in 
the  United Kingdom  and  Sweden  pursue  direct  inflation  targets  and  have  floating 
exchange rates,  while  in Greece  exchange  rate  stability against the  ECU has  been an 
integral part of  the official anti-inflation strategy. Developments in the exchange rates of 
these currencies are  described making reference to the DEM in Graph 5.3  and to their 
nominal effective exchange rates in Graph 5.4. In addition, for the GRD, exchange rate 
behaviour against the ECU is presented in Graph 5.3. 
The GRD appreciated against both the DEM and the ECU in the first part of the review 
period.  Since the second quarter of 1996, the GRD traded within a range of 155-160 per 
DEM. Against the ECU, the drachma drifted lower in the first half of 1997.  In nominal 
effective  terms,  the  GRD  was  relatively  stable  throughout  the  period.  The  firm 
commitment, as expressed by the Greek authorities, to participate in EMU and progress 
in  lowering  inflation  and  government  deficits  has  promoted  exchange  rate  stability. 
However,  the  GRD  experienced  considerable  selling  pressure  in  October 1997,  as 
fmancial disturbances spread from  emerging markets in Asia.  The GRD was defended 
successfully by temporary interest rate  increases and foreign exchange intervention.  In· 
March 1998, the GRD entered the ERM at a central rate of 357 per ECU, substantially 
below the market rate prevailing at the time. 
The nominal effective exchange rate of the SEK rose by about 5% between March and 
October 1996 but fell back in the period to June 1997 on deteriorating growth prospects 
in the Swedish economy and monetary easing by the Riksbank. The SEKJDEM exchange 
rate followed a similar trend but with larger amplitude.  The trend was reversed again 
from  June 1997,  when the  SEK  began to  appreciate  on  an  improved  outlook for  the 
Swedish economy.  In nominal  effective terms,  the  krona was  back to  its  March 1996 
level by the fourth quarter of 1997 and reached a high of  4.25 per DEM in October 1997. 
By end-February 1998, the SEK was trading at 4.42 per DEM. 
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Nominal effective exchange rates for Greece , Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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The GBP appreciated very substantially in the review period.  The strengthening of the 
GBP  was  a  consequence  of the  advanced  cyclical  position  of the  United Kingdom 
economy  relative  to  most  of the  other  Community  economies  and  accordingly  the 
expectation of higher interest rates. The appreciation was most pronounced in the period 
from August 1996 to July 1997, when the GBP rose by 25% in nominal effective terms. 
In the same period, the GBP made even larger gains against the DEM (38%) and other 
Community currencies. Demand for the GBP was fuelled by a monetary tightening by the 
Bank of England as inflationary pressures began to emerge and by traditional spillover 
effects from the rising USD.  Already in 1996, accelerating growth in the UK economy 
provoked market speculation about monetary policy tightening, implying a widening of 
the  already  positive  differential  between  United Kingdom  and  Gennan  interest  rates. 
Indeed,  the  Bank of England  increased  its  official  interest rate  to  7.25%  in  six  steps 
during  the  examination  period.  The  GBP  exchange  rate  was  further  supported  by 
EMU-related  developments  as  portfolio  diversification  ahead  of EMU  has tended  to 
boost  investment  in  GBP-d~nominated assets.  However,  there  was  a  short  period  of 
selling pressure on the  GBP  in  September/October 1997  amid  speculation about early 
EMU  participation  for  the  United Kingdom  with  an  entry  rate  below the  prevailing 
market  rate.  Expectations  of a  monetary  tightening  in  Gennany  resulted  in  some 
weakening of  the GBP in the second half of 1997 but it had returned towards 3.0 DEM by 
end-February 1998. 
164 5.3.  Assessment of exchange rate stability in the terms of the Treaty criterion 
Ten currencies -the BEF/LUF, the DKK, the DEM, the ESP, the FRF, the IEP, the NLG, 
the ATS and the PTE - had participated in the ERM for  more than two years by end-
February 1998.  Of these,  only the  IEP  had traded beyond  a ±2.25% range  around  its 
central rate against the  median currency for  a sustained period of time.  However,  the 
deviation  of the  IEP  had  been  mostly  above  its  central  rate.  Accordingly,  these 
10 currencies are deemed not to have experienced severe tensions in the ERM in the two 
year period under review. 
By  the  time  of the  decision  by  the  Council  in  May  1998,  ITL  and  FIM  will  have 
participated  in  the  ERM  for  about  17  and  18Yl months,  respectively.  In  terms  of 
exchange  rate  behaviour,  both  currencies  have  displayed  a  broadly  similar  pattern, 
appreciating in the period before ERM entry and enjoying relative strength and stability 
in the grid thereafter.  For the purpose of this examination, the stability of the ITL and 
FIM is assessed as if the two currencies had participated in the ERM with their current 
central rates for the full two-year period. For these two currencies, there was no need of 
direct monetary policy response in defence of  the currency either in the fonn of raising 
official  interest  rates  or  extensive  intervention.  Over the  examination  period,  neither 
currency is deemed to have experienced severe tensions Within the ERM. 
The GRD, the SEK and the GBP did not participate in the ERM during the examination 
period. In consequence, the stability of  their exchange rates cannot be assessed as for the 
participating Member States. 
165 Annex: Approaches to the appraisal of  exchange rate stability 
in theERM 
The  median  currency  approach  used  as  the  operational  framework  for  assessing 
fulfilment of  the exchange rate criterion is discussed extensively in the box in Chapter 5. 
This  annex  focuses  on  ·the  advantages  and  drawbacks  of  possible  alternative 
frameworks to.  Verification of  two-year participation in the ERM and the observance of  a 
±2.25 range around central rates are assumed to be common to all frameworks. The main 
differentiating feature of the alternative frameworks is the benchmark against which the 
exchange rate behaviour of  ERM currencies is assessed. 
At a general level, the main operational frameworks available involve an assessment of a 
currency's exchange rate behaviour with respect to its central rate against some reference 
currency. This reference currency, which may change in the course of the review period, 
is .defined as the benchmark of  the assessment. The important issue is how to choose this 
benchmark.  In  this  annex,  operational  frameworks  using  the  following  possible 
benchmarks are discussed: 
1.  the strongest currency in the ERM grid (possibly changing over time); 
2.  the DEM; and 
3.  theECU. 
1.  Assessment of exchange rate behaviour of ERM currencies wi.th  respect to  the 
strongest currency in the grid (Graphs 5.5 and 5.6) 
The  main advantage of using  the  strongest ERM  currency  as  a  benchmark is  that  it 
corresponds  to  an  ambitious  interpretation  of exchange  rate  stability.  Under  this 
approach, the focus of  the assessment is confined to the exchange rate movements of  the 
other ERM currencies with respect to their lower fluctuation margin against the strongest 
currency. However, there are several drawbacks to this·approach. 
to  Exchange rate behaviour of  the ERM currencies during the review period, within each framework,  is 
presented in terms of percentage deviations from  their central parity against the relevant benchmark 
currency in  Graphs 5.5-5.8,  and  summary statistics comparing the various methods  are provided  in 
Tables 5.2-5.5.  In  commenting on  the  results  of the  various  assessments,  a  brief analysis  of each 
framework will be provided, expanding on the discussion in the box of  Chapter 5. 
166 ·First, the assessment of a currency's exchange rate behaviour relative to  the strongest 
currency  in  the  ERM  does  not  correspond  either  to  the  intended  nor  to  the  actual 
functioning  of the  mechanism.  The  ERM  was  conceived  as  symmetrical  and,  in  this 
sense, the mechanism is anchored not by the strongest currency but by the currency at the 
centre. It is irrefutable that the DEM has played the role of de facto anchor in the ERM, 
reflecting its track record of stability and its status as an important international reserve 
currency. However, the DEM has not always been the strongest currency in the ERM. 
fudeed, the-anchor role of the DEM has been manifested in the tendency of the German 
currency to be located at or close to the centre of the mechanism.  In this context, it is 
notable that the DEM (or one of the closely linked core currencies) has been the median 
currency  in  the  ERM  for  the  vast  bulk of the  review period.  In  terms  of the  actual 
functioning  of the  ERM,  the  widening  of the  fluctuation  margins  to  ± 15%  has  been 
accompanied by a greater focus on the "centre" of the system as the reference point for 
exchange rate management.  Accordingly, national monetary authorities have been more 
concerned  with  avoiding  excessive  volatility  in  their  currencies  rather  than  with 
observing a narrow fluctuation margin against the strongest ERM currency. This view is 
supported by the absence of  any response within the mechanism to the appreciation of  the 
IEP in 1996. 
Second,  the  possibility  of greater  exchange  rate  variability  provided  by  the  ± 15% 
fluctuation margins creates a risk that the use of  the strongest currency as the benchmark 
may  produce  unreasonable  outcomes  when  examining  exchange  rate  behaviour.  As 
illustrated  in  Graph 5.5,  this  drawback  is  particularly  relevant  in  light  of the  IEP's 
behaviour in the review period. All of  the other ERM currencies have traded well below 
their central rates against the IEP for a significant time. However, it would be inaccurate 
to  conclude  that  these  currencies  were  'weak'  within  the  ERM.  The  IEP  is  easily 
identifiable as an outlier in view of the extent of its deviation from central rates against 
the other currencies which were tightly clustered in the grid. However, there is no guiding 
rule for determining whether the strongest currency is an outlier. Less clear-cut cases than 
that of  the IEP could only be decided on an arbitrary basis. 
Graph 5.6,  which presents  the  results  of the  calculation  without the  IEP,  shows  that 
bilateral spreads  larger than 2.25% have  not  been uncommon during the examination 
period and have to be seen as a characteristic of  the post-1993 ERM. 
167 2.  Assessment of exchange rate behaviour of ERM currencies with respect to  the 
DEM (Graph S. 7) 
Conventionally, the DEM has been chosen as the benchmark in assessing exchange rate 
behaviour within the ERM. This reflects the special role of the DEM as de facto anchor 
of the mechanism. However, the use of the DEM as benchmark is  inappropriate in the 
context of this examination since it would pre-judge the exchange rate behaviour of the 
DEMas stable by definition and so exclude it from the examination. For completeness, 
however, Graph 5.7 illustrates the exchange rate behaviour of the other ERM currencies 
with respect to their central rates against the DEM. Given ihe fact that the DEM or one of 
the other closely-linked core currencies has occupied the centre position in the ERM grid 
for the vast bulk of  the examination period, it is not surprising to find a close correlation 
between movements in exchange rates against the DEMand against the median currency. 
This correlation is particularly evident when comparing the summary statistics provided 
in Tables 5.1  and 5.4.  • 
. 3.  Assessment of exchange rate behaviour of ERM currencies with respect to  the 
ECU (Graph 5.8) 
The  ECU  might  be  considered  the  natural  candidate  for  use . as  the  benchmark  in 
assessing exchange rate behaviour in the ERM.  However, two main drawbacks can be 
identified in this respect. Firstly, fluctuation margins and intervention obligations within 
the ERM are defined in terms of a grid of bilateral rates. There has never been a formal 
commitment to  target  the EC.U  exchange  rate per se within  the  ERM.  Secondly,  the 
composition of the ECU basket includes non-ERM currencies.  As movements in these 
currencies can influence the  value of the ECU, the  exchange rate  of ERM  currencies 
relative to the ECU can be affected by developments external to the mechanism. This 
phenomenon is relevant to this examination because of  the sharp appreciation of  the GBP 
since mid-1996. Graph 5.8 shows deviations in the exchange rate of the ERM currencies 
from  their ECU  central  rates  in  the  examination period.  All  of the  ERM  currencies, 
excluding  the  ITL  and  the  IEP,  have  tended  to  depreciate  against  the  ECU.  These 
movements against the ECU were due mainly to the appreciation of the· GBP within the 
basket, making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about exchange rate behaviour 
within the ERM. 
168 . 
Table 5.2 
Spread against strongest currency 
(March 1996 -February 1998, daily data) 
Average  Maximum  Minimum  Standard  Days < ·2.25% 
deviation 
(%)  (%)  (%)  Number  As% of  trading 
days 
BEFILUF  -5.65  -0.24  -12.59  3.88  339  67 
DKK  -6.04  -1.47  -12.24  3.29  405  81 
DEM  -5.71  -0.29  -12.47  3.77  350  70  "-
ESP  -4.82  0.00  -11.36  3.87  329  65  . 
FRF  -6.41  -1.36  -13.05  3.49  443  88 
IEP  -0.61  0.00  -S.SO  1.35  56  11 
IlL  a)  -6.32  -1.61  -11.79  2.59  491  98 
NLG  -5.42  0.00  -12.40  3.94  334  66 
ATS  -5.73  -0.32  -12.48  3.78  350  70 
PTE  -4.83  0.00  -11.13  3.08  344  68 
FIMal  -4.96  0.90  -10.67  2.95  393  78 
a)  Figures for IlL and FIM are calculated as if  they had participated in the ERM for the whole 
examination period at their present central parities. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 5.3 
Spread against strongest currency excluding IEP 
(March 1996 -February 1998. daily data) 
Average  Maximum  Minimum  Standard  - Days < -2.25% 
deviation 
(%)  (%)  (%)  Number  As %of  trading 
- days 
BEF/LUF  -1.43  -0.24  -4.14  0.71  51  10 
DKK  -1.82  -0.25  -4.09  0.7!5  lOS  21 
DEM  -1.49  -0.29  -4.19  0.68  56  11 
ESP  -0.63  0.00  -2.85  0.62  3  1 
FRF  -2.18  -0.27  -4.77  0.87  259  51 
ITL a>  -2.13  0.00  -9.13  2.13  205  41 
NLG  -1.21  0.00  -3.89  0.71  35  7 
ATS  -LSI  -0.32  -4.18  0.68  57  11 
PTE  -0.67  0.00  -2.49  0.69  18  4 
FIMal  -0.80  0.90  -6.91  1.46  62  12 
a)  Figures for IlL and FIM are calculated as if they had participated in the ERM for the w.hole 
examination period at their present central parities. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 5.4 
Spread against DEM 
(March 1996 -February 1998, daily data) 
Average  Average  Maximum  Minimum  Standard  Days < -2.25% 
of  deviation 
absolute  Number  As%of 
(%)  values  (%)  (%)  trading days 
(%) 
BEF/LUF  0.06  0.11  0.~4  -0.13  0.15  0  0 
DKK  -0.33  0.48  0.24  -!.SO  0.58  0  0 
OEM  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0 
ESP  0.85  0.85  2.61  -0.34  0.46  0  0 
FRF  -0.68  0.73  0.25  -2.35  0.60  2  0 
IEP  4.68  5.34  11.09  -4.24  4.23  32  6 
ITL 
1>  -0.64  1.65  2.13  -7.82  2.20  96  19 
NLG  0.28  0.29  0.91  -0.07  0.25  0  0 
ATS  -0.02  0.02  0.06  -0.08  0.02  0  0 
PTE  0.81  1.01  3.05  -1.36  0.95  0  0 
FIM 1
)  0.68  1.40  4.02  -4.20  1.50  39  8 
1> Figures for ITL and FIM are calculated as if  they had participated in the ERM for the whole 
examination period at their present central parities. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table S.S 
Spread against ECU 
(March 1996 -February 1998, daily data) 
Average  Average  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
of  deviation  Days < -2.25% 
absolute 
(%)  values  (%)  (%)  Number  As%of 
(%)  trading days 
BEF/LUF  -0.90.  1.65  2.18  -3.31  1.59  146  29 
DKK  -1.29  1.33  0.55  -2.99  0.93  108  21 
OEM  -0.96  I.S5  1.85  -3.20  1.47  137  27 
ESP  .  -0.11  1.53  3.35  -2.36  1.68  7  1 
FRF  -1.64  1.64  0.21  -3.70  1.00  170  34 
1EP  3.82  4.08  8.91  -2.38  3.14  2  0 
ITL •>  -1.57  1.60  .0.62  -5.83  1.12  74  15 
NLG  -0.68  1.67  2.48  -3.14  1.70  133  26 
ATS  -0.98  I.S7  1.88  -3.21  1.47  143  28 
PTE  -0.14  1.12  1.77  -2.54  1.30  51  10 
FIM
1>  -0.26  1.11  2.55  ·-3.35  1.30  32  6 
1> Figures for ITL and FIM are calculated as if  they had participated in the ERM for the whole 
examination period at their present central parities. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Spread from the central rate against the strongest currency in the ER M 
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171 Graph 5. 6  Spread from the central rate against the strongest 
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172 Graph 5.7 
Spread from the OEM central rate 
(dally data) 
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174 6.  LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
6.1.  Treaty provisions 
The fourth indent of  Article 109j(l) of  the Treaty refers to: 
"the  durability  of convergence  achieved  by  the  Member  State  and of its 
participation  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism  of the  European  Monetary 
System being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels". 
Article 4 of  Protocol No 6 on the convergence criteria elaborates further, stating that: 
"The criterion on the convergence of  interest rates ... shall mean that,  observed 
over a period of  one year before the examination,  a Member State has had an 
average  nominal  long-term  interest rate  that does  not exceed by  more  than 
2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in 
terms of  price stability.  Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of  long-
term  government  bonds  or  comparable  securities,  taking  into  account 
differences in national definitions. "  , 
Long-term interest rates can also be seen as forward-looking indicators, which reflect the 
financial markets'  assessm~nt of underlying economic conditions and cannot be directly 
influenced by national authorities. The level of  the long-term interest rate is a function of · 
the underlying real rate, the expected inflation rate, and risk premia (related mainly to 
default  on  repayment  of debt,  expected  exchange-rate  movements  and  uncertainty 
-attached  to  inflation  rate  and  exchange  rate  expectations).  With  liberalised  capital 
markets in the Community, real long-term interest rates would tend to equalise across the 
Member States. Therefore, differentials between the corresponding nominal rates mainly 
reflect how fmancial markets assess the prospects - in terms of inflation, soundness of 
public finances and exchange-rate stability .: of  eaeh Member State relative to the othersl. 
Thus, {or each Member State, fulfilment of the interest rate criterion is evidence of the 
. Treaty's requirement that nominal convergence and exchange rate  stability have  been 
achieved on a durable basis. 
Differentials will also reflect differences in tax treatment and market liquidity. 
175 6.2.  Interest rate developments in the Member States 
Interest rate developments in the Member States cannot be assessed without reference to 
developments  outside of the  Community.  In  recent years,  the  absence  of significant 
inflationary  pressures  has  led  to  generally  stable  monetary  conditions  in  the  larger 
industrialised economies.  In the United States, the  inflation rate  has remained  below 
3.3%  since  end-1994,  despite  emerging  capacity  constraints  and  a  tightening  labour 
market. Since 1994, the US Federal Reserve has increased its federal-funds target rate by 
only 75 basis points to 5.5%. The low-inflation environment, reinforced by the prospect 
of  medium-term budgetary consolidation and flexible supply-side conditions, has boosted 
the US bond market. Bond yields2, which had risen by more than two percentage points 
in 1994, have followed a generally declining trend since end-1994, except in the first half 
of 1996  when  yields  rose  temporarily  amid  (unfulfilled)  market  expectations  of a 
monetary tightening. The yield on the benchmark 1  0-year bond has declined from about 
7.8% at end.;.1994  to 5.6% in February  1998,  more  recently helped by  heavy  capital 
inflows due to the financial disturbances in Asia. 
In Japan, the weakness of the economy has  restrained the  inflation rate to below 1% 
during most of the  1994-1997 period and has required a  growth-supportive  monetary 
policy.  The  official  discount  rate  has  been  at  an  historical  low  of 0.5%  since 
September 1995. Japanese bond yields have also fallen to historical lows since late 1997. 
The yield on the benchmark 1  0-year bond was 1.8% in Februaey 1998. 
Within the Community, the German inflation rate has been below 2% {or most of the 
period since end-1994.3 The increase in the Bundesbank's repo rate by 30 basis points to 
3.3% in October 1997 was the first change in official rates since mid-1996 and the first 
increase  since  1992.  With inflation subdued and  budgetary consolidation proceeding, 
German bond  yields have moved broadly in phase with the corresponding US yields. 
However, the differential  between German and US  yields  switched from  positive to 
negative  in April1996 as cyclical conditions in the US  economy remained relatively 
favourable. Having risen from·5.8% to 7.5% between January 1994 and January 1995, the 
yield on the German benchmark 10-year bond declined to 5.0% in February 1998. 
2 
3 
Unless otherwise stated, all yields discussed in this section are monthly averages. For the Community 
countries, harmonised series (as described in the box) have been used. For  non-Community countries, 
the yield on the benchmark I  0-year government bond has been used. 
See Chapter 3. 
176 In  the  rest  of the  Community,  inflation  rates  have  also  been  generally  low  and 
decelerating since end-1994. The basic stance of monetary policy has been similar among 
the Member States, although the trend in short-term interest rates has been more varied. 
In the  group  of countries  comprising  Belgium/Luxembourg,  Denmark,  France  and 
Austria,  the  stance  of monetary policy has  corresponded  closely to that of Germany. 
Money market rates in these countries are now at very similar levels.· In Spain, Italy and 
Portugal, a decline in inflation rates allowed a gradual reduction of official interest rates 
from end-1994 but money market rates in these countries remain relatively high, although 
to different degrees. There were increases in official interest rates in Ireland and in the 
Netherlands early in 1997, and in Finland in September 1997, as pre-emptive responses 
to possible inflation pressures. Within this group, money market rates vary widely, with 
the  rates  in the Netherlands among the lowest in the Community and  rates  in Ireland 
among the highest. In the United Kingdom money market rates are far above the lowest 
rates,  as  monetary policy was  tightened on a  sustained basis  in  1997  in an  effort to 
moderate domestic demand pressures and to bring the inflation rate back to the official 
target. 
Since end-1994, long-term interest rates in the Community have converged downward as 
shown  in  Graph 6.1.  The  favourable  evolution  is  attributable  to  developments  in 
corresponding  US rates,  and  the  combination  of moderate  inflationary  pressures  and 
sustained progress in budgetary consolidation. A high degree of exchange rate stability4, 
particularly  among  the  ERM  currencies,  has  also  been  a  contributory  factor.  The 
Community average  long-term interest rate5  has fallen by  about 390 basis points from 
9.2% in January 1995 to 5.3% in February 1998, with a more pronounced decline in those 
countries with relatively high interest rates at the beginning of  the period. 
Germany, France and the Netherlands have enjoyed the lowest long-term interest rates--. 
during most of  the period. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria ·have had rates consistently 
within one percentage point of the lowest rate in the Community. By February 1998, the 
rates in these six Member States were clustered within a range of only 15 basis points. 
Outside  of this  group,  Denmark  and  Ireland  have  experienced  moderately  higher 
long-term interest rates. In Finland, long-term interest rates were quite high until  1995 
but since then have converged sharply toward the lowest levels. In Portugal, Spain, Italy 
and Sweden, long-term interest rates were also higher but have converged lower since 
1995. The rates in these latter Member States peaked in March-April1995 but since then 
have declined by 800 basis points in Italy, 710 basis points in Spain, 690 basis points in 
Portugal,  and  590 basis  points  in  Sweden.  In  the  United Kingdom  the  decline  in 
long-term interest rates has been notably smaller than in other higher-yielding Member 
States. In Greece, long-term interest rates remain well above the Union average although 
they have declined from very high levels. 
4 
5 
See Chapter 5. 
Arithmetic mean of  domestic rates, weighted using shares ofEC GOP in 1995. (See the box for details 
on the national interest rates). 
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179 6.3.  Assessment  of long-term  interest  rate convergence  in  terms  of the  Treaty 
criterion 
For the assessment of the  criterion on the convergence of interest rates  the  yield on 
benchmark 10-year bonds has  been used6;  details about the interest rates used for  the 
Member  States  are  given  in the  box.  The  long-term  interest  rates  are  averaged  over 
periods of 12 months. The reference value is calculated from the simple average of the 
average long-term interest rates of the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price  stability7  plus  2 percentage  points.  As  explained  in  Chapter 3,  the  three  best 
performing Member States in terms of price stability are selected using the harmonised 
indices of consumer prices (HI CPs); average inflation rates based on the HI CPs can only 
be calculated from December 1996 and are not available beyond January 1998, and so the 
reference value for long-term interest rates can only be derived on a consistent basis for 
this same period, even trough interest rate data are available before December 1996 and 
already for February 1998. 
Average  long-term  interest  rates  for  the  12-month  period  from  February 1997  to 
January 1998 are shown in the final column of Table 6.1. The reference value (derived 
from  the  average  interest  rates  in  France,  Ireland  and  Austria,  the  three  best 
performing  Member  States  in terms  of price stabilityB  was  7  .8%.  Average long-term 
interest rates in 14 Member States (all except Greece) were below the reference value in 
January 1998, and therefore all Member States except Greece fulfilled the criterion on the 
convergence of  interest rates. 
The reference value has tended to decline since December 1996, when it was 9.1% (see 
Graph 6.2). As well as the general downward trend in long-term interest rates, changes in 
the constituents of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability 
also  affect  the  reference  value  and  caused  shifts  in  its  level  in  October  and 
December 1997. Thirteen Member States have had average long-term interest rates below 
the reference value ever since December 1996, which represents an additional indicator 
of sustainability.  In particular, the  pronounced narrowing during  1996  in interest rate 
differentials  for  Spain,  Portugal  and  Sweden  ensured  that  these  countries  already 
respected the reference value by December 1996. The average long-term interest rate for 
Italy fell below the reference value from February 1997 onwards. In Greece the average 
long-term  interest  rate  has  exceeded the  reference  value  throughout  the  period  since 
December 1996, but the difference has narrowed substantially. 
6 
7 
8 
Data for Greece are not fully comparable. 
It should be noted that the best performing Member States in terms of  price stability do not necessarily 
have the lowest interest rates. 
Again, see Chapter 3. 
180 Box: Data for the interest rate convergence criterion 
The  fourth  indent of Article 1  09j(l) of the  Treaty requires  that the  durability of nominal 
convergence and exchange rate stability in Member States should be assessed by reference to 
long-term  interest rates.  Article 4 of Protocol No 6 on the  convergence  criteria adds that 
these  "Interest rates  shall be  measured on  the  basis of long-term  government bonds  or 
comparable securities, taking into account differences in national definitions. " 
Article 5 of Protocol No 6 requires that the  Commi~sion should provide the statistical data 
used for the application of the convergence criteria. However, in the context of the interest 
rate criterion, the European Monetary Institute has developed a hannonised series of yields 
on benchmark  1  0-year bonds on behalf of Eurostat and collects the data from  the central 
banks. The selection of  bonds for inclusion in this series has the following characteristics: 
•  a residual maturity close to 1  0 years at the time the bond was selected; 
•  issued by central government; 
•  adequate  liquidity, which is  the main selection criterion; the choice between a  single 
benchmark or the simple average of  a sample is based on this requirement; 
•  yield gross of  tax; 
•  fixed coupon. 
For the vast majority of the  Member  States,  the representative  interest rates  used  in this 
examination  incorporate  all  of the  above  characteristics.  This  ensures  cross-country 
comparability.  As  of December 1997,  11 Member  States  were  using  a  single  benchmark 
bond and four  Member States were  using a sample of bonds (Germany,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Sweden). The hannonised series for Greece starts in mid-1997, as a 10-year benchmark bond 
has been available only since June 1997. Before this date, the representative interest rate was 
based  on available best proxies:  the yield  on a  seven-year bond with fixed  coupon from 
March to June 1997, rates at issue of seven-year bonds from February 1996 to January 1997, 
and rates at issue of  five-year bonds from September 1992 to January 1996. 
181 Table 6.1 
Development of long-term interest rates 
(12-month averages) 
1993 I)  1994  1995  1996  1997  Janu~ 
1998b 
B  7.2  7.8  7.5  6.5  5.8  5.7 
OK  7.3  7.8  8.3  7.2  6.3  6.2 
D  6.5  6.9  6.9  6.2  5.6  5.6 
EL  c>  23.3  20.8  17.4  14.4  9.9  9.8 
E  10.2  10.0  11.3  8.7  6.4  6.3 
F  6.8  7.2  7.5  6.3  5.6  5.5 
IRL  7.7  7.9  8.3  7.3  6.3  6.2 
I  11.2  10.5  12.2  9.4  6.9  6.7 
L  6.8  7.2  7.2  ~  5.6  5.6 
NL  6.4  6.9  6.9  6.2  5.6  5.5 
A  6.7  7.0  7.1  6.3  u  5.6 
p  11.2  10.5  11.5  8.6  6.4  6.2 
FIN  8.8  9.0  8.8  1J.  2..Q  5.9 
s  8.5  9.7  10.2  8.0  6.6  6.5 
UK  7.6  8.2  8.3  7.9  7.1  7.0 
EURd)  8.0  8.2  8.5  7.3  6.2  6.1 
Reference  9.1  8.0  7.8  value e) 
Average of3 
best  price  7.1  6.0  5.8 
performers 
Dispersion 
1.6  1.3  1.8  l.O  0.5  0.5  rate I) 
1)  . For 1993, data are not comparable for Luxemburg , Portugal and 
Greece. 
b)  Average of February 1997-January 1998. 
c)  For Greece data are not comparable. 
d)  Weighted average based on GOP. 
e)  Average of  interest rates of  the three best performing. 
Member States (underlined) in terms of  price stability plus 
I) 
2 percentage points. 
Measured by the standard deviation  (Greece omitted in all years). 
Source: EMI , Eurostat. 
182 Graph 6.2 
Comparison of average long-term Interest rates wtth the reference value 
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183 7.  ADDITIONAL FACTORS 
This chapter examines four areas associated with economic integration and convergence 
which Article 109j(l) stipulates shall also be taken account of  in the report: 
- the development of  the ECU; 
- the results of  the integration of  markets; 
- the situation and development of  the balances of  payments on current account; 
- an examination of  the development of  unit labour costs and other price indices. 
7.1.  Development of the ECU 
Since the peak of  the ECU markets, in 1993, there has been a gradual decline in activity. 
The ECU has suffered from a general lack of liquidity and from the adverse impact of  the 
troubles in the EMS in 1992 and 1993. The ECU markets continued to contract in 1996 
and  in 1997.  In  general,  activity  in all  ECU  markets  was  low but there  was  a  slight 
pick-up in the bond market during the first half of 1997. Nevertheless, due to continued 
·high levels of maturing paper the total  level of outstanding ECU-denominated bonds 
continued to fall.  In the first two months of 1998 there has been a marked increase in 
ECU bond issuing activity reflecting growing confidence in the euro. The spread between 
the exchange rate value of the ECU and its theoretical value also gradually contracted 
during 1997, and moved from a negative to a positive spread in November 1997. These 
modest improvements in the ECU markets reflected growing market confidence in the 
EMU timetable and increased legal clarity concerning the position of the ECU flowing 
from  the  approval,  in June 1997,  of the  Council  Regulation (EC) No 1103/97,  which 
. provides for the conversion of  the ECU into the euro at one-to-one. 
One manifestation of the ECU markets' underperfonnance was the development, from 
the middle of 1994, of  a negative spread, in excess of  50 basis points, between the market 
exchange  rate  value  of the  ECU  and  its  theoretical  value.  In an  historical  context, 
±20 basis points had been considered to be the normal trading ra.tlge of the spread. With 
the resurfacing of  tensions in the ERM in early 1995 and increasingly pessimistic market 
perceptions of the  EMU process the  spread widened to  unprecedented levels, reaching 
over  300 basis  points  in December 1995  (see  Graph 7.1).  Since  then,  the  spread  has 
contracted,  returning  to  beneath  50 basis  point  by  the  second  half of 1997.  From 
3 November to the end of 1997 the ECU traded at a premium to the basket on the foreign 
exchange market, reaching a high of +37 basis points on 25 November. By the end of 
1997 the spread was trading at close to parity with the basket, and during January and 
February 1998 the exchange rate value of the ECU continued to fluctuate around parity 
with the theoretical rate. 
184 (14) 
A number of factors have influenced the behaviour of the spread. In a very thin ECU 
market  the  balance  between  supply  and  demand  for  ECU  can  be  affected  by  the 
intervention of  an individual major player. Without a central bank for the ECU there is no 
monetary policy  and  ECU  interest rates  play a  very weak role.  In addition  to  these 
structural factors, a  major factor has been market sentiment towards the EMU project. In 
this  regard,  improved market  sentiment towards  EMU,  coupled with the approval of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97, which has provided the markets with legal clarity 
and certainty concerning the ECU, has resulted in market operators taking more active 
interest in the ECU. The markets are now convinced that at the start of Stage Three the 
ECU will convert at one-to-one with the euro. Thus the markets are pricing the ECU as a 
definite "in" currency the exchange value of which is already .fixed  against the euro. 
Nevertheless,  market  operators  do  not  foresee  any  large  upswing  in  the  overall 
performance of  the ECU markets. 
During 1996, bond issues denominated in ECU were significantly lower than maturing 
paper with the result  that  the  stock of outstanding debt in ECU  declined  by 7% to 
ECU 118 billion (excluding Greek ECU-linked bonds).  This compares with a  historic 
p~ak of ECU 140 billion stock owtstanding in 1993. In 1997 some ECU 14.8 billion was 
issued  and  ECU 19.1 billion  of ECU-denominated  bonds  matured.  The  net  amount 
outstanding of  ECU bonds therefore contracted to ECU 114 billion at the end of 1997, an 
·  annual reduction of 11%. 
Graph 7  .1.  ECU exchange rate spread 
basis points  ( weekly average) 
so  ~----------------~~~--~~--------------------~ 
-SO 
-100 
-ISO 
-200 
-lSO 
-300 
~~  ~----~~------+-----IH-S-----+-----~-9K~--~----~~~~----+-~ 
Source : Commlnlon aervlcea 
185 From the start of 1997 demand for ECU from institutional investors gradually increased, 
although from a very low level. Issue activity increased, compared with the average level 
of activity observed in· 1996. A number of innovative issues were brought to the market 
reflecting  growth  in  issuer  and  investor  interest  in  the  possibility  of taking  on  euro 
positions ahead of the start of Stage Three through the use  of the ECU.  Amongst the 
advantages  for  issuers  are  the  avoidance  of the  need  to  redenominate  bonds  and the 
creation of  a borrowing profile in euro prior to the introduction of  the euro. The latter is 
seen  as  potentially  giving  an  issuer  a  head  start  in  issuing  debt  in  the  future 
euro-denominated  market.  In  particular,  the  European  Investment  Bank  launched  a 
Eurobond denominated in euro with a nominal value of 1 billion. Until the introduction 
of the  euro,  all  monetary  rights  and  obligations  in  respect  of these  notes  will  be 
performed in ECU, at the one-to-one conversion rate. 
Taking into account the steady contraction of the ECU bond markets,  secondary ECU 
markets have performed relatively well. Though the overall trend has been for a gradual 
reduction in activity, the secondary markets have achieved periods of relative stability 
and some temporary growth.  · 
For example, the value of turnover in ECU bonds, cleared through Euroclear and Cedel, 
has modestly increased year on year since 1993.  However, the ECU's market share of 
total turnover has decreased each year. From 5.6% of the total in 1993  to  5.2% in 1994 
and "1995, to 4.3% in 1996, and to 3.4% in 1997. This decline in share is.in part due to the 
strong growth in other markets but does highlight the ECU' s failure to perform to its full 
potential. 
186 The  approximate  measure of commercial  and  financial  activity provided by  the  daily 
average turnover in the ECU Banking Association's ECU Clearing System has indicated 
~ modest fall in activity, from ECU 50.0 billion during 1994 to ECU 46.8 billion during 
1995,  and  to  ECU 46.3 billion during  1996.  However,  in  1997  a modest  increase  in 
activity has been observed, with average daily turnover rising to ECU 46.8 billion. 
During  1994 it was agreed that the Commission, in conjunction with the EMI, would 
carry out a study of  the ECU flows passing through the EBA' s ECU Clearing System that 
were of a commercial rather than financial nature. Three annual studies have now been 
completed. The results of  the third study confirm the findings of  the first and second, and 
suggest that commercial ECU payments represent less than one percent of  the total value 
of ECU payments. The annual amount of ECU commercial payments must therefore be 
in the region ofECU 50 billion to ECU 75 billion.  · 
In conclusion, activity in the ECU markets continues to decline  gr~ually. In part this 
reflects the focusing of market operators on the emo and the core currencies that will 
convert  on  1 January 1999.  The  ECU  is  not  seen  as  an  essential  key  to  enter  the 
euro-denominated markets. Whilst the conversion rate of the ECU to the euro is known, 
one-to-one, in other respects core currencies provide a better route to the euro in terms of 
market size, liquidity and range of available hedging instruments. Whilst the increase in 
bond issuing activity observed in January and February 1998 and issues such as that of 
the EIB denominated in euro suggest that some market operators are turning to the ECU 
as  part of their preparations for the euro, many prefer to use other market instruments 
issued in a core currency. The gradual decline in activity in the ECU should not therefore 
be  seen as  a negative  development,  but rather as  a signal  that market operators  have 
moved beyond the ECU and are preparing to switch to the euro on 1 J  anlla.ry 1999. 
187 7  .2.  Results of  the integration of markets 
Article  109j(l) requires  the  Commission to  consider the  results  of the  integration of 
markets  in its  examination  of convergence  between  Member  States.  This  therefore 
necessitates examining the Single Market Programme because of its highly significant 
impact on market integration in the Community. Furthermore, by increasing competition 
in product markets, the Single Market may also have helped improve the efficiency of 
Member States' markets and their adaptability to major economic shocks. 
Introduction  of the  single  currency  is  likely  to  stimulate  further  market  integration. 
Firstly, by enhancing cross-border price transparency and comparability, it will probably 
intensify  competition  in  product  markets  across  the  Community.  Secondly,  it  will 
eliminate exchange rate fluctuations, a source of  difficulty for the operation of  the Single 
Market in the past. 
In this  section  1,  evidence  is  presenied  on  developing  market  integration  inside  the 
Community through trade, foreign investment and industrial restructuring.  Some of the 
consequences of  this developing integration, the most important remaining problems and 
the measures taken to combat them are also discussed. 
7.2.1. Evidence of  market integration in the Community 
Trade 
By eliminating many trade  and  investment barriers  inside  the  Community,  the  Single 
Market has encouraged integration of Member  State markets;  intra-EC  manufacturing 
trade volumes are estimated to have grown by 20-30% since 1985. Furthermore, intra-EC 
trade has grown more  rapidly than trade between Member States and third countries, 
which is evidence of  deepening regional integration. Table 7.1  gives detailed evidence of 
this,  giving for  each Member State the  share of total trade accounted for  by  intra-EC 
trade. 
This section draws  an information (updated where  possible) from  the  Commission's Single  Market 
Review,  a  synthesis  of which  was  presented  in  "Economic  Evaluation  of the  Internal  Market", 
European Economy, Reports and Studies, No 4, 1996. 
188 Between  1985  and  1997,  most 
Member States have experienced 
increasing trade integration with 
Community  partners  (the 
average intra-EC trade ratio rose 
2.6 percentage points).  Much of 
this  appears  to  have  occurred 
between  1985  and  1990,  when 
intra-EC  trade  ratios  rose  (by 
6.1 percentage  points  on 
average)  in  all  the  15  current 
Member States, and especially in 
the  soutb,em  Member  States 
(Portugal,  Spain,  Greece  and 
Italy).  Subsequently,  the 
integration  process  appears  to 
have  slowed,  but  two  reasons 
suggest that this slowdown could 
be exaggerated: firstly, trade data 
since  1993  significantly  and 
consistently underestimate actual 
trade  flows  inside  the 
Community2;  secondly,  the 
intra-EC  trade  ratio  is  sensitive 
to  factors  other  than  trade 
integration,  and  such  factors 
probably  boosted  it  in  the  late 
1980s  and  decreased  it  after 
19903. 
Table 7.1 
Share of  trade within the Community 
in total trade •> 
1997 D)  198S-90  198S-97 D) 
(o/o)  Share change  · Share change 
BIL  72.6  4.0  0.3 
DK  68.S  4.8  4.3 
D  S6.8  3.8  -2.3 
EL  S8.6  14.0  4.9 
E  67.0  16.8  19.3 
F  63.9  1.S  4.7 
lRL  64.4  2.S  -8.7 
I  S1.3  10.9  6.1 
NL  67.9  3.6  -0.4 
A  68.6  7.8  7.0 
p  76.6  17.6  18.0 
FIN  S1.0  9.2  6.0 
s  S1.9  3.0  -1.7 
UK  52.1  3.3  -1.1 
EUR  61.2  6.1  2.6 
•>  Average of  imports and exports of  goods. 
b)  First nine months. 
Source: Eurostat. 
2  The Single Market eliminated frontier fonnalities in  1993  to reduce ''red tape" and speed up cross-
border  deliveries.  However,  as  intra-Community  trade  data  had  always  been  collected  at  these 
frontiers, a new collection system was-needed. The new system, based on a survey approach, appears 
to  significantly  under-record  actual  flows.  Consequently,  the  ratio  of intra-EC  trade  relative  to 
extra-EC trade (for which collection methods remain unchanged} is also underestimated. 
3  Oil price falls  in the late  1980s will have increased the intra-EC trade ratio by cutting the value of 
extra-EC imports. Community growth at the same time will have reinforced the effect: strong market 
demand will have led Community producers to supply Member State markets in preference to third 
country markets. Recession in the early 1990s will have had the opposite effect. 
189 Today, well over half of every Member State's trade is with other Member States (the 
Community average was 61.2% in the first nine months of 1997). Portugal, Belgium and 
Luxembourg are most integrated within the Community in trade terms, with ratios above 
70%. The United Kingdom, with a ratio of  52.1% in 1997, is the least integrated, but that 
ratio rose over 3 points between  1985  and  1990.  Even the newest Member 'states are 
already well  integrated (their intra-EC  trade  ratios  range between 57.0% and 68.6%), 
despite only becoming Member States in 1995. 
Increasingly,  Member States are trading  similar products of varying price and quality 
with each other.  This has a number of beneficial effects.  Firstly, there is more intense 
competition on Member States' markets, squeezing firms'  profit margins, especially in 
sectors where trade barriers were most significant in 1985. Secondly, there are benefits to 
consumers in the form of  a wider choice of  products to buy. 
Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment is another way through which markets become more closely 
integrated.  In  recent  decades,  but  especially  in the  1980s,  foreign  investment  flows 
world-wide have expanded very rapidly, and the Community has attracted a remarkably 
high and increasing share of  these-44% between 1991  and 1993, up from just over 28% 
between  1982  and  1987.  Foreign  investment  activity  inside  the  Community  grew 
vigorously between 1986 and  1991  (on average, nominal inflows grew 41% annually) 
before  slowing  between  1992  and  1996  (on  average,  growing  just  7%  annually  in 
nominal terms). 
Table 7.2 shows that during the 1986 to 1991 period, the United Kingdom was by far the 
prime target for foreign investors, absorbing 32% of all foreign investment received by 
the Community.  Its record particularly reflected its success in attracting investment from 
non-Member States  (receiving  45% of all  such flows).  Other  important recipients of 
foreign investment in the period were France, Spain, the Benelux countries and Germany. 
190 Table 7.2 
Origin of foreign direct investment inflows 
1986-91  1992-96 
Share of  flows originatin2 from  S~offlowsori~atin2from 
EUR12  Rest of  The  EUR15  Rest of  The 
world  world  world  world 
S1%of  43%of  100%  6S%of  3S%of  100% 
total  total  of  total  total  total  oftotal' 
inflows  inflows  inflows  inflows  inflows  inflows 
BIL  IS  6  11  12  8  11 
DK  1  2  1  2  2  2 
D  14  4  10  13  7  11 
EL  1  1  1  1  1 &)  1 &) 
E  12  10  11  8  6  7 
F  12  13  12  12  18  14 
IRL  s  3  4  4  3  a)  4  a) 
I  s  7  6  7  3  6 
NL  11  9  10  17  9 a)  14  a) 
A  ..  ..  ..  3  1  2 
p  2  2  2  2  1  1 
FIN  ..  ..  .  .  1  0  1 
s  ..  ..  ..  s  10  7 
UK  22  4S  32  IS  30  a)  20  a) 
EUR  100  100  100  100  100  100 
a) estimated. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Since 1992, however, foreign investment flows inside the Community have been more 
evenly distributed. The United Kingdom has continued to receive most, but no longer a 
disproportionately  large  share  (over  17%  of total  flows  between  1992  and  1996), 
followed by the Netherlands, France and Germany. The United Kingdom's performance 
reflects falls in its share of both total intra-EC and extra-EC foreign investment (to 15% 
and about 30% respectively). 
191 Investment  flows  between  Member  States  are  becoming  increasingly  important, 
providing 65% of the Community's total foreign investment between 1992 and 1996 as  . 
against 57%% between 1986 and  1991.  The United Kingdom,  Benelux, Germany and 
France have enjoyed the largest shares of this throughout the  1986-96 period,  but the 
Netherlands'  share bas  significantly increased since  1992 whilst the United Kingdom's 
bas decreased. 
Mergers and acquisitions 
The  evolution. of merger  and  acquisition  activity  inside  the  Community  reflects  the 
pattern of foreign investment. In 1996, the number of mergers and acquisitions was less 
than in 1995, and well below the peak year of 1990, although their value bas  actually 
climbed steadily since  1994.  Nearly  70%  of all  operations  inside the  Community  are 
purely domestic affairs, involving companies from the same Member State. About 18% 
are  between  companies  from  different  Member  States,  and  less  than  14%  involve 
companies from the Community and a third country (especially the United States, but 
also  Switzerland).  However,  the  importance  of the  last  type  of operation  is  growing 
fastest. Generally, merger and acquisition activity by companies in Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom is well above the share of their 
national economies in Community GDP. 
All  this  merger  and  acquisition  activity  is  changing  the  structure  of manufacturing, 
increasing average levels of Community-wide industrial concentration (on average,  the 
share  of total  sales  by  the  largest  four  manufacturing  firms  in  all  sectors  rose 
2.3 percentage points between 1987 and 1993}, but causing some declines at the Member 
State level (in France, the United Kingdom and Belgium, the average sales shares of the 
four leading firms in all industries fell  0.1, 0.9 and  1.7 percentage points, respectively, 
between  1987  and  1993).  An  explanation  for  this  could  be  that  while  large-scale 
operators are becoming fewer and bigger, taking greater shares of the total Community 
market, they also have wider geographical coverage, intensifying competition at the level 
of each  Member  State.  Services  have  not  so  far  undergone  such  a  transformation, 
especially  in  sectors  which  remain  heavily  regulated.  Furthermore,  deregulation  of 
services bas lagged beflind deregulation of goods markets, so mergers and acquisitions 
among  service operators have  become  important only in the  most recent period.  Any 
impact this may have on the services sector is therefore only just starting. 
192 7.2.2.  Consequences of  the Community's mtll'ket integration 
On competition conditions 
Evidence  on  firms'  profit  margins  indicates  that  market  integration  has  intensified 
competition;  average  margins  were  estimated to  be  some  0.5 percentage  points  lower 
between 1987 and 1991  than they would have been in the absence of  the Single Market, 
but the impact was even stronger in sectors where trade barriers had been traditionally 
most significant (e.g. consumer electronics or motor vehicles). Competition has therefore 
helped  to  restrain  price  inflation  throughout  the  Community,  but  also  stimulated 
Community-wide  consumer  price  convergence  for  both  goods  and  services  (again 
especially in the most deregulated sectors); the coefficient of price variation (including 
taxes) in consumer goods between Member States dropped from 22.5% in 1985 to 19.6% 
in  1993.  For services, the drop  was  from  33.7% to  28.6%.  On the other hand,  in the 
energy  sector,  where  deregulation has  hardly begun,  the  coefficient of price  variation 
between Member States  actually  increased  strongly  (from  21.1% to  31.7%).  Overall, 
however,  competition  has  increased,  with  positiye  effects  on  Community  GDP, 
investment and employment. 
On the Community's financial markets 
Abolition of exchange controls and of other restrictions to capital flows, together with . 
deregulation of financial  markets, is starting to have effects.  Already there have been 
significant  increases  in  cross-border  saving  and  investment  flows.  In  1993,  foreign 
portfolio investment outflows were  equivalent to  an  (unweighted)  average of 4.2% of 
GDP,  compared with just 1.8% of GDP  in  1985.  In the same period, foreign portfolio 
investment inflows increased from  an (unweighted) average of 2.0% of GDP to  7.1%. 
Increased flows imply growing foreign asset stocks. 
193 7.2.3.  Implementation of  the Single Market 
· Although market integration among  Member States has  intensified,  the  Single Market 
still  remains  legally  incomplete.  On  1 February 1998,  21.1%  of all· relevant  measures 
were still not applied in all Member States. Non-implementation is worst in the fields of 
transport, public procurement and intellectual and industrial property rights. Finland,' the 
United Kingdom  and  Sweden  have  the  best  transposition  records  (2.5%  or  less  of 
legislation still to be transposed), Belgium, Austria and Germany the worst (over 7% still 
needing transposition).  To  improve the situation and reap the  full  potential of market 
integration, the Commission and Member States agreed an Action Plan for  the Single 
Market in June 1997. 
·Beyond legislation, however,  other problems are also  delaying market integration (and 
therefore  are  the  target of Community action).  These  include  technical  trade  barriers 
(estimated to cover around 63% of internal Community trade), tax distortions (harmful 
tax  competition  between  Member  States,  double  taxation,  incoherent  national  VAT 
systems),  and  state aids  (representing between 0.4% and 2.6% of GDP  in the various 
Member States between 1992 and 1994  ). 
194 7  .3.  Situation and development of balances of  payments on current account 
Article 109j(l) of  the Treaty requires that this report shall.take into account the situation 
and  development  of the  balances  of payments  on  current  account.  This  requirement 
reflects  the  need  to  ensure  that  a  sustainable  current  account  position  exists  in  the 
Member States entering EMU. 
The  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  has  increased  private  sector  access  to 
international  credit  and  saving  opportunities.  In  consequence,  the  inter-temporal 
optimisation of private sector spending and saving has improved with the result that the 
current account balance reflects to a larger extent than previously the saving/investment 
behaviour of the  private  sector.  Current account deficits  are  not  evidence  of macro-
economic disequilibria so  long as they are  sustainable in the longer term.  However, if 
current account deficits (coinciding with high levels of  external debt) are perceived to be 
unsustainable, confidence in the exchange rate may be undermined.  Such exchange-rate 
considerations will be less relevant in the single currency environment of EMU, but the 
current account balance remains a vital. indicator of national debt sustainability. In this 
sense,  a  review  of the  current  account  balance  supplements  the  Treaty  criteria  by· 
providing a broader assessment of the Member States' capacity to  sustain their  o~erail 
-public and_private sector- indebtedness. The following anatysis sheds some light on the 
current account positions of  the Community as a whole and the Member States. 
Table 7.3-presents the trends in the current account balance of  the Community as a whole 
and of  the Member States in recent years. The current account surplus of  the Community 
has increased progressively since 1994; this contrasts with the situation of the late 1980s 
and  early  1990s  when  significant  deficits  were  recorded.  The  Community's  external 
performance has benefited from  a strong USD and growth in its main export markets. 
Meanwhile, import growth has been constrained by relatively subdued domestic demand, · 
particularly in some of the larger Member States. The improved current account balance 
is  also the counterpart of higher national saving in many Member States as  budgetary 
consolidation  has  proceeded.  In  1997,  the  Community  current  account  surplus  is 
estimated to have reached  1.3% of GDP, comprising a substantial trade surplus (about 
2.% of GDP), partly offset by deficits in factor income and transfers. A surplus of this 
magnitude is unusual and was last recorded in 1986. 
195 As  might  be  expected,  the 
improvement in the external 
position  of the  Community 
mainly  reflects 
corresponding  trends  in the 
larger  Member  States  as 
deficits in Germany and the 
United Kingdom  have 
narrowed  toward  balance 
and surpluses in France and 
Spain  have  widened.  The 
current account trends in the 
other  Member  States  have 
been  mixed.  In  1997,  the 
current  account  balances  of 
the  Member  States  ranged 
from  +6%  to  -3%  of GDP. 
A  notable  exception  is 
Luxembourg,  where  a 
surplus  of  1  5%  of  GDP 
(although  declining  from 
levels  of  30%  in  the 
mid-1980s) was recorded. 
In  considering  current 
account developments in the 
Member States, three groups 
can be distinguished. 
Table 7.3 
Current account of  the balance of payments 
(national accounts definition, as% ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 * 
B  3.3  3.9  4.5  4.5  4.9  5.2 
DK  3.0  1.5  0.8  0.8  0.1  0.0 
D  -l.l  -l.S  -1.4  -1.2  -0.6  0.1  . 
EL  -2.6  -0.8  -2.1  -2.6  -2.3  -2.8 
E  -1.0  -1.3  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.7 
F  1.0  1.0  1.5  1.6  2.9  2.9 
IRL  5.3  3.6  4.5  3.8  3.9  . 3.1 
I  1.0  1.4  2.4  3.4  3.1  3.1 
L  20.1  18.2  15.4  16.3  14.4  17.0 
NL  4.9  S.4  5.5  5.8  5.8  5.6 
A  -0.4  -0.9  -1.8  -2.1  -1.9  -1.6 
p  -2.3  -2.7  -2.0  -1.4  -2.8  -2.7 
FIN  -1.3  1.3  4.1  3.8  5.3  6.0 
s  -1.4  -0.5  1.2  l.S  2.1  2.2 
UK  -2.4  -1.9  -1.9  -1.5  -0.9  -2.2 
EUR  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.8  1.2  1.1 
* Spring  1998 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
196 •  The first group is Denmark, Ge~any,  Spain, Austria, and the United Kingdom, where 
the current account was more or less in balance. Denmark is at an advanced stage of 
its economic cycle and the current account has moved from strong surplus in the early 
1990s to  near balance  in  1997.  Given Denmark's relatively high level  of external 
indebtedness, a balanced current account would seem appropriate. In Germany, ·the 
current account has been moving closer to balance, having been in significant deficit 
since unification. High levels of consumption in the eastern part of the country have 
reduced export supply to third countries. Improved competitiveness should reduce the 
current account imbalance in coming years. However, surpluses on the pre-unification 
scale are unlikely to emerge as the cyclical upswing in the economy feeds through to 
domestic demand. Germany still enjoys a positive net external asset position. In Spain, 
· the current account balance has been steadily improving.  Sustained disinflation and 
budgetary consolidation have raised economic confidence which,  together with low 
interest rates, has tended to stimulate domestic demand.  In the United Kingdom, the 
current account has moved from substantial deficit since the mid-1980s into balance in 
1997, despite the advanced cyclical position of  the economy. However, the significant 
appreciation of  sterling since end-1996 is likely to lead to a deterioration in the current 
account  position  in  1998.  In  Austria  the  current  account  deficit  is  mainly  the 
consequence of  a sharp deterioration in the services balance. 
•  A second group, comprising Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Finland, has achieved current account surpluses of  more than 2% ofGDP in 1997. 
In Belgium, the weakness of domestic demand relative to external demand is likely to 
have increased the already wide current surplus, while relative demand conditions will 
have  also  underpinned  the  French  surplus.  In Ireland,  the  current  account  surplus 
reflects a very wide trade surplus and is further supported by substantial receipts from 
the structural funds. The improvement in the current account balance of  Italy has been 
particularly  striking.  The  widening  in the  surplus  to  over 3% of GDP  since  1996 
primarily reflects higher national saving as budgeta.rY imbalances have been reduced. 
However, the prospect of  lower interest rates in co~g  years may prompt a decline in 
the very high saving rate of private households (15% of gross disposable income in 
1997)  with  a  consequent  boost  to  domestic  demand  and  import  growth.  The 
Netherlands has reached a fairly mature stage in the economic cycle and the "output 
gap" appears to have narrowed significantly. In these circumstances, the large current 
account surplus would  seem to  reflect very favourable  competitiveness rather than 
relative  demand.  A  similar  situation  prevails  in  Finland,  where  the  level  of 
competitiveness seems to be favourable.  In Sweden, the current account has moved 
from deficit into surplus in recent years, reflecting a strong export performance, 
197 •  There were current account deficits of more than 2% of GDP in Greece and Portugal 
in  1997.  Greece  still has a relatively large  government deficit reducing the level of 
national  savings.  Thus, budgetary consolidation will  have  a positive impact on the 
balance  of current  account.  In  Portugal,  rapidly  rising  import  growth  due  to  a 
domestically led recovery explains most of  the current account deterioration. Portugal 
is,  however,  experiencing  high  productivity  growth  in  the  exposed  sector 
compensating  for  unit  labour  cost  increases  in  the  overall  economy.  Furthermore, 
inflows of foreign  direct  investment remain  strong  in  Portugal,  indicating  that  the 
current account deficit is sustainable at least for the foreseeable period. 
Among the Member States, the Nordic countries have a significant net external debtor 
position (Denmark: 25% of GDP in 1996, Finland and Sweden: both 43% of GDP, see 
Graph 7.2). The current account surplus prevailing in Sweden and Finland will  reduce 
this exposure over time,  making these economies less vulnerable to  external monetary 
developments.  However,  other countries  with an  even  higher  current account  surplus 
(Belgium,  the Netherlands)  also  have  a  si~eable external  creditor position.  The  other 
Member States have either a small external creditor position (the net asset positions of 
Germany and the United Kingdom have been shrinking) or a net liability position (Italy's 
position has come close to balance). 
Graph 7.2  Current account- net foreign assets 11 -1996. 
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198 7.4.  Examination of  development of unit labour costs and other price indices 
Indices of final consumer prices constitute accurate and timely indicators for  assessing 
the trend in the general level of prices, since they capture price developments at the end 
of the economic process. However, they are less appropriate for the assessment of the 
causes of  price inflation and the sustainability of  the inflation performance. Therefore, the 
Treaty (Article 109j(l)) also requires that "the development of  unit labour costs and other 
price indices" should be considered. 
7.4.1.  Unit labour costs 
As a key factor underlying trends in consumer prices, developments" in unit labour costs 
have been examined in detail in Section 3.4.2 of  the present report. The major conclusion 
from this analysis is that, at the Community level, moderate increases in unit labour costs 
have  been  one  of the  major  contributory  forces  behind  the  favourable  inflation 
performance during the second stage.  Developments at the country level  show a clear 
convergence between Member States toward a low rate of  growth of  unit labour costs. 
The appropriate behaviour of unit labour costs does not result from  an acceleration in 
labour  productivity  growth  but  from  moderate  growth  in  nominal  compensation  per 
employee.  This has been common to all Member States and can be attributed to three 
main factors: low inflation expectations, heightened awareness of supply constraints and 
an improvement in labour supply. These factors constitute important structural changes, 
which are  likely to  ensure  wage  developments  consistent  with  the  objective  of price 
stability in the coming years. 
199 7.4.2.  Import prices 
Like unit labour costs, import prices are an important determinant of price developments 
and have therefore also been analysed in Chapter 3. Increases in international commodity 
prices  were' moderate  during  the  second  stage  of EMU,  but the  beneficial  effect  on 
domestic prices has depended very much on the evolution of  exchange rates. In countries 
whose currencies remained strong, import prices had a moderating impact on domestic 
inflation. In countries whose currencies were subject to considerable downward pressure 
during the mid-1990s, import prices rose by less than could be expected. Moreover, the 
rise in import prices was passed on to consumer prices to a limited extent only, thanks to 
a vigorous implementation of  anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies complemented by 
structural policies aimed at a more efficient functioning of product, service and labour 
markets  . 
.  · 7.4.3.  Producer prices 
As  a  measure  of  price 
trends at an early stage of 
the  distribution  process, 
the  producer  price  index 
(PPI)  may  signal 
inflationary  pressures 
before the  latter is  clearly 
perceptible  in  the 
consumer  price  index.  In 
addition,  the  coverage  of 
the  PPI  _  includes  some 
goods like raw materials -or 
semi-finished  goods, 
which  are  sensitive  to 
variations  in  some 
important  underlying 
factors  of  inflation,  like 
international  prices, 
exchange  rates  or  labour 
costs. 
Table 7.4 
Producer prices 
Domestic output of  total industry excltlding construction 
(national currency, percentage change) 
1993  1994  199S  1996  1997 I) 
B  -1.0  1.4  2.3  0.6  1.7 
DK  -1.1  0.7  3.8  1.6  2.2 
D  0.2  0.6  1.7  -0.4  1.1 
EL  11.4  7.2  9.S  7.4  3.S 
E  2.4  4.3  6.4  1.7  1.0 
F  -1.0  0.3  2.2  o.s  0.2 
IRL  2.3  2.0  3.7  1.8  0.1 
I  3.8  3.7  7.9  1.9  1.3 
L  0.9  2.0  3.4  -0.4  1.7 
NL  -1.6  0.7  3.0  1.8  2.7 
A b)  -0.4  1.3  0.4  0.0  0.4 
p  3.6  2.8  3.8  3.1  1.6 
FIN  2.8  1.9  1.8  -0.1  1.3 
s  2.0  4.3  8.0  0.6  1.0 
UK  3.9  2.S  3.7  0.8  0.4 
EUR  1.7  1.9  3.9  0.8  1.0 
•> Average until November 1997 over same months 1996. 
b) General wholesale price index. 
Source: Commission services , OECD. 
200 Developments in PPI over the last two years may therefore give some indication on the 
prospects for inflation.  At the Community level, the increase in PPJ  has remained very 
subdued,  less than 1 per cent both in  1996  and  19974•  This modest rise is  common to 
nearly all  the Member States (see  Table 7.4)  The most remarkable feature is the sharp 
deceleration  in  produce  price  inflation  in  Member  States  where  inflation  was  still 
relatively  high  in  1995  (Spain,  Italy,  Portugal).  With  the  exception  of Greece,  only 
Denmark and the Netherlands show an increase in PPI above 2 per cent, due to the high 
level of  activity experienced by these two economies in recent years. 
7.4.4.  Indirect taxes 
During Stage Two, all Member States have relied, 
but  to  a  varying  extent,  on  increases  in  indirect 
taxes  to  reduce  their  government  deficits.  In 
several  countries,  these  increases  were  important 
and  have contributed significantly to  increases in 
inflation, as is suggested in Table 7.5 which shows 
estimates  of  the  direct  mechanical  impact  of 
indirect tax changes under the assumption of a full 
pass-through  of  changes  in  indirect  taxes  to 
consumer prices. 
The  most  important  contributions  have  been 
observed  in  Belgium  (1994),  Ireland  (1994), 
France  (1995),  Italy  (1995),  United-Kingdom 
(1994-95),  Finland  (1995-1996),  and  Sweden 
(1997).  However,  more  than  the  mechanical 
impact - which is  by definition a one-off effect -
what  matters  is  the  risk  that  increased  indirect 
taxes raise inflation expectations and thus trigger a 
wage/price spiral. This does not seem to have been 
the case in any of these countries. After showing a 
blip,  inflation came down swiftly in  all countries 
which  have  experienced  significant  increases  in 
indirect taxes. 
Table 7.5 
Effects of indirect tax changes 
on consumer price inflation 
(percentage points) 
1994  1995  1996  1997 
B  0.8  0.0  0.6  0.2 
DK  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
D  0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.4 
EL  0.8  0.6  0.8  n.a 
E  0.3  1.0  0.2  0.3 
F  0.1  t.l  0.1  0.4 
IRL  0.7  0.2  0.2  0.4 
I  0.3  0.8  0.1  0.1 
L  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 
NL  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.2 
A  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.1 
p  0.2  0.5  -0.2  -0.3 
FIN  0.7  1.1  1.0  0.3 
s  0.3  0.5  0.2  1.0 
UK  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.5 
Source: Commission services. 
4  Regarding 1997, only the first II months ofthe year are available. 
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